DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B
2004-07-21
A fifth annual Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition meeting organized by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was held February 16-18, 2004, at the State Education Center (SEC), 4 Aerodromnya Drive, St. Petersburg, Russia. The meeting discussed Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition topics for which LLNL has the US Technical Lead Organization responsibilities. The technical areas discussed included Radioactive Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal, Plutonium Oxide and Plutonium Metal Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation. The meeting was conducted with a conference format using technical presentations of papers with simultaneous translation into English and Russian. There were 46more » Russian attendees from 14 different Russian organizations and six non-Russian attendees, four from the US and two from France. Forty technical presentations were made. The meeting agenda is given in Appendix B and the attendance list is in Appendix C.« less
Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Leventhal, P.
1996-05-01
The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}furthermore » steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.« less
Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1994-04-30
The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readilymore » achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.« less
Ceramics: Durability and radiation effects
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W.; Weber, W.J.
1996-05-01
At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (1) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (2) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass {open_quotes}logs{close_quotes}; (3) deep borehole disposal. The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramicsmore » apatite, pyrochlore, zirconolite, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Not Available
The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study wasmore » based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0{sub 2} plant design is discussed here.« less
High-Temperature Oxidation of Plutonium Surrogate Metals and Alloys
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Sparks, Joshua C.; Krantz, Kelsie E.; Christian, Jonathan H.
The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) is a nuclear non-proliferation agreement designed to remove 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from Russia and the United States. While several removal options have been proposed since the agreement was first signed in 2000, processing the weapons-grade plutonium to mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel has remained the leading candidate for achieving the goals of the PMDA. However, the MOX program has received its share of criticisms, which causes its future to be uncertain. One alternative pathway for plutonium disposition would involve oxidizing the metal followed by impurity down blending and burial in the Waste Isolationmore » Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. This pathway was investigated by use of a hybrid microwave and a muffle furnace with Fe and Al as surrogate materials. Oxidation occurred similarly in the microwave and muffle furnace; however, the microwave process time was significantly faster.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Not Available
The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy.
Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ferguson, K.L.
1994-08-09
This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues relatedmore » to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified.« less
FMDP reactor alternative summary report. Volume 1 - existing LWR alternative
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Greene, S.R.; Bevard, B.B.
1996-10-07
Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials [primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] are becoming surplus to national defense needs in both the United States and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. This document summarizes the results of analysis concerned with existing light water reactor plutonium disposition alternatives.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Not Available
1994-04-30
As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID,more » is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.« less
Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
ULLAH, M K
2001-02-26
The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stablemore » state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cluff, D.
1996-04-01
The Center operates under a cooperative agreement between DOE and the State of Texas and is directed and administered by an education consortium. Its programs include developing peaceful uses for the materials removed from dismantled weapons, studying effects of nuclear materials on environment and public health, remedying contaminated soils and water, studying storage, disposition, and transport of Pu, HE, and other hazardous materials removed from weapons, providing research and counsel to US in carrying out weapons reductions in cooperation with Russia, and conducting a variety of education and training programs.
Quarterly technical progress report, February 1, 1996--April 30, 1996
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
This report from the Amarillo National REsource Center for PLutonium provides research highlights and provides information regarding the public dissemination of information. The center is a a scientific resource for information regarding the issues of the storage, disposition, potential utilization and transport of plutonium, high explosives, and other hazardous materials generated from nuclear weapons dismantlement. The center responds to informational needs and interpretation of technical and scientific data raised by interested parties and advisory groups. Also, research efforts are carried out on remedial action programs and biological/agricultural studies.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Cummings, Mary Anne; Johnson, Rolland
Acceptable capital and operating costs of high-power proton accelerators suitable for profitable commercial electric-power and process-heat applications have been demonstrated. However, studies have pointed out that even a few hundred trips of an accelerator lasting a few seconds would lead to unacceptable thermal stresses as each trip causes fission to be turned off in solid fuel structures found in conventional reactors. The newest designs based on the GEM*STAR concept take such trips in stride by using molten-salt fuel, where fuel pin fatigue is not an issue. Other aspects of the GEM*STAR concept which address all historical reactor failures include an internal spallation neutron target and high temperature molten salt fuel with continuous purging of volatile radioactive fission products such that the reactor contains less than a critical mass and almost a million times fewer volatile radioactive fission products than conventional reactors. GEM*STAR is a reactor that without redesign will burn spent nuclear fuel, natural uranium, thorium, or surplus weapons material. It will operate without the need for a critical core, fuel enrichment, or reprocessing making it an excellent candidate for export. As a first application, the design for a pilot plant is described for the profitable disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium by using process heat to produce green diesel fuel for the Department of Defense (DOD) from natural gas and renewable carbon.
Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.
2000-04-15
The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R&D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R&Dmore » on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the excellent Russian plutonium immobilization contract work. This proceedings document presents the wide extent of Russian immobilization activities, provides a reference for their work, and makes it available to others.« less
Some less conventional options for plutonium disposal
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Stoll, Dr. Wolfgang, Prof.
2000-07-01
Disposition of weapons Pu (W-Pu) aims at the replacement of military access restrictions by inherent longlasting technical barriers to make the return into the weapons state difficult and not rewarding anymore. At the time of the NAS-study in 1994, two ways were perceived to be mature and selected: Fissioning of W-Pu as LWR-MOX and the disposal in a vitrified radionuclide-spiked form.1 Both options since have been questioned for equality, met different acceptance at both superpowers and showed slow progress. A criterion to measure disarmament would be the amount of W-Pu in the different proliferation resistant forms, multiplied by the effort needed for each form to return to weapons quality.
Science and technology review, April 1997
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Upadhye, R.
1997-04-01
This month's issue has the following articles: (1) The Laboratory in the News; (2) Commentary by Tom Isaacs--Shaping Nuclear Materials Policy; (3) Dealing with a Dangerous Surplus from the Cold War--Since the end of the Cold War, the Laboratory has been spearheading studies on the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium; (4) Volcanoes: A Peek into Our Planet's Plumbing; and (5) Optical Networks: The Wave of the Future.
Nuclear waste forms for actinides
Ewing, Rodney C.
1999-01-01
The disposition of actinides, most recently 239Pu from dismantled nuclear weapons, requires effective containment of waste generated by the nuclear fuel cycle. Because actinides (e.g., 239Pu and 237Np) are long-lived, they have a major impact on risk assessments of geologic repositories. Thus, demonstrable, long-term chemical and mechanical durability are essential properties of waste forms for the immobilization of actinides. Mineralogic and geologic studies provide excellent candidate phases for immobilization and a unique database that cannot be duplicated by a purely materials science approach. The “mineralogic approach” is illustrated by a discussion of zircon as a phase for the immobilization of excess weapons plutonium. PMID:10097054
MOX fuel arrangement for nuclear core
Kantrowitz, M.L.; Rosenstein, R.G.
1998-10-13
In order to use up a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, the plutonium is converted into a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel form wherein it can be disposed in a plurality of different fuel assembly types. Depending on the equilibrium cycle that is required, a predetermined number of one or more of the fuel assembly types are selected and arranged in the core of the reactor in accordance with a selected loading schedule. Each of the fuel assemblies is designed to produce different combustion characteristics whereby the appropriate selection and disposition in the core enables the resulting equilibrium cycle to closely resemble that which is produced using urania fuel. The arrangement of the MOX rods and burnable absorber rods within each of the fuel assemblies, in combination with a selective control of the amount of plutonium which is contained in each of the MOX rods, is used to tailor the combustion characteristics of the assembly. 38 figs.
Mox fuel arrangement for nuclear core
Kantrowitz, Mark L.; Rosenstein, Richard G.
2001-05-15
In order to use up a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, the plutonium is converted into a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel form wherein it can be disposed in a plurality of different fuel assembly types. Depending on the equilibrium cycle that is required, a predetermined number of one or more of the fuel assembly types are selected and arranged in the core of the reactor in accordance with a selected loading schedule. Each of the fuel assemblies is designed to produce different combustion characteristics whereby the appropriate selection and disposition in the core enables the resulting equilibrium cycle to closely resemble that which is produced using urania fuel. The arrangement of the MOX rods and burnable absorber rods within each of the fuel assemblies, in combination with a selective control of the amount of plutonium which is contained in each of the MOX rods, is used to tailor the combustion. characteristics of the assembly.
MOX fuel arrangement for nuclear core
Kantrowitz, Mark L.; Rosenstein, Richard G.
2001-07-17
In order to use up a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, the plutonium is converted into a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel form wherein it can be disposed in a plurality of different fuel assembly types. Depending on the equilibrium cycle that is required, a predetermined number of one or more of the fuel assembly types are selected and arranged in the core of the reactor in accordance with a selected loading schedule. Each of the fuel assemblies is designed to produce different combustion characteristics whereby the appropriate selection and disposition in the core enables the resulting equilibrium cycle to closely resemble that which is produced using urania fuel. The arrangement of the MOX rods and burnable absorber rods within each of the fuel assemblies, in combination with a selective control of the amount of plutonium which is contained in each of the MOX rods, is used to tailor the combustion characteristics of the assembly.
MOX fuel arrangement for nuclear core
Kantrowitz, Mark L.; Rosenstein, Richard G.
1998-01-01
In order to use up a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, the plutonium is converted into a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel form wherein it can be disposed in a plurality of different fuel assembly types. Depending on the equilibrium cycle that is required, a predetermined number of one or more of the fuel assembly types are selected and arranged in the core of the reactor in accordance with a selected loading schedule. Each of the fuel assemblies is designed to produce different combustion characteristics whereby the appropriate selection and disposition in the core enables the resulting equilibrium cycle to closely resemble that which is produced using urania fuel. The arrangement of the MOX rods and burnable absorber rods within each of the fuel assemblies, in combination with a selective control of the amount of plutonium which is contained in each of the MOX rods, is used to tailor the combustion characteristics of the assembly.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M.
1996-05-01
The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed inmore » this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.« less
Status of plutonium ceramic immobilization processes and immobilization forms
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Van Konynenburg, R.A.; Vance, E.R.
1996-05-01
Immobilization in a ceramic followed by permanent emplacement in a repository or borehole is one of the alternatives currently being considered by the Fissile Materials Disposition Program for the ultimate disposal of excess weapons-grade plutonium. To make Pu recovery more difficult, radioactive cesium may also be incorporated into the immobilization form. Valuable data are already available for ceramics form R&D efforts to immobilize high-level and mixed wastes. Ceramics have a high capacity for actinides, cesium, and some neutron absorbers. A unique characteristic of ceramics is the existence of mineral analogues found in nature that have demonstrated actinide immobilization over geologicmore » time periods. The ceramic form currently being considered for plutonium disposition is a synthetic rock (SYNROC) material composed primarily of zirconolite (CaZrTi{sub 2}O{sub 7}), the desired actinide host phase, with lesser amounts of hollandite (BaAl{sub 2}Ti{sub 6}O{sub 16}) and rutile (TiO{sub 2}). Alternative actinide host phases are also being considered. These include pyrochlore (Gd{sub 2}Ti{sub 2}O{sub 7}), zircon (ZrSiO{sub 4}), and monazite (CePO{sub 4}), to name a few of the most promising. R&D activities to address important technical issues are discussed. Primarily these include moderate scale hot press fabrications with plutonium, direct loading of PuO{sub 2} powder, cold press and sinter fabrication methods, and immobilization form formulation issues.« less
Preparation of plutonium-bearing ceramics via mechanically activated precursor
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Chizhevskaya, S. V.; Stefanovsky, S. V.
2000-07-01
The problem of excess weapons plutonium disposition is suggested to be solved by means of its incorporation in stable ceramics with high chemical durability and radiation resistivity. The most promising host phases for plutonium as well as uranium and neutron poisons (gadolinium, hafnium) are zirconolite, pyrochlore, zircon, zirconia [1,2], and murataite [3]. Their production requires high temperatures and a fine-grained homogeneous precursor to reach final waste form with high quality and low leachability. Currently various routes to homogeneous products preparation such as sol-gel technology, wet-milling, and grinding in a ball or planetary mill are used. The best result demonstrates sol-gel technology but this route is very complicated. An alternative technology for preparation of ceramic precursors is the treatment of the oxide batch with high mechanical energy [4]. Such a treatment produces combination of mechanical (fine milling with formation of various defects, homogenization) and chemical (split bonds with formation of active centers—free radicals, ion-radicals, etc.) effects resulting in higher reactivity of the activated batch.
Frank, Michael I [Dublin, CA
2010-02-02
A self-contained source of gamma-ray and neutron radiation suitable for use as a radiation surrogate for weapons-grade plutonium is described. The source generates a radiation spectrum similar to that of weapons-grade plutonium at 5% energy resolution between 59 and 2614 keV, but contains no special nuclear material and emits little .alpha.-particle radiation. The weapons-grade plutonium radiation surrogate also emits neutrons having fluxes commensurate with the gamma-radiation intensities employed.
32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...
32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...
32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...
32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...
32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...
32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...
32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...
32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...
32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...
Review of Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition LLNL Contract Work in Russia-(English)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jardine, L; Borisov, G B
This third meeting of the recently completed and ongoing Russian plutonium immobilization contract work was held at the State Education Center (SEC) in St. Petersburg on January 14-18, 2002. The meeting agenda is reprinted here as Appendix A and the attendance list as Appendix B. The meeting had 58 Russian participants from 21 Russian organizations, including the industrial sites (Mayak, Krasonayarsk-26, Tomsk), scientific institutes (VNIINM, KRI, VNIPIPT, RIAR), design organizations (VNIPIET and GSPI), universities (Nyzhny Novgorod, Urals Technical), Russian Academy of Sciences (Institute of Physical Chemistry or IPhCh, Institute of Ore-Deposit Geology, Petrography, Mineralogy, and Geochemistry or IGEM), Radon-Moscow, S&TCmore » Podol'osk, Kharkov-Ukraine, GAN-SEC-NRS and SNIIChM, the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Gosatomnadzor (GAN). This volume, published by LLNL, documents this third annual meeting. Forty-nine technical papers were presented by the Russian participants, and nearly all of these have been collected in this Proceedings. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing this contract work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work amongst each other. (2) Publish a meeting summary and proceedings of all the excellent Russian plutonium immobilization and other plutonium disposition contract work in one document so that the wide extent of the Russian immobilization activities are documented, referencable and available for others to use, as were the Proceedings of the two previous meetings. Attendees gave talks describing their LLNL contract work and submitted written papers documenting their contract work (in English and Russian), in both hard copy and on computer disks. Simultaneous translation into Russian and English was used for presentations made at the State Region Educational Center (SEC).« less
Plutonium Decontamination of Uranium using CO2 Cleaning
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Blau, M
A concern of the Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) and Defense Programs (DP), and of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), is the disposition of thousands of legacy and recently generated plutonium (Pu)-contaminated, highly enriched uranium (HEU) parts. These parts take up needed vault space. This presents a serious problem for LLNL, as site limit could result in the stoppage of future weapons work. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (NN-60) will also face a similar problem as thousands of HEU parts will be created with the disassembly of site-return pitsmore » for plutonium recovery when the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) becomes operational. To send HEU to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y-12 Plant for disposition, the contamination for metal must be less than 20 disintegrations per minute (dpm) of swipable transuranic per 100 cm{sup 2} of surface area or the Pu bulk contamination for oxide must be less than 210 parts per billion (ppb). LANL has used the electrolytic process on Pu-contaminated HEU weapon parts with some success. However, this process requires that a different fixture be used for every configuration; each fixture cost approximately $10K. Moreover, electrolytic decontamination leaches the uranium metal substrate (no uranium or plutonium oxide) from the HEU part. The leaching rate at the uranium metal grain boundaries is higher than that of the grains and depends on the thickness of the uranium oxide layer. As the leaching liquid flows past the HEU part, it carries away plutonium oxide contamination and uranium oxide. The uneven uranium metal surface created by the leaching becomes a trap for plutonium oxide contamination. In addition, other DOE sites have used CO{sub 2} cleaning for Pu decontamination successfully. In the 1990's, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory investigated this technology and showed that CO{sub 2} pellet blasting (or CO{sub 2} cleaning) reduced both fixed and smearable contamination on tools. In 1997, LLNL proved that even tritium contamination could be removed from a variety of different matrices using CO{sub 2}cleaning. CO{sub 2} cleaning is a non-toxic, nonconductive, nonabrasive decontamination process whose primary cleaning mechanisms are: (1) Impact of the CO{sub 2} pellets loosens the bond between the contaminant and the substrate. (2) CO{sub 2} pellets shatter and sublimate into a gaseous state with large expansion ({approx}800 times). The expanding CO{sub 2} gas forms a layer between the contaminant and the substrate that acts as a spatula and peels off the contaminant. (3) Cooling of the contaminant assists in breaking its bond with the substrate. Thus, LLNL conducted feasibility testing to determine if CO{sub 2} pellet blasting could remove Pu contamination (e.g., uranium oxide) from uranium metal without abrading the metal matrix. This report contains a summary of events and the results of this test.« less
Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Peterson, P.F.
1996-05-01
If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu wastemore » forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups.« less
Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
von Hippel, Frank
2010-02-01
Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )
Progress on plutonium stabilization
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hurt, D.
1996-05-01
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE`s stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities.
2015-10-30
with nuclear weapons testing or plutonium work. The results for the 100 atomic veterans were compared to those of the unexposed population, and...as a marker for significant internal intakes of other associated radionuclides in nuclear weapons debris due to its low natural background. However...isotope in weapons grade plutonium, is important from a health perspective, its presence within a given urine sample being analyzed by FTA can only
11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...
11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
Determining Reactor Fuel Type from Continuous Antineutrino Monitoring
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Jaffke, Patrick; Huber, Patrick
2017-09-01
We investigate the ability of an antineutrino detector to determine the fuel type of a reactor. A hypothetical 5-ton antineutrino detector is placed 25 m from the core and measures the spectral shape and rate of antineutrinos emitted by fission fragments in the core for a number of 90-d periods. Our results indicate that four major fuel types can be differentiated from the variation of fission fractions over the irradiation time with a true positive probability of detection at approximately 95%. In addition, we demonstrate that antineutrinos can identify the burnup at which weapons-grade mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel would be reduced to reactor-grade MOX, on average, providing assurance that plutonium-disposition goals are met. We also investigate removal scenarios where plutonium is purposefully diverted from a mixture of MOX and low-enriched uranium fuel. Finally, we discuss how our analysis is impacted by a spectral distortion around 6 MeV observed in the antineutrino spectrum measured from commercial power reactors.
Plutonium in the arctic marine environment--a short review.
Skipperud, Lindis
2004-06-18
Anthropogenic plutonium has been introduced into the environment over the past 50 years as the result of the detonation of nuclear weapons and operational releases from the nuclear industry. In the Arctic environment, the main source of plutonium is from atmospheric weapons testing, which has resulted in a relatively uniform, underlying global distribution of plutonium. Previous studies of plutonium in the Kara Sea have shown that, at certain sites, other releases have given rise to enhanced local concentrations. Since different plutonium sources are characterised by distinctive plutonium-isotope ratios, evidence of a localised influence can be supported by clear perturbations in the plutonium-isotope ratio fingerprints as compared to the known ratio in global fallout. In Kara Sea sites, such perturbations have been observed as a result of underwater weapons tests at Chernaya Bay, dumped radioactive waste in Novaya Zemlya, and terrestrial runoff from the Ob and Yenisey Rivers. Measurement of the plutonium-isotope ratios offers both a means of identifying the origin of radionuclide contamination and the influence of the various nuclear installations on inputs to the Arctic, as well as a potential method for following the movement of water and sediment loads in the rivers.
Radionuclide Basics: Plutonium
Plutonium (chemical symbol Pu) is a radioactive metal. Plutonium is considered a man-made element. Plutonium-239 is used to make nuclear weapons. Pu-239 and Pu-240 are byproducts of nuclear reactor operations and nuclear bomb explosions.
12. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. AFTER SEGREGATION, ...
12. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. AFTER SEGREGATION, PLUTONIUM MATERIALS WERE EITHER RETURNED TO THE BUILDING 776 FOUNDRY WHERE THEY WERE CAST INTO FEED INGOTS, OR UNDERWENT CHEMICAL RECOVERY FOR PURIFICATION. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
31. VIEW OF A WORKER HOLDING A PLUTONIUM 'BUTTON.' PLUTONIUM, ...
31. VIEW OF A WORKER HOLDING A PLUTONIUM 'BUTTON.' PLUTONIUM, A MAN-MADE SUBSTANCE, WAS RARE. SCRAPS RESULTING FROM PRODUCTION AND PLUTONIUM RECOVERED FROM RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE REPROCESSED INTO VALUABLE PURE-PLUTONIUM METAL (9/19/73). - Rocky Flats Plant, Bounded by Indiana Street & Routes 93, 128 & 72, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Marshalkin, V. E.; Povyshev, V. M.
2015-12-01
A method for joint utilization of non-weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the thorium-uranium—plutonium oxide fuel of a water-moderated reactor with a varying water composition (D2O, H2O) is proposed. The method is characterized by efficient breeding of the 233U isotope and safe reactor operation and is comparatively simple to implement.
Effect of Americium-241 Content on Plutonium Radiation Source Terms
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Rainisch, R.
1998-12-28
The management of excess plutonium by the US Department of Energy includes a number of storage and disposition alternatives. Savannah River Site (SRS) is supporting DOE with plutonium disposition efforts, including the immobilization of certain plutonium materials in a borosilicate glass matrix. Surplus plutonium inventories slated for vitrification include materials with elevated levels of Americium-241. The Am-241 content of plutonium materials generally reflects in-growth of the isotope due to decay of plutonium and is age-dependent. However, select plutonium inventories have Am-241 levels considerably above the age-based levels. Elevated levels of americium significantly impact radiation source terms of plutonium materials andmore » will make handling of the materials more difficult. Plutonium materials are normally handled in shielded glove boxes, and the work entails both extremity and whole body exposures. This paper reports results of an SRS analysis of plutonium materials source terms vs. the Americium-241 content of the materials. Data with respect to dependence and magnitude of source terms on/vs. Am-241 levels are presented and discussed. The investigation encompasses both vitrified and un-vitrified plutonium oxide (PuO2) batches.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Marshalkin, V. E., E-mail: marshalkin@vniief.ru; Povyshev, V. M.
A method for joint utilization of non-weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the thorium–uranium—plutonium oxide fuel of a water-moderated reactor with a varying water composition (D{sub 2}O, H{sub 2}O) is proposed. The method is characterized by efficient breeding of the {sup 233}U isotope and safe reactor operation and is comparatively simple to implement.
Chemical Disposition of Plutonium in Hanford Site Tank Wastes
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Delegard, Calvin H.; Jones, Susan A.
2015-05-07
This report examines the chemical disposition of plutonium (Pu) in Hanford Site tank wastes, by itself and in its observed and potential interactions with the neutron absorbers aluminum (Al), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn), nickel (Ni), and sodium (Na). Consideration also is given to the interactions of plutonium with uranium (U). No consideration of the disposition of uranium itself as an element with fissile isotopes is considered except tangentially with respect to its interaction as an absorber for plutonium. The report begins with a brief review of Hanford Site plutonium processes, examining the various means used tomore » recover plutonium from irradiated fuel and from scrap, and also examines the intermediate processing of plutonium to prepare useful chemical forms. The paper provides an overview of Hanford tank defined-waste–type compositions and some calculations of the ratios of plutonium to absorber elements in these waste types and in individual waste analyses. These assessments are based on Hanford tank waste inventory data derived from separately published, expert assessments of tank disposal records, process flowsheets, and chemical/radiochemical analyses. This work also investigates the distribution and expected speciation of plutonium in tank waste solution and solid phases. For the solid phases, both pure plutonium compounds and plutonium interactions with absorber elements are considered. These assessments of plutonium chemistry are based largely on analyses of idealized or simulated tank waste or strongly alkaline systems. The very limited information available on plutonium behavior, disposition, and speciation in genuine tank waste also is discussed. The assessments show that plutonium coprecipitates strongly with chromium, iron, manganese and uranium absorbers. Plutonium’s chemical interactions with aluminum, nickel, and sodium are minimal to non-existent. Credit for neutronic interaction of plutonium with these absorbers occurs only if they are physically proximal in solution or the plutonium present in the solid phase is intimately mixed with compounds or solutions of these absorbers. No information on the potential chemical interaction of plutonium with cadmium was found in the technical literature. Definitive evidence of sorption or adsorption of plutonium onto various solid phases from strongly alkaline media is less clear-cut, perhaps owing to fewer studies and to some well-attributed tests run under conditions exceeding the very low solubility of plutonium. The several studies that are well-founded show that only about half of the plutonium is adsorbed from waste solutions onto sludge solid phases. The organic complexants found in many Hanford tank waste solutions seem to decrease plutonium uptake onto solids. A number of studies show plutonium sorbs effectively onto sodium titanate. Finally, this report presents findings describing the behavior of plutonium vis-à-vis other elements during sludge dissolution in nitric acid based on Hanford tank waste experience gained by lab-scale tests, chemical and radiochemical sample characterization, and full-scale processing in preparation for strontium-90 recovery from PUREX sludges.« less
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-06-27
... Extracted From Nuclear Weapons #0; #0; #0; Presidential Documents #0; #0; #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 77... Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons By the... the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Carmack, Jon; Hayes, Steven; Walters, L. C.
This document explores startup fuel options for a proposed test/demonstration fast reactor. The fuel options considered are the metallic fuels U-Zr and U-Pu-Zr and the ceramic fuels UO 2 and UO 2-PuO 2 (MOX). Attributes of the candidate fuel choices considered were feedstock availability, fabrication feasibility, rough order of magnitude cost and schedule, and the existing irradiation performance database. The reactor-grade plutonium bearing fuels (U-Pu-Zr and MOX) were eliminated from consideration as the initial startup fuels because the availability and isotopics of domestic plutonium feedstock is uncertain. There are international sources of reactor grade plutonium feedstock but isotopics and availabilitymore » are also uncertain. Weapons grade plutonium is the only possible source of Pu feedstock in sufficient quantities needed to fuel a startup core. Currently, the available U.S. source of (excess) weapons-grade plutonium is designated for irradiation in commercial light water reactors (LWR) to a level that would preclude diversion. Weapons-grade plutonium also contains a significant concentration of gallium. Gallium presents a potential issue for both the fabrication of MOX fuel as well as possible performance issues for metallic fuel. Also, the construction of a fuel fabrication line for plutonium fuels, with or without a line to remove gallium, is expected to be considerably more expensive than for uranium fuels. In the case of U-Pu-Zr, a relatively small number of fuel pins have been irradiated to high burnup, and in no case has a full assembly been irradiated to high burnup without disassembly and re-constitution. For MOX fuel, the irradiation database from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is extensive. If a significant source of either weapons-grade or reactor-grade Pu became available (i.e., from an international source), a startup core based on Pu could be reconsidered.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bronikowski, M.G.
2002-06-24
Nuclear Materials Management Division (NMMD) has proposed that up to 100 kg of the plutonium (Pu) solutions stored in H-Canyon be precipitated with a nuclear poison and dispositioned to H-Area Tank Farm. The use of gadolinium (Gd) as the poison would greatly reduce the number of additional glass logs resulting from this disposition. This report summarizes the characteristics of the precipitation process and addresses criticality concerns in the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. No problems were found with the nature of the precipitate or the neutralization process.
69. INTERIOR, BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE BUILDING) LOOKING SOUTHWEST THROUGH ...
69. INTERIOR, BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE BUILDING) LOOKING SOUTHWEST THROUGH DOOR-WAY INTO PLUTONIUM STORAGE AREA. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME
Zirconia ceramics for excess weapons plutonium waste
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Gong, W. L.; Lutze, W.; Ewing, R. C.
2000-01-01
We synthesized a zirconia (ZrO 2)-based single-phase ceramic containing simulated excess weapons plutonium waste. ZrO 2 has large solubility for other metallic oxides. More than 20 binary systems A xO y-ZrO 2 have been reported in the literature, including PuO 2, rare-earth oxides, and oxides of metals contained in weapons plutonium wastes. We show that significant amounts of gadolinium (neutron absorber) and yttrium (additional stabilizer of the cubic modification) can be dissolved in ZrO 2, together with plutonium (simulated by Ce 4+, U 4+ or Th 4+) and impurities (e.g., Ca, Mg, Fe, Si). Sol-gel and powder methods were applied to make homogeneous, single-phase zirconia solid solutions. Pu waste impurities were completely dissolved in the solid solutions. In contrast to other phases, e.g., zirconolite and pyrochlore, zirconia is extremely radiation resistant and does not undergo amorphization. Baddeleyite (ZrO 2) is suggested as the natural analogue to study long-term radiation resistance and chemical durability of zirconia-based waste forms.
Plutonium segregation in glassy aerodynamic fallout from a nuclear weapon test
Holliday, K. S.; Dierken, J. M.; Monroe, M. L.; ...
2017-01-11
Our study combines electron microscopy equipped with energy dispersive spectroscopy to probe major element composition and autoradiography to map plutonium in order to examine the spatial relationships between plutonium and fallout composition in aerodynamic glassy fallout from a nuclear weapon test. We interrogated a sample set of 48 individual fallout specimens in order to reveal that the significant chemical heterogeneity of this sample set could be described compositionally with a relatively small number of compositional endmembers. Furthermore, high concentrations of plutonium were never associated with several endmember compositions and concentrated with the so-called mafic glass endmember. Our result suggests thatmore » it is the physical characteristics of the compositional endmembers and not the chemical characteristics of the individual component elements that govern the un-burnt plutonium distribution with respect to major element composition in fallout.« less
71. INTERIOR, BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE BUILDING) LOOKING NORTHEAST INTO ...
71. INTERIOR, BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE BUILDING) LOOKING NORTHEAST INTO PLUTONIUM STORAGE ROOM SHOWING CUBICLES FOR STORAGE. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME
2015-06-01
Research Committee nm Nanometer Np Neptunium NPT Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ns Nanosecond ps Picosecond Pu Plutonium RIMS...discovery—credited also to Fritz Strassman— scientists realized these reactions also emitted secondary neutrons . These secondary neutrons could in...destructive capabilities of nuclear fission and atomic weapons . Figure 1. Uranium-235 Fission chain reaction, from [1
Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
2006-07-10
continued...) The complex could contain explosions up to 500 pounds of explosive and associated plutonium. Another SCE, “ Unicorn ,” is to be conducted...scheduled for FY2006, as noted below. SCEs try to determine if radioactive decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon performance. Several SCEs...Richardson called SCEs “a key part of our scientific program to provide new tools and data that assess age -related complications and maintain the reliability
Safe, Cost Effective Management of Inactive Facilities at the Savannah River Site
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Austin, W. E.; Yannitell, D. M.; Freeman, D. W.
The Savannah River Site is part of the U.S. Department of Energy complex. It was constructed during the early 1950s to produce basic materials (such as plutonium-239 and tritium) used in the production of nuclear weapons. The 310-square-mile site is located in South Carolina, about 12 miles south of Aiken, South Carolina, and about 15 miles southeast of Augusta, Georgia. Savannah River Site (SRS) has approximately 200 facilities identified as inactive. These facilities range in size and complexity from large nuclear reactors to small storage buildings. These facilities are located throughout the site including three reactor areas, the heavy watermore » plant area, the manufacturing area, and other research and support areas. Unlike DOE Closure Sites such as Hanford and Rocky Flats, SRS is a Project Completion Site with continuing missions. As facilities complete their defined mission, they are shutdown and transferred from operations to the facility disposition program. At the SRS, Facilities Decontamination and Decommissioning (FDD) personnel manage the disposition phase of a inactive facility's life cycle in a manner that minimizes life cycle cost without compromising (1) the health or safety of workers and the public or (2) the quality of the environment. The disposition phase begins upon completion of operations shutdown and extends through establishing the final end-state. FDD has developed innovative programs to manage their responsibilities within a constrained budget.« less
Development of an alternate pathway for materials destined for disposition to WIPP
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ayers, Georgette Y; Mckerley, Bill; Veazey, Gerald W
2010-01-01
The Los Alamos National Laboratory currently has an inventory of process residues that may be viable candidates for disposition to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) located at Carlsbad, New Mexico. A recent 'Attractiveness Level D' exemption allows for the discard of specified intractable materials regardless of the percent plutonium. However, the limits with respect to drum loadings must be met. Cementation is a key component of the aqueous nitrate flowsheet and serves as a 'bleed-off' stream for impurities separated from the plutonium during processing operations. The main 'feed' to the cementation operations are the 'bottoms' from the evaporation process.more » In the majority of cases, the cemented bottoms contain less than the allowed amount per drum for WIPP acceptance. This project would expand the route to WIPP for items that have no defined disposition path, are difficult to process, have been through multiple passes, have no current recovery operations available to recover the plutonium and that are amenable to cementation. This initial work will provide the foundation for a full scale disposition pathway of the candidate materials. Once the pathway has been expanded and a cementation matrix developed, routine discard activities will be initiated.« less
The Manhattan Project; A very brief introduction to the physics of nuclear weapons
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Reed, B. Cameron
2017-05-01
The development of nuclear weapons by the Manhattan Project during World War II was one of the most dramatic scientific/technological episodes in human history. This book, prepared by a recognized expert on the Manhattan Project, offers a concise survey of the essential physics concepts underlying fission weapons. The text describes the energetics and timescales of fast-neutron chain reactions, why only certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium are suitable for use in fission weapons, how critical mass and bomb yield can be estimated, how the efficiency of nuclear weapons can be enhanced, how the fissile forms of uranium and plutonium were obtained, some of the design details of the 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' bombs, and some of the thermal, shock, and radiation effects of nuclear weapons. Calculation exercises are provided, and a Bibliography lists authoritative print and online sources of information for readers who wish to pursue more detailed study of this fascinating topic.
The 871 keV gamma ray from 17O and the identification of plutonium oxide
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Peurrung, Anthony; Arthur, Richard; Elovich, Robert; Geelhood, Bruce; Kouzes, Richard; Pratt, Sharon; Scheele, Randy; Sell, Richard
2001-12-01
Disarmament agreements and discussions between the United States and the Russian Federation for reducing the number of stockpiled nuclear weapons require verification of the origin of materials as having come from disassembled weapons. This has resulted in the identification of measurable "attributes" that characterize such materials. It has been proposed that the 871 keV gamma ray of 17O can be observed as an indicator of the unexpected presence of plutonium oxide, as opposed to plutonium metal, in such materials. We have shown that the observation of the 871 keV gamma ray is not a specific indicator of the presence of the oxide, but rather indicates the presence of nitrogen.
None
2017-12-09
In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
None
2010-05-21
In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
None
2009-07-29
In 1999, the Nuclear Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.
None
2018-01-16
In 1999, the Nuclear Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.
Risk Assessment for Emergency Planning Related to Nuclear Weapons Accidents
1985-09-25
accidents is higher than many of the other accidents, several reviewers thought it appropriate to evaluate these accidents in more detail. In particular, it...consequences is presented in Table 2-5. The plutonium releases in the 1F-3F gram range are due to plutonium burning in Type A weapons, while the higher ...explosion given a tanker casualty varies from 0.05 (in harbor) to 0.16 (at pier) to 0.19 (at sea). Although these numbers are somewhat higher than the
68. INTERIOR SHOT OF ENTRANCE TO BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE ...
68. INTERIOR SHOT OF ENTRANCE TO BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE BUILDING) LOOKING WEST. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
This report summarizes activities of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium during the quarter. The report describes the Electronic Resource Library; DOE support activities; current and future environmental health and safety programs; pollution prevention and pollution avoidance; communication, education, training, and community involvement programs; and nuclear and other material studies, including plutonium storage and disposition studies.
Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Rotblat, J.
1977-01-01
Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)
Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Pillay, K.K.S.
1996-05-01
Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron andmore » those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.« less
The nuclear arsenals and nuclear disarmament.
Barnaby, F
1998-01-01
Current world stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the status of treaties for nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are summarised. The need for including stockpiles of civil plutonium in a programme for ending production and disposing of fissile materials is emphasized, and the ultimate difficulty of disposing of the last few nuclear weapons discussed.
70. INTERIOR, BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE BUILDING) LOOKING WEST INTO ...
70. INTERIOR, BUILDING 272 (PLUTONIUM STORAGE BUILDING) LOOKING WEST INTO STORAGE AREA SHOWING THE FOUR STORAGE ROOM ENTRANCES. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME
Safe disposal of surplus plutonium
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Gong, W. L.; Naz, S.; Lutze, W.; Busch, R.; Prinja, A.; Stoll, W.
2001-06-01
About 150 tons of weapons grade and weapons usable plutonium (metal, oxide, and in residues) have been declared surplus in the USA and Russia. Both countries plan to convert the metal and oxide into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear power reactors. Russia has not yet decided what to do with the residues. The US will convert residues into a ceramic, which will then be over-poured with highly radioactive borosilicate glass. The radioactive glass is meant to provide a deterrent to recovery of plutonium, as required by a US standard. Here we show a waste form for plutonium residues, zirconia/boron carbide (ZrO 2/B 4C), with an unprecedented combination of properties: a single, radiation-resistant, and chemically durable phase contains the residues; billion-year-old natural analogs are available; and criticality safety is given under all conceivable disposal conditions. ZrO 2/B 4C can be disposed of directly, without further processing, making it attractive to all countries facing the task of plutonium disposal. The US standard for protection against recovery can be met by disposal of the waste form together with used reactor fuel.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Clark, David L.; Hecker, Siegfried S.; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Neu, Mary P.
The element plutonium occupies a unique place in the history of chemistry, physics, technology, and international relations. After the initial discovery based on submicrogram amounts, it is now generated by transmutation of uranium in nuclear reactors on a large scale, and has been separated in ton quantities in large industrial facilities. The intense interest in plutonium resulted fromthe dual-use scenario of domestic power production and nuclear weapons - drawing energy from an atomic nucleus that can produce a factor of millions in energy output relative to chemical energy sources. Indeed, within 5 years of its original synthesis, the primary use of plutonium was for the release of nuclear energy in weapons of unprecedented power, and it seemed that the new element might lead the human race to the brink of self-annihilation. Instead, it has forced the human race to govern itself without resorting to nuclear war over the past 60 years. Plutonium evokes the entire gamut of human emotions, from good to evil, from hope to despair, from the salvation of humanity to its utter destruction. There is no other element in the periodic table that has had such a profound impact on the consciousness of mankind.
PLUTONIUM PROCESSING OPTIMIZATION IN SUPPORT OF THE MOX FUEL PROGRAM
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
GRAY, DEVIN W.; COSTA, DAVID A.
2007-02-02
After Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) personnel completed polishing 125 Kg of plutonium as highly purified PuO{sub 2} from surplus nuclear weapons, Duke, COGEMA, Stone, and Webster (DCS) required as the next process stage, the validation and optimization of all phases of the plutonium polishing flow sheet. Personnel will develop the optimized parameters for use in the upcoming 330 kg production mission.
Vitrification of plutonium at Rocky Flats the argument for a pilot plant
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Moore, L.
1996-05-01
Current plans for stabilizing and storing the plutonium at Rocky Flats Plant fail to put the material in a form suitable for disposition and resistant to proliferation. Vitrification should be considered as an alternate technology. The vitrification should begin with a small-scale pilot plant.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
McClure, J.D.; Luna, R.E.
1989-01-01
Several aspects of special packagings of plutonium for air transport should be recognized. The accident cases cited by Congressman Scheuer were incidents of local plutonium contamination in military aircraft accidents that had nuclear weapons on board. There is no disputing the occurrence of these military accidents but military weapon shipments were exempted from the provisions of the Scheuer amendment. There have been no recorded civilian aircraft crashes involving plutonium dispersal although there have been civilian aircraft crashes that were severe. Shortly after the introduction of the amendment by Mr. Scheuer on June 20, 1975, there was a serious aircraft crashmore » at JFK International. In his remarks to the House on July 24, 1975 Mr. Scheuer called attention to this event. The NRC originally opposed the provisions of the Scheuer amendment but with the passing of the amendment NRC compiled with its provisions. This led to the development of the plutonium air transport package PAT-1 in the US. The introduction of special rules for the air transport of plutonium into the US packaging regulations has been made them more severe than the provision of the international regulations, IAEA Safety Series 6. The IAEA is now discussing proposed regulations related to the air transport of plutonium. An additional legislative action was introduced the US in December 1987 which would require actual crash tests of packages intended for the air transport of plutonium, the Murkowski amendment. 13 refs.« less
Actinide Waste Forms and Radiation Effects
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ewing, R. C.; Weber, W. J.
Over the past few decades, many studies of actinides in glasses and ceramics have been conducted that have contributed substantially to the increased understanding of actinide incorporation in solids and radiation effects due to actinide decay. These studies have included fundamental research on actinides in solids and applied research and development related to the immobilization of the high level wastes (HLW) from commercial nuclear power plants and processing of nuclear weapons materials, environmental restoration in the nuclear weapons complex, and the immobilization of weapons-grade plutonium as a result of disarmament activities. Thus, the immobilization of actinides has become a pressing issue for the twenty-first century (Ewing, 1999), and plutonium immobilization, in particular, has received considerable attention in the USA (Muller et al., 2002; Muller and Weber, 2001). The investigation of actinides and
SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NORTON SH
2010-02-23
CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material.more » The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford nuclear reservation. Workers had to pass through metal detectors when they arrived at the plant and materials leaving the plant had to be scanned for security reasons. Whereas other high-security nuclear materials were shipped from the PFP to Savannah River, S.C. as part ofa Department of Energy (DOE) program to consolidate weapons-grade plutonium, it was determined that the SIF should remain onsite pending disposition to a national repository. Nevertheless, the SIF still requires a high level of security that the PFP complex has always provided. With the 60-year PFP mission of producing and storing plutonium concluded, the environmental cleanup plans for Hanford call for the demolition of the 63-building PFP complex. Consequently, if the SIF remained at PFP it not only would have interfered with the environmental cleanup plans, but would have required $100 million in facility upgrades to meet increased national security requirements imposed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A new smaller and more cost-effective area was needed to store this material, which led to the SIF Project. Once the SIF project was successfully completed and the SIF was safely removed from PFP, the existing Protected Area at PFP could be removed, and demolition could proceed more quickly without being encumbered by restrictive security requirements that an active Protected Area requires. The lightened PFP security level brought by safely removing and storing the SIF would also yield lowered costs for deactivation and demolition, as well as reduce overall life-cycle costs.« less
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-04-01
... semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for... assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for official use... licensed dealers in semiautomatic assault weapons, as well as persons who manufacture, import, or deal in...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-04-01
... semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for... assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for official use... licensed dealers in semiautomatic assault weapons, as well as persons who manufacture, import, or deal in...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-04-01
... semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for... assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for official use... licensed dealers in semiautomatic assault weapons, as well as persons who manufacture, import, or deal in...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-04-01
... semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for... assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to law enforcement officers for official use... licensed dealers in semiautomatic assault weapons, as well as persons who manufacture, import, or deal in...
Plutonium Immobilization Project System Design Description for Can Loading System
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kriikku, E.
2001-02-15
The purpose of this System Design Description (SDD) is to specify the system and component functions and requirements for the Can Loading System and provide a complete description of the system (design features, boundaries, and interfaces), principles of operation (including upsets and recovery), and the system maintenance approach. The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) will immobilize up to 13 metric tons (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials.
Method of immobilizing weapons plutonium to provide a durable, disposable waste product
Ewing, Rodney C.; Lutze, Werner; Weber, William J.
1996-01-01
A method of atomic scale fixation and immobilization of plutonium to provide a durable waste product. Plutonium is provided in the form of either PuO.sub.2 or Pu(NO.sub.3).sub.4 and is mixed with and SiO.sub.2. The resulting mixture is cold pressed and then heated under pressure to form (Zr,Pu)SiO.sub.4 as the waste product.
Transportation and storage of MOX and LEU assemblies at the Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
2001-01-01
The VVER-1000-type Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant has been chosen to dispose of the : plutonium created as part of Russian weapons program. The plutonium will be converted to mixed-oxide : (MOX), fabricated into assemblies and loaded into the reactor. ...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-07-19
... immobilization). Also, DOE had identified a glass can-in-canister immobilization approach as its preferred... allow immobilization of some or all of the surplus plutonium in glass or ceramic material for disposal... in canisters to be filled with borosilicate glass containing intensely radioactive high-level waste...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-07-27
... announcing the dates, times and locations for public hearings to receive comments on the Draft SPD... additional options for pit disassembly and conversion, which entails processing plutonium metal components to... practicable. DOE will hold public hearings on the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS; the dates, times and locations...
The benefits of an advanced fast reactor fuel cycle for plutonium management
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hannum, W.H.; McFarlane, H.F.; Wade, D.C.
1996-12-31
The United States has no program to investigate advanced nuclear fuel cycles for the large-scale consumption of plutonium from military and civilian sources. The official U.S. position has been to focus on means to bury spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors and to achieve the spent fuel standard for excess separated plutonium, which is considered by policy makers to be an urgent international priority. Recently, the National Research Council published a long awaited report on its study of potential separation and transmutation technologies (STATS), which concluded that in the nuclear energy phase-out scenario that they evaluated, transmutation of plutonium andmore » long-lived radioisotopes would not be worth the cost. However, at the American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting in June, 1996, the STATS panelists endorsed further study of partitioning to achieve superior waste forms for burial, and suggested that any further consideration of transmutation should be in the context of energy production, not of waste management. 2048 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has an active program for the short-term disposition of excess fissile material and a `focus area` for safe, secure stabilization, storage and disposition of plutonium, but has no current programs for fast reactor development. Nevertheless, sufficient data exist to identify the potential advantages of an advanced fast reactor metallic fuel cycle for the long-term management of plutonium. Advantages are discussed.« less
241Am Ingrowth and Its Effect on Internal Dose
Konzen, Kevin
2016-07-01
Generally, plutonium has been manufactured to support commercial and military applications involving heat sources, weapons and reactor fuel. This work focuses on three typical plutonium mixtures, while observing the potential of 241Am ingrowth and its effect on internal dose. The term “ingrowth” is used to describe 241Am production due solely from the decay of 241Pu as part of a plutonium mixture, where it is initially absent or present in a smaller quantity. Dose calculation models do not account for 241Am ingrowth unless the 241Pu quantity is specified. This work suggested that 241Am ingrowth be considered in bioassay analysis when theremore » is a potential of a 10% increase to the individual’s committed effective dose. It was determined that plutonium fuel mixtures, initially absent of 241Am, would likely exceed 10% for typical reactor grade fuel aged less than 30 years; however, heat source grade and aged weapons grade fuel would normally fall below this threshold. In conclusion, although this work addresses typical plutonium mixtures following separation, it may be extended to irradiated commercial uranium fuel and is expected to be a concern in the recycling of spent fuel.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Konzen, Kevin
Generally, plutonium has been manufactured to support commercial and military applications involving heat sources, weapons and reactor fuel. This work focuses on three typical plutonium mixtures, while observing the potential of 241Am ingrowth and its effect on internal dose. The term “ingrowth” is used to describe 241Am production due solely from the decay of 241Pu as part of a plutonium mixture, where it is initially absent or present in a smaller quantity. Dose calculation models do not account for 241Am ingrowth unless the 241Pu quantity is specified. This work suggested that 241Am ingrowth be considered in bioassay analysis when theremore » is a potential of a 10% increase to the individual’s committed effective dose. It was determined that plutonium fuel mixtures, initially absent of 241Am, would likely exceed 10% for typical reactor grade fuel aged less than 30 years; however, heat source grade and aged weapons grade fuel would normally fall below this threshold. In conclusion, although this work addresses typical plutonium mixtures following separation, it may be extended to irradiated commercial uranium fuel and is expected to be a concern in the recycling of spent fuel.« less
Dealing With Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons
2004-01-01
the plants, facilities, and equipment necessary to safely secure and store weapons pits (the plutonium “triggers” at the center of a thermonuclear ... bomb , and hence the most critical piece) proffered by either party. Furthermore, the statute requires the IAEA to establish control over the pits until
Exploding the myths about the fast breeder reactor
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Burns, S.
1979-01-01
This paper discusses the facts and figures about the effects of conservation policies, the benefits of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor demonstration plant, the feasibility of nuclear weapons manufacture from reactor-grade plutonium, diversion of plutonium from nuclear plants, radioactive waste disposal, and the toxicity of plutonium. The paper concludes that the U.S. is not proceeding with a high confidence strategy for breeder development because of a variety of false assumptions.
Heterogeneity Effects in Plutonium Contaminated Soil
2009-03-01
masses up to one kilogram once the ratio of Americium - 241 (Am- 241 ) and plutonium concentrations was established (Rademacher, 2001). Alpha...with a sample number and tared weight with a non-smearing marker. A standard control was then set using a point source of Americium - 241 on an aluminum...During the fire the weapons grade plutonium (Pu- 239, Pu-240, and Pu- 241 ) ignited and was released into the surrounding area, due to both
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Blandinskiy, V. Yu.
2014-12-01
This paper presents the results of a numerical investigation into burnup and breeding of nuclides in metallic fuel consisting of a mixture of plutonium and depleted uranium in a fast reactor with sodium coolant. The feasibility of using plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel from domestic thermal reactors and weapons-grade plutonium is discussed. It is shown that the largest production of secondary fuel and the least change in the reactivity over the reactor lifetime can be achieved when employing plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel from a reactor of the RBMK-1000 type.
Volatile Impurities in the Plutonium Immobilization Ceramic Wasteform
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cozzi, A.D.
1999-10-15
Approximately 18 of the 50 metric tons of plutonium identified for disposition contain significant quantities of impurities. A ceramic waste form is the chosen option for immobilization of the excess plutonium. The impurities associated with the stored plutonium have been identified (CaCl2, MgF2, Pb, etc.). For this study, only volatile species are investigated. The impurities are added individually. Cerium is used as the surrogate for plutonium. Three compositions, including the baseline composition, were used to verify the ability of the ceramic wasteform to accommodate impurities. The criteria for evaluation of the effect of the impurities were the apparent porosity andmore » phase assemblage of sintered pellets.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ewing, Rodney C.; Weber, William J.; Lian, Jie
2004-06-01
During the past half-century, the nuclear fuel cycle has generated approximately 1400 metric tons of plutonium and substantial quantities of the "minor" actinides, such as Np, Am, and Cm. The successful disposition of these actinides has an important impact on the strategy for developing advanced nuclear fuel cycles, weapons proliferation, and the geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste. During the last decade, there has been substantial interest in the use of the isometric pyrochlore structure-type, A2B2O7, for the immobilization of actinides. Most of the interest has focused on titanate-pyrochlore because of its chemical durability; however, these compositions experience a radiation-induced transition from the crystalline-to-aperiodic state due to radiation damage from the alpha-decay of actinides. Depending on the actinide concentration, the titanate pyrochlore will become amorphous in less than 1000 years of storage. Recently, systematic ion beam irradiations of a variety of pyrochlore compositions has revealed that many zirconate pyrochlores do not become amorphous, but remain crystalline as a defect fluorite structure-type due to disordering of the A- and B-site cations. The zirconate pyrochlores will remain crystalline even to very high doses, greater than 100 displacements per atom. Systematic experimental studies of actinide-doped and ion beam-irradiated pyrochlore, analyses of natural U- and Th-bearing pyrochlore, and simulations of the energetics of the disordering process now provide a rather detailed understanding of the structural and chemical controls on the response of pyrochlore to radiation. These results provide a solid basis for predicting the behavior and durability of pyrochlore used to immobilize plutonium.
A Graphical Examination of Uranium and Plutonium Fissility
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Reed, B. Cameron
2008-01-01
The issue of why only particular isotopes of uranium and plutonium are suitable for use in nuclear weapons is analyzed with the aid of graphs and semiquantitative discussions of parameters such as excitation energies, fission barriers, reaction cross-sections, and the role of processes such as [alpha]-decay and spontaneous fission. The goal is to…
Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kautz, D.
2012-07-02
A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutoniummore » is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.« less
2016-06-01
of these three pillars, yet current detectors for fast neutrons from nuclear weapons materials are bulky, expensive, and have low efficiencies, well...passive fast neutron emissions. Similarly, isotopes present in weapons grade Plutonium (which is predominantly Pu-239), especially Pu-240, are... weapons material, and the propensity of the neutrons resulting from their fission to inelastically scatter, defines the interactions of interest
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-01-12
... suitable for MOX fuel fabrication is disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico... Waste Processing Facility at SRS or disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. On... are safety (criticality) limits on how much plutonium can be sent to the Defense Waste Processing...
Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?
Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.
2015-08-01
Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasizedmore » and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.« less
Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.
Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasizedmore » and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.« less
A perspective on the proliferation risks of plutonium mines
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lyman, E.S.
1996-05-01
The program of geologic disposal of spent fuel and other plutonium-containing materials is increasingly becoming the target of criticism by individuals who argue that in the future, repositories may become low-cost sources of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This paper attempts to outline a consistent framework for analyzing the proliferation risks of these so-called {open_quotes}plutonium mines{close_quotes} and putting them into perspective. First, it is emphasized that the attractiveness of plutonium in a repository as a source of weapons material depends on its accessibility relative to other sources of fissile material. Then, the notion of a {open_quotes}material production standard{close_quotes} (MPS) ismore » proposed: namely, that the proliferation risks posed by geologic disposal will be acceptable if one can demonstrate, under a number of reasonable scenarios, that the recovery of plutonium from a repository is likely to be as difficult as new production of fissile material. A preliminary analysis suggests that the range of circumstances under which current mined repository concepts would fail to meet this standard is fairly narrow. Nevertheless, a broad application of the MPS may impose severe restrictions on repository design. In this context, the relationship of repository design parameters to easy of recovery is discussed.« less
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... Extracted From Nuclear Weapons 13617 Order 13617 Presidential Documents Executive Orders Executive Order... to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons By the authority vested... accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-06-18
... To the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material In the... Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons...
Reactive spark plasma synthesis of CaZrTi2O7 zirconolite ceramics for plutonium disposition
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sun, Shi-Kuan; Stennett, Martin C.; Corkhill, Claire L.; Hyatt, Neil C.
2018-03-01
Near single phase zirconolite ceramics, prototypically CaZrTi2O7, were fabricated by reactive spark plasma sintering (RSPS), from commercially available CaTiO3, ZrO2 and TiO2 reagents, after processing at 1200 °C for only 1 h. Ceramics were of theoretical density and formed with a controlled mean grain size of 1.9 ± 0.6 μm. The reducing conditions of RSPS afforded the presence of paramagnetic Ti3+, as demonstrated by EPR spectroscopy. Overall, this study demonstrates the potential for RSPS to be a disruptive technology for disposition of surplus separated plutonium stockpiles in ceramic wasteforms, given its inherent advantage of near net shape products and rapid throughput.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Bowen, James M.
The goal of this research was to investigate the physicochemical properties of weapons grade plutonium particles originating from the 1960 BOMARC incident for the purpose of predicting their fate in the environment and to address radiation protection and nuclear security concerns. Methods were developed to locate and isolate the particles in order to characterize them. Physical, chemical, and radiological characterization was performed using a variety of techniques. And finally, the particles were subjected to a sequential extraction procedure, a series of increasingly aggressive reagents, to simulate an accelerated environmental exposure. A link between the morphology of the particles and their partitioning amongst environmental mechanisms was established.
Sources of plutonium in the atmosphere and stratosphere-troposphere mixing
Hirose, Katsumi; Povinec, Pavel P.
2015-01-01
Plutonium isotopes have primarily been injected to the stratosphere by the atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and the burn-up of the SNAP-9A satellite. Here we show by using published data that the stratospheric plutonium exponentially decreased with apparent residence time of 1.5 ± 0.5 years, and that the temporal variations of plutonium in surface air followed the stratospheric trends until the early 1980s. In the 2000s, plutonium and its isotope ratios in the atmosphere varied dynamically, and sporadic high concentrations of 239,240Pu reported for the lower stratospheric and upper tropospheric aerosols may be due to environmental events such as the global dust outbreaks and biomass burning. PMID:26508010
The North Korean nuclear dilemma.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hecker, Siegfried S.
2004-01-01
The current nuclear crisis, the second one in ten years, erupted when North Korea expelled international nuclear inspectors in December 2002, then withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and claimed to be building more nuclear weapons with the plutonium extracted from the spent fuel rods heretofore stored under international inspection. These actions were triggered by a disagreement over U.S. assertions that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework (which froze the plutonium path to nuclear weapons to end the first crisis in 1994) by clandestinely developing uranium enrichment capabilities providing an alternative path to nuclear weapons. With Stanford Universitymore » Professor John Lewis and three other Americans, I was allowed to visit the Yongbyon Nuclear Center on Jan. 8, 2004. We toured the 5 MWe reactor, the 50 MWe reactor construction site, the spent fuel pool storage building, and the radiochemical laboratory. We concluded that North Korea has restarted its 5 MWe reactor (which produces roughly 6 kg of plutonium annually), it removed the 8000 spent fuel rods that were previously stored under IAEA safeguards from the spent fuel pool, and that it most likely extracted the 25 to 30 kg of plutonium contained in these fuel rods. Although North Korean officials showed us what they claimed was their plutonium metal product from this reprocessing campaign, we were not able to conclude definitively that it was in fact plutonium metal and that it came from the most recent reprocessing campaign. Nevertheless, our North Korean hosts demonstrated that they had the capability, the facility and requisite capacity, and the technical expertise to produce plutonium metal. On the basis of our visit, we were not able to address the issue of whether or not North Korea had a 'deterrent' as claimed - that is, we were not able to conclude that North Korea can build a nuclear device and that it can integrate nuclear devices into suitable delivery systems. However, based on the capabilities we saw, we must assume that North Korea has the capability to produce a crude nuclear device. On the matter of uranium enrichment programs, our host categorically denied that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program - he said, 'we have no program, no equipment, and no technical expertise for uranium enrichment.' The denials were not convincing at the time and since then have proven to be quite hollow by the revelations of A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market activities. There is no easy solution to the nuclear crisis in North Korea. A military strike to eliminate the nuclear facilities was never very attractive and now has been overcome by events. The principal threat is posed by a stockpile of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade plutonium. We have no way of finding where either may be hidden. A diplomatic solution remains the only path forward, but it has proven elusive. All sides have proclaimed a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula as the end goal. The U.S. Government has chosen to negotiate with North Korea by means of the six-party talks. It has very clearly outlined its position of insisting on complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs. North Korea has offered several versions of 're-freezing' its plutonium program while still denying a uranium enrichment program. It has insisted on simultaneous and reciprocal steps to a final solution. Regardless of which diplomatic path is chosen, the scientific challenges of eliminating the North Korean nuclear weapons programs (and its associated infrastructure) in a safe, secure, and verifiable manner are immense. The North Korean program is considerably more complex and developed than the fledgling Iraqi program of 1991 and Libyan program of 2004. It is more along the lines, but more complex than that of South Africa in the early 1990s. Actions taken or not taken by the North Koreans at their nuclear facilities during the course of the ongoing diplomatic discussions are key to whether or not the nuclear program can be eliminated safely and securely, and they will greatly influence the price tag for such operations. Moreover, they will determine whether or not one can verify complete elimination. Hence, cooperation of the North Koreans now and during the dismantlement and elimination stages is crucial. Technical discussions among specialists, perhaps within the framework of the working groups of the six-party talks, could be very productive in setting the stage for an effective, verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.« less
Integrating the stabilization of nuclear materials
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dalton, H.F.
1996-05-01
In response to Recommendation 94-1 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department of Energy committed to stabilizing specific nuclear materials within 3 and 8 years. These efforts are underway. The Department has already repackaged the plutonium at Rocky Flats and metal turnings at Savannah River that had been in contact with plastic. As this effort proceeds, we begin to look at activities beyond stabilization and prepare for the final disposition of these materials. To describe the plutonium materials being stabilize, Figure 1 illustrates the quantities of plutonium in various forms that will be stabilized. Plutonium as metal comprisesmore » 8.5 metric tons. Plutonium oxide contains 5.5 metric tons of plutonium. Plutonium residues and solutions, together, contain 7 metric tons of plutonium. Figure 2 shows the quantity of plutonium-bearing material in these four categories. In this depiction, 200 metric tons of plutonium residues and 400 metric tons of solutions containing plutonium constitute most of the material in the stabilization program. So, it is not surprising that much of the work in stabilization is directed toward the residues and solutions, even though they contain less of the plutonium.« less
Assessment of plutonium in the Savannah River Site environment. Revision 1
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Carlton, W.H.; Evans, A.G.; Geary, L.A.
1992-12-31
Plutonium in the Savannah River Site Environment is published as a part of the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP). It is the fifth in a series of eight documents on individual radioisotopes released to the environment as a result of Savannah River Site (SRS) operations. These are living documents, each to be revised and updated on a two-year schedule. This document describes the sources of plutonium in the environment, its release from SRS, environmental transport and ecological concentration of plutonium, and the radiological impact of SRS releases to the environment. Plutonium exists in the environment as a result of above-ground nuclearmore » weapons tests, the Chernobyl accident, the destruction of satellite SNAP 9-A, plane crashes involving nuclear weapons, and small releases from reactors and reprocessing plants. Plutonium has been produced at SRS during the operation of five production reactors and released in small quantities during the processing of fuel and targets in chemical separations facilities. Approximately 0.6 Ci of plutonium was released into streams and about 12 Ci was released to seepage basins, where it was tightly bound by clay in the soil. A smaller quantity, about 3.8 Ci, was released to the atmosphere. Virtually all releases have occurred in F- and H-Area separation facilities. Plutonium concentration and transport mechanisms for the atmosphere, surface water, and ground water releases have been extensively studied by Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) and ecological mechanisms have been studied by Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL). The overall radiological impact of SRS releases to the offsite maximum individual can be characterized by a total dose of 15 mrem (atmospheric) and 0.18 mrem (liquid), compared with the dose of 12,960 mrem from non-SRS sources during the same period of time (1954--1989). Plutonium releases from SRS facilities have resulted in a negligible impact to the environment and the population it supports.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Jernström, J.; Eriksson, M.; Simon, R.; Tamborini, G.; Bildstein, O.; Marquez, R. Carlos; Kehl, S. R.; Hamilton, T. F.; Ranebo, Y.; Betti, M.
2006-08-01
Six plutonium-containing particles stemming from Runit Island soil (Marshall Islands) were characterized by non-destructive analytical and microanalytical methods. Composition and elemental distribution in the particles were studied with synchrotron radiation based micro X-ray fluorescence spectrometry. Scanning electron microscope equipped with energy dispersive X-ray detector and with wavelength dispersive system as well as a secondary ion mass spectrometer were used to examine particle surfaces. Based on the elemental composition the particles were divided into two groups: particles with pure Pu matrix, and particles where the plutonium is included in Si/O-rich matrix being more heterogenously distributed. All of the particles were identified as nuclear fuel fragments of exploded weapon components. As containing plutonium with low 240Pu/ 239Pu atomic ratio, less than 0.065, which corresponds to weapons-grade plutonium or a detonation with low fission yield, the particles were identified to originate from the safety test and low-yield tests conducted in the history of Runit Island. The Si/O-rich particles contained traces of 137Cs ( 239 + 240 Pu/ 137Cs activity ratio higher than 2500), which indicated that a minor fission process occurred during the explosion. The average 241Am/ 239Pu atomic ratio in the six particles was 3.7 × 10 - 3 ± 0.2 × 10 - 3 (February 2006), which indicated that plutonium in the different particles had similar age.
Mortality among workers with chronic radiation sickness
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Shilnikova, N.S.; Koshurnikova, N.A.; Bolotnikova, M.G.
1996-07-01
This study is based on a registry containing medical and dosimetric data of the employees who began working at different plants of the Mayak nuclear complex between 1948 and 1958 who developed chronic radiation sickness. Mayak is the first nuclear weapons plutonium production enterprise built in Russia and includes nuclear reactors, a radiochemical plant for plutonium separation, and a plutonium production enterprise built in Russia and includes nuclear reactors, a radiochemical plant for plutonium separation, and a plutonium production plant.Workers whose employment began between 1948 and 1958 exhibited a 6-28% incidence of chronic radiation sickness at the different facilities. Theremore » were no cases of chronic radiation sickness among those who began working after 1958. Data on doses of external whole-body gamma-irradiation and mortality in workers with chronic radiation sickness are presented. 6 refs., 5 tabs.« less
Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
von Hippel, Frank N.
2014-01-01
A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material – in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium – for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international – most likely International Atomic Energy Agency – monitoring. There are many non-weapon states that argue the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. Our paper discusses the scope of themore » FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.« less
In search of plutonium: A nonproliferation journey
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hecker, Siegfried
2010-02-01
In February 1992, I landed in the formerly secret city of Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, followed a few days later by a visit to Snezhinsk, their Livermore. The briefings we received of the Russian nuclear weapons program and tours of their plutonium, reactor, explosives, and laser facilities were mind boggling considering the Soviet Union was dissolved only two months earlier. This visit began a 17-year, 41 journey relationship with the Russian nuclear complex dedicated to working with them in partnership to protect and safeguard their weapons and fissile materials, while addressing the plight of their scientists and engineers. In the process, we solved a forty-year disagreement about the plutonium-gallium phase diagram and began a series of fundamental plutonium science workshops that are now in their tenth year. At the Yonbyon reprocessing facility in January 2004, my North Korean hosts had hoped to convince me that they have a nuclear deterrent. When I expressed skepticism, they asked if I wanted to see their ``product.'' I asked if they meant the plutonium; they replied, ``Well, yes.'' Thus, I wound up holding 200 grams of North Korean plutonium (in a sealed glass jar) to make sure it was heavy and warm. So began the first of my six journeys to North Korea to provide technical input to the continuing North Korean nuclear puzzle. In Trombay and Kalpakkam a few years later I visited the Indian nuclear research centers to try to understand how India's ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion can be accomplished safely and securely. I will describe these and other attempts to deal with the nonproliferation legacy of the cold war and the new challenges ahead. )
Future Remains: Industrial Heritage at the Hanford Plutonium Works
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Freer, Brian
This dissertation argues that U.S. environmental and historic preservation regulations, industrial heritage projects, history, and art only provide partial frameworks for successfully transmitting an informed story into the long range future about nuclear technology and its related environmental legacy. This argument is important because plutonium from nuclear weapons production is toxic to humans in very small amounts, threatens environmental health, has a half-life of 24, 110 years and because the industrial heritage project at Hanford is the first time an entire U.S. Department of Energy weapons production site has been designated a U.S. Historic District. This research is situated within anthropological interest in industrial heritage studies, environmental anthropology, applied visual anthropology, as well as wider discourses on nuclear studies. However, none of these disciplines is really designed or intended to be a completely satisfactory frame of reference for addressing this perplexing challenge of documenting and conveying an informed story about nuclear technology and its related environmental legacy into the long range future. Others have thought about this question and have made important contributions toward a potential solution. Examples here include: future generations movements concerning intergenerational equity as evidenced in scholarship, law, and amongst Native American groups; Nez Perce and Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation responses to the Hanford End State Vision and Hanford's Canyon Disposition Initiative; as well as the findings of organizational scholars on the advantages realized by organizations that have a long term future perspective. While these ideas inform the main line inquiry of this dissertation, the principal approach put forth by the researcher of how to convey an informed story about nuclear technology and waste into the long range future is implementation of the proposed Future Remains clause, as originated by the author, by amendment to two U.S. federal laws: National Historic Preservation Act and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The dissertation provides a case study in public anthropology. The findings of the dissertation include recommendations whereby the Future Remains clause gives historic preservation and cultural resources a leading and ongoing role in facilitating real-time forward looking historical documentation at environmental restoration projects at United States National Priorities List (i.e., "Superfund") sites.
Source Book on Plutonium and Its Decontamination
1973-09-24
Energy Commisjsion Policy The AEC is the foremoacst regulator of the use of radioactive materials in this country. It derives this power from the...Congress and furthers Its responsibilities in two ways; first, through its licensin~g power and second, by regulation of the activities of its contractors...biological hazard. Plutonium- 239 is of interest because of its abundance in weapons and Pu-238 because of its use in power sources. Half lives for the two
Macroencapsulation Equivalency Guidance for Classified Weapon Components and NNSSWAC Compliance
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Poling, J.
2012-05-15
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex has a surplus of classified legacy weapon components generated over the years with no direct path for disposal. The majority of the components have been held for uncertainty of future use or no identified method of sanitization or disposal. As more weapons are retired, there is an increasing need to reduce the amount of components currently in storage or on hold. A process is currently underway to disposition and dispose of the legacy/retired weapons components across the DOE complex.
Plutonium release from Fukushima Daiichi fosters the need for more detailed investigations
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Schneider, Stephanie; Walther, Clemens; Bister, Stefan; Schauer, Viktoria; Christl, Marcus; Synal, Hans-Arno; Shozugawa, Katsumi; Steinhauser, Georg
2013-10-01
The contamination of Japan after the Fukushima accident has been investigated mainly for volatile fission products, but only sparsely for actinides such as plutonium. Only small releases of actinides were estimated in Fukushima. Plutonium is still omnipresent in the environment from previous atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. We investigated soil and plants sampled at different hot spots in Japan, searching for reactor-borne plutonium using its isotopic ratio 240Pu/239Pu. By using accelerator mass spectrometry, we clearly demonstrated the release of Pu from the Fukushima Daiichi power plant: While most samples contained only the radionuclide signature of fallout plutonium, there is at least one vegetation sample whose isotope ratio (0.381 +/- 0.046) evidences that the Pu originates from a nuclear reactor (239+240Pu activity concentration 0.49 Bq/kg). Plutonium content and isotope ratios differ considerably even for very close sampling locations, e.g. the soil and the plants growing on it. This strong localization indicates a particulate Pu release, which is of high radiological risk if incorporated.
Plutonium release from the 903 pad at Rocky Flats.
Mongan, T R; Ripple, S R; Winges, K D
1996-10-01
The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDH) sponsored a study to reconstruct contaminant doses to the public from operations at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant. This analysis of the accidental release of plutonium from the area known as the 903 Pad is part of the CDH study. In the 1950's and 1960's, 55-gallon drums of waste oil contaminated with plutonium, and uranium were stored outdoors at the 903 Pad. The drums corroded, leaking contaminated oil onto soil subsequently carried off-site by the wind. The plutonium release is estimated using environmental data from the 1960's and 1970's and an atmospheric transport model for fugitive dust. The best estimate of total plutonium release to areas beyond plant-owned property is about 0.26 TBq (7 Ci). Off-site airborne concentrations and deposition of plutonium are estimated for dose calculation purposes. The best estimate of the highest predicted off-site effective dose is approximately 72 microSv (7.2 mrem).
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
BLEJWAS,THOMAS E.; SANDERS,THOMAS L.; EAGAN,ROBERT J.
2000-01-01
Nuclear power is an important and, the authors believe, essential component of a secure nuclear future. Although nuclear fuel cycles create materials that have some potential for use in nuclear weapons, with appropriate fuel cycles, nuclear power could reduce rather than increase real proliferation risk worldwide. Future fuel cycles could be designed to avoid plutonium production, generate minimal amounts of plutonium in proliferation-resistant amounts or configurations, and/or transparently and efficiently consume plutonium already created. Furthermore, a strong and viable US nuclear infrastructure, of which nuclear power is a large element, is essential if the US is to maintain a leadershipmore » or even participatory role in defining the global nuclear infrastructure and controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By focusing on new fuel cycles and new reactor technologies, it is possible to advantageously burn and reduce nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear weapons rather than increase and/or dispose of these materials. Thus, the authors suggest that planners for a secure nuclear future use technology to design an ideal future. In this future, nuclear power creates large amounts of virtually atmospherically clean energy while significantly lowering the threat of proliferation through the thoughtful use, physical security, and agreed-upon transparency of nuclear materials. The authors must develop options for policy makers that bring them as close as practical to this ideal. Just as Atoms for Peace became the ideal for the first nuclear century, they see a potential nuclear future that contributes significantly to power for peace and prosperity.« less
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... official use and to employees or contractors of nuclear facilities. 478.132 Section 478.132 Alcohol... and to employees or contractors of nuclear facilities. Licensed manufacturers, licensed importers, and licensed dealers in semiautomatic assault weapons, as well as persons who manufacture, import, or deal in...
JOWOG 22/2 - Actinide Chemical Technology (July 9-13, 2012)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jackson, Jay M.; Lopez, Jacquelyn C.; Wayne, David M.
2012-07-05
The Plutonium Science and Manufacturing Directorate provides world-class, safe, secure, and reliable special nuclear material research, process development, technology demonstration, and manufacturing capabilities that support the nation's defense, energy, and environmental needs. We safely and efficiently process plutonium, uranium, and other actinide materials to meet national program requirements, while expanding the scientific and engineering basis of nuclear weapons-based manufacturing, and while producing the next generation of nuclear engineers and scientists. Actinide Process Chemistry (NCO-2) safely and efficiently processes plutonium and other actinide compounds to meet the nation's nuclear defense program needs. All of our processing activities are done in amore » world class and highly regulated nuclear facility. NCO-2's plutonium processing activities consist of direct oxide reduction, metal chlorination, americium extraction, and electrorefining. In addition, NCO-2 uses hydrochloric and nitric acid dissolutions for both plutonium processing and reduction of hazardous components in the waste streams. Finally, NCO-2 is a key team member in the processing of plutonium oxide from disassembled pits and the subsequent stabilization of plutonium oxide for safe and stable long-term storage.« less
Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations
2010-06-04
extensive use of photons, packets of energy with no rest mass and no electrical charge. Electromagnetic radiation consists of photons, and may be measured...bulk property, expressed as mass per unit volume. In general, the densest materials are those of high Z. These properties may be used to detect...SNM by detecting the time pattern of neutron generation. A subcritical mass of highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium can support a
Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need
2015-08-18
Recently, U.S. and Chinese experts have estimated that the North Koreans may be able to produce enough fissionable plutonium and uranium to build up...long-range missiles, but their recently revealed ability to separate uranium could give them the ability to build gun-assembled fission weapons similar...weapons programs and living up to their international obligations.” 36North Korea has had a uranium enrichment capacity since at least November 2010
Detection Technology in the 21st Century: The Case of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction
2008-03-26
Weapons of Mass Destruction FORMAT : Strategy Research Project DATE: 26 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 6,764 PAGES: 25 KEY TERMS: National Security, Deterrence...stocks remaining in Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and other former Soviet and Eastern European states, and the unknown amounts of highly enriched uranium ...detect emissions from the decay of radioactive nuclides, which can occur naturally, such as uranium and thorium, or are manmade, such as plutonium
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bunch, Kyle J.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep
The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components andmore » fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cowell, B.S.; Fontana, M.H.; Krakowski, R.A.
1995-04-01
In preparation for and in support of a detailed R and D Plan for the Accelerator-Based Conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium, an ABC Plant Layout Study was conducted at the level of a pre-conceptual engineering design. The plant layout is based on an adaptation of the Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) detailed conceptual design that was completed in the early 1070s. Although the ABC Plant Layout Study included the Accelerator Equipment as an essential element, the engineering assessment focused primarily on the Target; Primary System (blanket and all systems containing plutonium-bearing fuel salt); the Heat-Removal System (secondary-coolant-salt and supercritical-steam systems); Chemicalmore » Processing; Operation and Maintenance; Containment and Safety; and Instrumentation and Control systems. Although constrained primarily to a reflection of an accelerator-driven (subcritical) variant of MSBR system, unique features and added flexibilities of the ABC suggest improved or alternative approaches to each of the above-listed subsystems; these, along with the key technical issues in need of resolution through a detailed R&D plan for ABC are described on the bases of the ``strawman`` or ``point-of-departure`` plant layout that resulted from this study.« less
Modeling and Comparison of Options for the Disposal of Excess Weapons Plutonium in Russia
2002-04-01
fuel LWR cooling time LWR Pu load rate LWR net destruction frac ~ LWR reactors op life mox core frac Excess Separated Pu HTGR Cycle Pu in Waste LWR MOX...reflecting the cycle used in this type of reactor. For the HTGR , the entire core consists of plutonium fuel , therefore a core fraction is not specified...cooling time Time spent fuel unloaded from HTGR reactor must cool before permanently stored 3 years Mox core fraction Fraction of
Safety features of subcritical fluid fueled systems
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bell, C.R.
1995-10-01
Accelerator-driven transmutation technology has been under study at Los Alamos for several years for application to nuclear waste treatment, tritium production, energy generation, and recently, to the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. Studies and evaluations performed to date at Los Alamos have led to a current focus on a fluid-fuel, fission system operating in a neutron source-supported subcritical mode, using molten salt reactor technology and accelerator-driven proton-neutron spallation. In this paper, the safety features and characteristics of such systems are explored from the perspective of the fundamental nuclear safety objectives that any reactor-type system should address. This exploration is qualitativemore » in nature and uses current vintage solid-fueled reactors as a baseline for comparison. Based on the safety perspectives presented, such systems should be capable of meeting the fundamental nuclear safety objectives. In addition, they should be able to provide the safety robustness desired for advanced reactors. However, the manner in which safety objectives and robustness are achieved is very different from that associated with conventional reactors. Also, there are a number of safety design and operational challenges that will have to be addressed for the safety potential of such systems to be credible.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1994-09-01
This report provides the input to and results of the Department of Energy (DOE) - Oak Ridge Operations (ORO) DOE Plutonium Environment, Safety and Health (ES & H) Vulnerability Assessment (VA) self-assessment performed by the Site Assessment Team (SAT) for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL or X-10) and the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant (Y-12) sites that are managed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (MMES). As initiated (March 15, 1994) by the Secretary of Energy, the objective of the VA is to identify and rank-order DOE-ES&H vulnerabilities associated for the purpose of decision making on the interim safe managementmore » and ultimate disposition of fissile materials. This assessment is directed at plutonium and other co-located transuranics in various forms.« less
Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
2006-08-16
Unicorn ,” is to be conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical shaft configuration similar to an underground nuclear test, not in a tunnel, to exercise...operational readiness.42 It is scheduled for FY2006, as noted below. SCEs try to determine if radioactive decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon...Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson called SCEs “a key part of our scientific program to provide new tools and data that assess age -related complications
Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
2006-11-15
Unicorn ,” was conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical CRS-18 58 “Nanos Tours Nevada Test Site,” Daily Newsbulletin, Los Alamos National Laboratory...radioactive decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon performance. Several SCEs have been used to support certification of the W88 pit. (A pit is the...tools and data that assess age -related complications and maintain the reliability and safety of the nation’s nuclear deterrent.”59 As they produce no
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Biegalski, Steven R.; Buchholz, Bruce A.
2011-08-24
The objective of this work is to identify isotopic ratios suitable for analysis via mass spectrometry that distinguish between commercial nuclear reactor fuel cycles, fuel cycles for weapons grade plutonium, and products from nuclear weapons explosions. Methods will also be determined to distinguish the above from medical and industrial radionuclide sources. Mass spectrometry systems will be identified that are suitable for field measurement of such isotopes in an expedient manner.
Environmental Information Document: L-reactor reactivation
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mackey, H.E. Jr.
1982-04-01
Purpose of this Environmental Information Document is to provide background for assessing environmental impacts associated with the renovation, restartup, and operation of L Reactor at the Savannah River Plant (SRP). SRP is a major US Department of Energy installation for the production of nuclear materials for national defense. The purpose of the restart of L Reactor is to increase the production of nuclear weapons materials, such as plutonium and tritium, to meet projected needs in the nuclear weapons program.
Scientific computations section monthly report, November 1993
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Buckner, M.R.
1993-12-30
This progress report from the Savannah River Technology Center contains abstracts from papers from the computational modeling, applied statistics, applied physics, experimental thermal hydraulics, and packaging and transportation groups. Specific topics covered include: engineering modeling and process simulation, criticality methods and analysis, plutonium disposition.
Comparative safety assessment of surface versus submarine plutonium shipments
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Knepper, D.S.; Feltus, M.A.
1993-01-01
The recent shipment of plutonium from France to Japan aboard the freighter Akatsuki Maru touched off protests from environmental and antinuclear organizations. These protests arose from the fear of an accidental sinking of the vessel that would release its cargo to the sea, as well as the threat of a terrorist nation highjacking the ship for its cargo to produce atomic weapons. The sinking of a merchant ship is not uncommon, as illustrated by the famous losses of the tankers Amoco Cadiz and Exxon Valdez. The highjacking of a lightly armed freighter such as the Akatsuki Maru is possible andmore » would not be unduly difficult for a well-equipped terrorist nation. The combined threats of weapons proliferation and environmental damage arising from the diversion or destruction of a sea vessel carrying plutonium will continue to abound as the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel increases. An alternate method for the transportation with reduced risks of both diversion and destruction needs to be developed. The shipment aboard the Akatsuki Maru was originally proposed to be flown from France to Japan over the continental United States. This proposal was rejected by the Reagan administration in 1988. A third alternative to the current ideas of air transport and surface transport is subsurface transport. This research project investigates the transportation of plutonium by submarine and compares it to the current method of transportation by freighter. This analysis involves a study of the military threat to a submarine by a terrorist nation and comparable threat to a surface vessel. To study the nonmilitary aspects of plutonium shipping, a fault-tree evaluation is performed for transportation by submarine and compared with the current risk analysis performed for surface vessels.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Vettraino, F.; Magnani, G.; La Torretta, T.; Marmo, E.; Coelli, S.; Luzzi, L.; Ossi, P.; Zappa, G.
1999-08-01
The plutonium disposition is presently acknowledged as a most urgent issue at the world level. Inert matrix and thoria fuel concepts for Pu burning in LWRs show good potential in providing effective and ultimate solutions to this issue. In non-fertile (U-free) inert matrix fuel, plutonium oxide is diluted within inert oxides such as stabilised ZrO 2, Al 2O 3, MgO or MgAl 2O 4. Thoria addition, which helps improve neutronic characteristics of inert fuels, appears as a promising variant of U-free fuel. In the context of an R&D activity aimed at assessing the feasibility of the fuel concept above, simulated fuel pellets have been produced both from dry-powder metallurgy and the sol-gel route. Results show that they can be fabricated by matching basic nuclear grade specifications such as the required geometry, density and microstructure. Some characterisation testing dealing with thermo-physical properties, ion irradiation damage and solubility also have been started. Results from thermo-physical measurements at room temperature have been achieved. A main feature stemming from solubility testing outcomes is a very high chemical stability which should render the fuel strongly diversion resistant and suitable for direct final disposal in deep geological repository (once-through solution).
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kunsman, D.M.
We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant differencemore » between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kunsman, D.M.
We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant differencemore » between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.« less
Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah River Site, USA. A Long-Term Study
Armstrong, Christopher R.; Nuessle, Patterson R.; Brant, Heather A.; ...
2015-01-16
This work presents the findings of a long term plutonium study at Savannah River Site (SRS) conducted between 2003 and 2013. Terrestrial environmental samples were obtained at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in A-area. Plutonium content and isotopic abundances were measured over this time period by alpha spectrometry and three stage thermal ionization mass spectrometry (3STIMS). Here we detail the complete sample collection, radiochemical separation, and measurement procedure specifically targeted to trace plutonium in bulk environmental samples. Total plutonium activities were determined to be not significantly above atmospheric global fallout. However, the 238Pu/ 239+240Pu activity ratios attributed to SRS aremore » above atmospheric global fallout ranges. The 240Pu/ 239Pu atom ratios are reasonably consistent from year to year and are lower than fallout, while the 242Pu/ 239Pu atom ratios are higher than fallout values. Overall, the plutonium signatures obtained in this study reflect a mixture of weapons-grade, higher burn-up, and fallout material. This study provides a blue print for long term low level monitoring of plutonium in the environment.« less
Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1998-06-01
This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TSmore » replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.« less
Fuzzy-probabilistic model for risk assessment of radioactive material railway transportation.
Avramenko, M; Bolyatko, V; Kosterev, V
2005-01-01
Transportation of radioactive materials is obviously accompanied by a certain risk. A model for risk assessment of emergency situations and terrorist attacks may be useful for choosing possible routes and for comparing the various defence strategies. In particular, risk assessment is crucial for safe transportation of excess weapons-grade plutonium arising from the removal of plutonium from military employment. A fuzzy-probabilistic model for risk assessment of railway transportation has been developed taking into account the different natures of risk-affecting parameters (probabilistic and not probabilistic but fuzzy). Fuzzy set theory methods as well as standard methods of probability theory have been used for quantitative risk assessment. Information-preserving transformations are applied to realise the correct aggregation of probabilistic and fuzzy parameters. Estimations have also been made of the inhalation doses resulting from possible accidents during plutonium transportation. The obtained data show the scale of possible consequences that may arise from plutonium transportation accidents.
NCSP IER 422 CED-3b Documentation
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hutchinson, Jesson D.; Cutler, Theresa Elizabeth; Bahran, Rian Mustafa
2017-11-22
A Subcritical Copper-Reflected α-phase Plutonium (SCRαP) integral benchmark experiment has been designed and measured. In this experiment, multiplication is approximated using correlated neutron data from a detector system consisting of 3He tubes inside high density polyethylene (HDPE). Measurements were performed on various subcritical experimental configurations consisting of a weapons-grade plutonium sphere surrounded by different Cu thicknesses. In addition to the proposed base experimental configurations with Cu, additional configurations were performed with the plutonium ball nested in various thicknesses of interleaved HDPE spherical shells mixed in with the Cu shells. The HDPE is intended to provide fast neutron moderation and reflection,more » resulting in additional measurements with differing multiplication, spectra, and nuclear data sensitivity.« less
Stabilizing stored PuO2 with addition of metal impurities
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Moten, Shafaq; Huda, Muhammad
Plutonium oxides is of widespread significance due its application in nuclear fuels, space missions, as well as the long-termed storage of plutonium from spent fuel and nuclear weapons. The processes to refine and store plutonium bring many other elements in contact with the plutonium metal and thereby affect the chemistry of the plutonium. Pure plutonium metal corrodes to an oxide in air with the most stable form of this oxide is stoichiometric plutonium dioxide, PuO2. Defects such as impurities and vacancies can form in the plutonium dioxide before, during and after the refining processes as well as during storage. An impurity defect manifests itself at the bottom of the conduction band and affects the band gap of the unit cell. Studying the interaction between transition metals and plutonium dioxide is critical for better, more efficient storage plans as well as gaining insights to provide a better response to potential threats of exposure to the environment. Our study explores the interaction of a few metals within the plutonium dioxide structure which have a likelihood of being exposed to the plutonium dioxide powder. Using Density Functional Theory, we calculated a substituted metal impurity in PuO2 supercell. We repeated the calculations with an additional oxygen vacancy. Our results reveal interesting volume contraction of PuO2 supercell when one plutonium atom is substituted with a metal atom. The authors acknowledge the Texas Computing Center (TACC) at The University of Texas at Austin and High Performance Computing (HPC) at The University of Texas at Arlington.
Hande, M Prakash; Azizova, Tamara V; Burak, Ludmilla E; Khokhryakov, Valentin F; Geard, Charles R; Brenner, David J
2005-09-01
Long-lived, sensitive, and specific biomarkers of particular mutagenic agents are much sought after and potentially have broad applications in the fields of cancer biology, epidemiology, and prevention. Many clastogens induce a spectrum of chromosome aberrations, and some of them can be exploited as biomarkers of exposure. Densely ionizing radiation, for example, alpha particle radiation (from radon or plutonium) and neutron radiation, preferentially induces complex chromosome aberrations, which can be detected by the 24-color multifluor fluorescence in situ hybridization (mFISH) technique. We report the detection and quantification of stable complex chromosome aberrations in lymphocytes of healthy former nuclear-weapons workers, who were exposed many years ago to plutonium, gamma rays, or both, at the Mayak weapons complex in Russia. We analyzed peripheral-blood lymphocytes from these individuals for the presence of persistent complex chromosome aberrations. A significantly elevated frequency of complex chromosome translocations was detected in the highly exposed plutonium workers but not in the group exposed only to high doses of gamma radiation. No such differences were found for simple chromosomal aberrations. The results suggest that stable complex chromosomal translocations represent a long-lived, quantitative, low-background biomarker of densely ionizing radiation for human populations exposed many years ago. (c) 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
Short History of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1943 - 1993) Los Alamos, New Mexico * Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory * Site Selection * History @ Los Alamos Hanford, Washington * Selected as Plutonium Production Facility * History of the Hanford Site 1943 - 1990 Chicago, Illinois * Promethean Boldness at
Ruttenber, A J; McCrea, J S; Wade, T D; Schonbeck, M F; LaMontagne, A D; Van Dyke, M V; Martyny, J W
2001-02-01
We outline methods for integrating epidemiologic and industrial hygiene data systems for the purpose of exposure estimation, exposure surveillance, worker notification, and occupational medicine practice. We present examples of these methods from our work at the Rocky Flats Plant--a former nuclear weapons facility that fabricated plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons and is now being decontaminated and decommissioned. The weapons production processes exposed workers to plutonium, gamma photons, neutrons, beryllium, asbestos, and several hazardous chemical agents, including chlorinated hydrocarbons and heavy metals. We developed a job exposure matrix (JEM) for estimating exposures to 10 chemical agents in 20 buildings for 120 different job categories over a production history spanning 34 years. With the JEM, we estimated lifetime chemical exposures for about 12,000 of the 16,000 former production workers. We show how the JEM database is used to estimate cumulative exposures over different time periods for epidemiological studies and to provide notification and determine eligibility for a medical screening program developed for former workers. We designed an industrial hygiene data system for maintaining exposure data for current cleanup workers. We describe how this system can be used for exposure surveillance and linked with the JEM and databases on radiation doses to develop lifetime exposure histories and to determine appropriate medical monitoring tests for current cleanup workers. We also present time-line-based graphical methods for reviewing and correcting exposure estimates and reporting them to individual workers.
Plutonium in the atmosphere: A global perspective.
Thakur, P; Khaing, H; Salminen-Paatero, S
2017-09-01
A number of potential source terms have contributed plutonium isotopes to the atmosphere. The atmospheric nuclear weapon tests conducted between 1945 and 1980 and the re-entry of the burned SNAP-9A satellite in 1964, respectively. It is generally believed that current levels of plutonium in the stratosphere are negligible and compared with the levels generally found at surface-level air. In this study, the time trend analysis and long-term behavior of plutonium isotopes ( 239+240 Pu and 238 Pu) in the atmosphere were assessed using historical data collected by various national and international monitoring networks since 1960s. An analysis of historical data indicates that 239+240 Pu concentration post-1984 is still frequently detectable, whereas 238 Pu is detected infrequently. Furthermore, the seasonal and time-trend variation of plutonium concentration in surface air followed the stratospheric trends until the early 1980s. After the last Chinese test of 1980, the plutonium concentrations in surface air dropped to the current levels, suggesting that the observed concentrations post-1984 have not been under stratospheric control, but rather reflect the environmental processes such as resuspension. Recent plutonium atmospheric air concentrations data show that besides resuspension, other environmental processes such as global dust storms and biomass burning/wildfire also play an important role in redistributing plutonium in the atmosphere. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Engineering Provision of Assault Crossing of Rivers,
1983-01-21
in the first place, in the missile and nuclear weapons warfare sharply they increased frontage and the depth of troop dispositions in the defense...modern missile and nuclear weapons warfare the medium * and wide rivers, reinforced by mine fields and decomposition of water-engineering and other...PMP and transport motor pool PVD -20. The existing pontoon trains make it possible to mechanize labor-consuming fitters work, to the minimum to bring
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Finch, Warren I.
1978-01-01
The results of President Carter's policy on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are expected to slow the growth rate in energy consumption, put the development of the breeder reactor in question, halt plans to reprocess and recycle uranium and plutonium, and expand facilities to supply enriched uranium. (Author/MA)
Crystalline matrices for the immobilization of plutonium and actinides
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Anderson, E.B.; Burakov, E.E.; Galkin, Ya.B.
1996-05-01
The management of weapon plutonium, disengaged as a result of conversion, is considered together with the problem of the actinide fraction of long-lived high level radioactive wastes. It is proposed to use polymineral ceramics based on crystalline host-phases: zircon ZrSiO{sub 4} and zirconium dioxide ZrO{sub 2}, for various variants of the management of plutonium and actinides (including the purposes of long-term safe storage or final disposal from the human activity sphere). It is shown that plutonium and actinides are able to form with these phases on ZrSiO{sub 4} and ZrO{sub 2} was done on laboratory level by the hot pressingmore » method, using the plasmochemical calcination technology. To incorporate simulators of plutonium into the structure of ZrSiO{sub 4} and ZrO{sub 2} in the course of synthesis, an original method developed by the authors as a result of studying the high-uranium zircon (Zr,U) SiO{sub 4} form Chernobyl {open_quotes}lavas{close_quotes} was used.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Couture, A.
2013-06-07
Nuclear facilities sometimes use hand-held plastic scintillator detectors to detect attempts to divert special nuclear material in situations where portal monitors are impractical. MCNP calculations have been performed to determine the neutron and gamma radiation field arising from a Category I quantity of weapons-grade plutonium in various shielding configurations. The shields considered were composed of combinations of lead and high-density polyethylene such that the mass of the plutonium plus shield was 22.7 kilograms. Monte-Carlo techniques were also used to determine the detector response to each of the shielding configurations. The detector response calculations were verified using field measurements of high-,more » medium-, and low- energy gamma-ray sources as well as a Cf-252 neutron source.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Not Available
1993-05-01
This table lists quantities of warheads (in stockpile, peak number per year, total number built, number of known test explosions), weapon development milestones (developers of the atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb, date of first operational ICBM, first nuclear-powered naval SSN in service, first MIRVed missile deployed), and testing milestones (first fission test, type of boosted fission weapon, multistage thermonuclear test, number of months from fission bomb to multistage thermonuclear bomb, etc.), and nuclear infrastructure (assembly plants, plutonium production reactors, uranium enrichment plants, etc.). Countries included in the tally are the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China.
Policy and Technical Issues Facing a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
von Hippel, Frank; Mian, Zia
2015-05-18
We report the largest obstacle to creating nuclear weapons, starting with the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been to make sufficient quantities of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – to sustain an explosive fission chain reaction.1 Recognition of this fact has, for more than fifty years, underpinned both the support for and the opposition to adoption of an international treaty banning at a minimum the production of more fissile materials for nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Nielsen, Christopher E.; Wilson, Dulaney A.; Brooks, Antone L.
The long-term retention of inhaled soluble forms of plutonium raises concerns as to the potential health effects in persons working in nuclear energy or the nuclear weapons program. The distributions of long-term retained inhaled plutonium-nitrate [239Pu (NO3)4] deposited in the lungs of an accidentally exposed nuclear worker (Human Case 0269) and in the lungs of experimentally exposed beagle dogs with varying initial lung depositions were determined via autoradiographs of selected histological lung, lymph node, trachea, and nasal turbinate tissue sections. These studies showed that both the human and dogs had a non-uniform distribution of plutonium throughout the lung tissue. Fibroticmore » scar tissue effectively encapsulated a portion of the plutonium and prevented its clearance from the body or translocation to other tissues and diminished dose to organ parenchyma. Alpha radiation activity from deposited plutonium in Human Case 0269 was observed primarily along the sub-pleural regions while no alpha activity was seen in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes of this individual. However, relatively high activity levels in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes of the beagles indicated the lymphatic system was effective in clearing deposited plutonium from the lung tissues. In both the human case and beagle dogs, the appearance of retained plutonium within the respiratory tract was inconsistent with current biokinetic models of clearance for soluble forms of plutonium. Bound plutonium can have a marked effect on the dose to the lungs and subsequent radiation exposure has the potential increase in cancer risk.« less
A simple model for the critical mass of a nuclear weapon
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Reed, B. Cameron
2018-07-01
A probability-based model for estimating the critical mass of a fissile isotope is developed. The model requires introducing some concepts from nuclear physics and incorporating some approximations, but gives results correct to about a factor of two for uranium-235 and plutonium-239.
Measurements of plutonium, 237Np, and 137Cs in the BCR 482 lichen reference material
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lavelle, Kevin B.; Miller, Jeffrey L.; Hanson, Susan K.
Select anthropogenic radionuclides were measured in lichen reference material, BCR 482. This material was originally collected in Axalp, Switzerland in 1991 and is composed of the epiphytic lichen Pseudevernia furfuracea. Samples from three separate bottles of BCR 482 were analyzed for uranium, neptunium, and plutonium isotopes by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and analyzed for cesium-137 by gamma-ray spectrometry. The isotopic composition of the radionuclides measured in BCR 482 suggests contributions from both global fallout resulting from historical nuclear weapons testing and more volatile materials released following the Chernobyl accident.
Measurements of plutonium, 237Np, and 137Cs in the BCR 482 lichen reference material
Lavelle, Kevin B.; Miller, Jeffrey L.; Hanson, Susan K.; ...
2015-10-01
Select anthropogenic radionuclides were measured in lichen reference material, BCR 482. This material was originally collected in Axalp, Switzerland in 1991 and is composed of the epiphytic lichen Pseudevernia furfuracea. Samples from three separate bottles of BCR 482 were analyzed for uranium, neptunium, and plutonium isotopes by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and analyzed for cesium-137 by gamma-ray spectrometry. The isotopic composition of the radionuclides measured in BCR 482 suggests contributions from both global fallout resulting from historical nuclear weapons testing and more volatile materials released following the Chernobyl accident.
A Plutonium-Contaminated Wound, 1985, USA
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Doran M. Christensen, DO, REAC /TS Associate Director and Staff Physician Eugene H. Carbaugh, CHP, Staff Scientist, Internal Dosimetry Manager, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington
2012-02-02
A hand injury occurred at a U.S. facility in 1985 involving a pointed shaft (similar to a meat thermometer) that a worker was using to remove scrap solid plutonium from a plastic bottle. The worker punctured his right index finger on the palm side at the metacarpal-phalangeal joint. The wound was not through-and- through, although it was deep. The puncture wound resulted in deposition of ~48 kBq of alpha activity from the weapons-grade plutonium mixture with a nominal 12 to 1 Pu-alpha to {sup 241}Am-alpha ratio. This case clearly showed that DTPA was very effective for decorporation of plutonium andmore » americium. The case is a model for management of wounds contaminated with transuranics: (1) a team approach for dealing with all of the issues surrounding the incident, including the psychological, (2) early surgical intervention for foreign-body removal, (3) wound irrigation with DTPA solution, and (4) early and prolonged DTPA administration based upon bioassay and in vivo dosimetry.« less
A long view of global plutonium management
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Wagner, R.L. Jr.
1995-10-01
Dealing with the large and growing world inventories of fissile materials from all sources is a major part of the long term challenge of limiting the danger from nuclear weapons. Providing clean, safe nuclear power may also be needed to prevent conditions from arising which could lead to large scale nuclear weapon (re)armament. ADTT technologies might reconcile the seeming dilemma of providing nuclear power while maintaining a very low world inventory of nuclear materials which can be used in weapons. This vision for ADTT should be tested in a variety of ways, including comparisons with competing approaches and with othermore » objectives. Such testing is one part of constructing a path for a decades-long, worldwide implementation campaign for ADTT.« less
Jaegler, Hugo; Pointurier, Fabien; Onda, Yuichi; Hubert, Amélie; Laceby, J Patrick; Cirella, Maëva; Evrard, Olivier
2018-05-04
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) accident resulted in a significant release of radionuclides that were deposited on soils in Northeastern Japan. Plutonium was detected at trace levels in soils and sediments collected around the FDNPP. However, little is known regarding the spatial-temporal variation of plutonium in sediment transiting rivers in the region. In this study, plutonium isotopic compositions were first measured in soils (n = 5) in order to investigate the initial plutonium deposition. Then, plutonium isotopic compositions were measured on flood sediment deposits (n = 12) collected after major typhoon events in 2011, 2013 and 2014. After a thorough radiochemical purification, isotopic ratios ( 240 Pu/ 239 Pu, 241 Pu/ 239 Pu and 242 Pu/ 239 Pu) were measured with a Multi-Collector Inductively Coupled Mass Spectrometer (MC ICP-MS), providing discrimination between plutonium derived from global fallout, from atmospheric nuclear weapon tests, and plutonium derived from the FDNPP accident. Results demonstrate that soils with the most Fukushima-derived plutonium were in the main radiocaesium plume and that there was a variable mixture of plutonium sources in the flood sediment samples. Plutonium concentrations and isotopic ratios generally decreased between 2011 and 2014, reflecting the progressive erosion and transport of contaminated sediment in this coastal river during flood events. Exceptions to this general trend were attributed to the occurrence of decontamination works or the remobilisation of contaminated material during typhoons. The different plutonium concentrations and isotopic ratios obtained on three aliquots of a single sample suggest that the Fukushima-derived plutonium was likely borne by discrete plutonium-containing particles. In the future, these particles should be isolated and further characterized in order to better understand the fate of this long-lived radionuclide in the environment. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat
2010-01-01
Bermudez, Joseph S., “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan , and James J. Wirtz, eds...Korea Has ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium,” Associated Press, January 17, 2009. Robbins, Carla Anne, and Gordon Fairclough, “North Korea Sparks Proliferation
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Reed, B. Cameron
2014-12-01
The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.
Advanced research workshop: nuclear materials safety
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jardine, L J; Moshkov, M M
The Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on Nuclear Materials Safety held June 8-10, 1998, in St. Petersburg, Russia, was attended by 27 Russian experts from 14 different Russian organizations, seven European experts from six different organizations, and 14 U.S. experts from seven different organizations. The ARW was conducted at the State Education Center (SEC), a former Minatom nuclear training center in St. Petersburg. Thirty-three technical presentations were made using simultaneous translations. These presentations are reprinted in this volume as a formal ARW Proceedings in the NATO Science Series. The representative technical papers contained here cover nuclear material safety topics on themore » storage and disposition of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium (HEU) fissile materials, including vitrification, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, plutonium ceramics, reprocessing, geologic disposal, transportation, and Russian regulatory processes. This ARW completed discussions by experts of the nuclear materials safety topics that were not covered in the previous, companion ARW on Nuclear Materials Safety held in Amarillo, Texas, in March 1997. These two workshops, when viewed together as a set, have addressed most nuclear material aspects of the storage and disposition operations required for excess HEU and plutonium. As a result, specific experts in nuclear materials safety have been identified, know each other from their participation in t he two ARW interactions, and have developed a partial consensus and dialogue on the most urgent nuclear materials safety topics to be addressed in a formal bilateral program on t he subject. A strong basis now exists for maintaining and developing a continuing dialogue between Russian, European, and U.S. experts in nuclear materials safety that will improve the safety of future nuclear materials operations in all the countries involved because of t he positive synergistic effects of focusing these diverse backgrounds of nuclear experience on a common objectiveÑthe safe and secure storage and disposition of excess fissile nuclear materials.« less
Aqueous Electrochemical Mechanisms in Actinide Residue Processing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Morris, David E.; Burns, Carol J.; Smith, Wayne H.
2000-12-31
Plutonium and uranium residues (e.g., incinerator ash, combustibles, and sand/slag/crucibles) resulting from the purification and processing of nuclear materials constitute an enormous volume of ''lean'' processing waste and represent a significant fraction of the U. S. Department of Energy's (DOE) legacy waste from fifty years of nuclear weapons production activities. Much of this material is presently in storage at sites throughout the DOE weapons production complex (most notably Rocky Flats, Savannah River and Hanford) awaiting further processing and/or final disposition. The chemical and physical stability of much of this material has been called into question recently by the Defense Nuclearmore » Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) and resulted in the issuance of a mandate by the DNFSB to undertake a program to stabilize these materials [1]. The ultimate disposition for much of these materials is anticipated to be geologic repositories such as the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. However, in light of the mandate to stabilize existing residues and the probable concomitant increase in the volume of material to be disposed as a result of stabilization (e.g., from repackaging at lower residue densities), the projected storage volume for these wastes within anticipated geologic repositories will likely be exceeded simply to handle existing wastes. Additional processing of some of these residue waste streams to reduce radionuclide activity levels, matrix volume, or both is a potentially important strategy to achieve both stabilization and volume reduction so that the anticipated geologic repositories will provide adequate storage volume. In general, the plutonium and uranium that remains in solid residue materials exists in a very stable chemical form (e.g., as binary oxides), and the options available to remove the actinides are limited. However, there have been some demonstrated successes in this vain using aqueous phase electrochemical methods such as the Catalyzed Electrochemical Plutonium Oxide Dissolution (CEPOD) process pioneered by workers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in the mid-1970s [2]. The basis for most of these mediated electrochemical oxidation/reduction (MEO/R) processes is the generation of a dissolved electrochemical catalyst, such as Ag2+, which is capable of oxidizing or reducing solid-phase actinide species or actinide sorbates via 7 heterogeneous electron transfer to oxidation states that have significantly greater solubilities (e.g., PuO2(s) to PuO2 2+ (dissolved)). The solubilized actinide can then be recovered by ion exchange or other mechanisms. These aqueous electrochemical methods for residue treatment have been considered in many of the ''trade studies'' to evaluate options for stabilization of the various categories of residue materials. While some concerns generally arise (e.g., large secondary waste volumes could results since the process stream normally goes th rough anion exchange or precipitation steps to remove the actinide), the real utility and versatility of these methods should not be overlooked. They are low temperature, ambient pressure processes that operate in a non-corrosive environment. In principle, they can be designed to be highly selective for the actinides (i.e., no substrate degradation occurs), they can be utilized for many categories of residue materials with little or no modification in hardware or operating conditions, and they can conceivably be engineered to minimize secondary waste stream volume. However, some fundamental questions remain concerning the mechanisms through which these processes act, and how the processes might be optimized to maximize efficiency while minimizing secondary waste. In addition, given the success achieved to date on the limited set of residues, further research is merited to extend the range of applicability of these electrochemical methods to other residue and waste streams. The principal goal of the work described here is to develop a fundamental understanding of the heterogeneous electron transfer thermodynamics and kinetics that lie at the heart of the MEO/R processes for actinide solids and actinide species entrained in or surface-bound to residue substrates. This has been accomplished as described in detail below through spectroscopic characterization of actinide-bearing substrates and electrochemical investigations of electron transfer reactions between uranium- and plutonium- (or surrogates) bearing solids (dispersed actinide solid phases and actinides sorbed to inorganic and organic colloids) and polarizable electrode materials. In general, the actinide solids or substrate-supported species were chosen to represent relevant residue materials (e.g., incinerator ash, sand/slag/crucible, and combustibles).« less
Effects of Aging on PuO2∙xH2O Particle Size in Alkaline Solution
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Delegard, Calvin H.
Between 1944 and 1989, 54.5 metric tons of the United States’ weapons-grade plutonium and an additional 12.9 metric tons of fuel-grade plutonium were produced and separated from irradiated fuel at the Hanford Site. Acidic high-activity wastes containing around 600 kg of plutonium were made alkaline and discharged to underground storage tanks from separations, isolation, and recycle processes to yield average plutonium concentration of about 0.003 grams per liter (or ~0.0002 wt%) in the ~200 million liter tank waste volume. The plutonium is largely associated with low-solubility metal hydroxide/oxide sludges where its low concentration and intimate mixture with neutron-absorbing elements (e.g.,more » iron) are credited in nuclear criticality safety. However, concerns have been expressed that plutonium, in the form of plutonium hydrous oxide, PuO2∙xH2O, could undergo sufficient crystal growth through dissolution and reprecipitation in the alkaline tank waste to potentially become separable from neutron absorbing constituents by settling or sedimentation. Thermodynamic considerations and laboratory studies of systems chemically analogous to tank waste show that the plutonium formed in the alkaline tank waste by precipitation through neutralization from acid solution probably entered as 2–4-nm PuO2∙xH2O crystallite particles that, because of their low solubility and opposition from radiolytic processes, grow from that point at exceedingly slow rates, thus posing no risk of physical segregation.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Robertson, Janeen Denise
In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the controlmore » groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
White, M.G.; Pfuderer, H.A.
This bibliography serves as a guide to the environmental studies sponsored by the Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) at the Department of Energy Nevada Test Site nuclear weapons complex. The NAEG is part of the Nevada Operations Office of the United States Department of Energy. The references included in the bibliography reflect the interests of the NAEG (e.g., hazard evaluation of the nuclear safety-shot sites). The objectives of the NAEG plutonium studies at the Nevada Test Site were defined as follows: (1) delineate locations of contamination; (2) determine concentrations in ecosystem components; (3) quantify rates of movements among ecosystem components;more » (4) evaluate radiological hazards of plutonium; (5) identify areas which need to be cleaned up or treated; and (6) develop techniques for cleanup or treatment.« less
Improved plutonium identification and characterization results with NaI(Tl) detector using ASEDRA
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Detwiler, R.; Sjoden, G.; Baciak, J.; LaVigne, E.
2008-04-01
The ASEDRA algorithm (Advanced Synthetically Enhanced Detector Resolution Algorithm) is a tool developed at the University of Florida to synthetically enhance the resolved photopeaks derived from a characteristically poor resolution spectra collected at room temperature from scintillator crystal-photomultiplier detector, such as a NaI(Tl) system. This work reports on analysis of a side-by-side test comparing the identification capabilities of ASEDRA applied to a NaI(Tl) detector with HPGe results for a Plutonium Beryllium (PuBe) source containing approximately 47 year old weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu), a test case of real-world interest with a complex spectra including plutonium isotopes and 241Am decay products. The analysis included a comparison of photopeaks identified and photopeak energies between the ASEDRA and HPGe detector systems, and the known energies of the plutonium isotopes. ASEDRA's performance in peak area accuracy, also important in isotope identification as well as plutonium quality and age determination, was evaluated for key energy lines by comparing the observed relative ratios of peak areas, adjusted for efficiency and attenuation due to source shielding, to the predicted ratios from known energy line branching and source isotopics. The results show that ASEDRA has identified over 20 lines also found by the HPGe and directly correlated to WGPu energies.
The myth of the ``proliferation-resistant'' closed nuclear fuel cycle
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lyman, Edwin S.
2000-07-01
National nuclear energy programs that engage in reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the development of "closed" nuclear fuel cycles based on the utilization of plutonium process and store large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials in forms vulnerable to diversion or theft by national or subnational groups. Proliferation resistance, an idea dating back at least as far as the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) of the late 1970s, is a loosely defined term referring to processes for chemical separation of SNF that do not extract weapons-usable materials in a purified form.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hellesen, C.; Grape, S.; Haakanson, A.
2013-07-01
Fertile blankets can be used in fast reactors to enhance the breeding gain as well as the passive safety characteristics. However, such blankets typically result in the production of weapons grade plutonium. For this reason they are often excluded from Generation IV reactor designs. In this paper we demonstrate that using blankets manufactured directly from spent light water (LWR) reactor fuel it is possible to produce a plutonium product with non-proliferation characteristics on a par with spent LWR fuel of 30-50 MWd/kg burnup. The beneficial breeding and safety characteristics are retained. (authors)
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues
2009-05-26
Warren Strobel , “North Korean nuclear documents challenge CIA assertions,” McClatchyNewspapers, May 28, 2008. 23 “N.K. says plutonium ‘weaponized’ and...Chosun Ilbo, January 29, 2008. 78 Lee Chi-dong, “N Korea Complains About Slow Provision of Energy Aid,” Yonhap News, June 5, 2008. 79 “N. Korea
A Physicist Looks at the Terrorist Threat
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Muller, Richard
2009-05-01
Many people fear a terrorist nuclear device, smuggled into the United States, as the one weapon that could surpass the destruction and impact of 9-11. I'll review the design of nuclear weapons, with emphasis on the kinds that can be developed by rogue nations, terrorist groups, and high-school students. Saddam, prior to the first gulf war, was developing a uranium bomb, similar to the one that destroyed Hiroshima. His calutrons (named after my university) were destroyed by the United Nations. The North Korean nuclear weapon was, like the U.S. bomb used on Nagasaki, based on plutonium. Its test released the energy equivalent of about 400 tons of TNT. Although some people have speculated that they were attempting to build a small bomb, it is far more likely that this weapon was a fizzle, with less than 1 percent of the plutonium exploded. In contrast, the energy released from burning jet fuel at the 9-11 World Trade Center attack was the equivalent of 900 tons of TNT for each plane -- over twice that of the North Korean Nuke. The damage came from the fact that gasoline delivers 10 kilocalories per gram, about 15 times the energy of an equal weight of TNT. It is this huge energy per gram that also accounts for our addiction to gasoline; per gram, high performance lithium-ion computer batteries carry only 1 percent as much energy. A dirty bomb (radiological weapon) is also unattractive to terrorists because of the threhold effect: doses less than 100 rem produce no radiation illness and will leave no dead bodies at the scene. That may be why al Qaeda instructed Jose Padilla to abandon his plans for a dirty bomb attack in Chicago, and to try a fossil fuel attack (natural gas) instead. I will argue that the biggest terrorist threat is the conventional low-tech one, such as an airplane attack on a crowded stadium using the explosive fuel that they can legally buy at the corner station.
The scheme for evaluation of isotopic composition of fast reactor core in closed nuclear fuel cycle
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Saldikov, I. S.; Ternovykh, M. Yu; Fomichenko, P. A.; Gerasimov, A. S.
2017-01-01
The PRORYV (i.e. «Breakthrough» in Russian) project is currently under development. Within the framework of this project, fast reactors BN-1200 and BREST-OD-300 should be built to, inter alia, demonstrate possibility of the closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies with plutonium as a main source of power. Russia has a large inventory of plutonium which was accumulated in the result of reprocessing of spent fuel of thermal power reactors and conversion of nuclear weapons. This kind of plutonium will be used for development of initial fuel assemblies for fast reactors. To solve the closed nuclear fuel modeling tasks REPRORYV code was developed. It simulates the mass flow for nuclides in the closed fuel cycle. This paper presents the results of modeling of a closed nuclear fuel cycle, nuclide flows considering the influence of the uncertainty on the outcome of neutron-physical characteristics of the reactor.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Pistner, C.; Liebert, W.; Fujara, F.
2006-06-01
Inert matrix fuels (IMF) with plutonium may play a significant role to dispose of stockpiles of separated plutonium from military or civilian origin. For reasons of reactivity control of such fuels, burnable poisons (BP) will have to be used. The impact of different possible BP candidates (B, Eu, Er and Gd) on the achievable burnup as well as on safety and non-proliferation aspects of IMF are analyzed. To this end, cell burnup calculations have been performed and burnup dependent reactivity coefficients (boron worth, fuel temperature and moderator void coefficient) were calculated. All BP candidates were analyzed for one initial BP concentration and a range of different initial plutonium-concentrations (0.4-1.0 g cm-3) for reactor-grade plutonium isotopic composition as well as for weapon-grade plutonium. For the two most promising BP candidates (Er and Gd), a range of different BP concentrations was investigated to study the impact of BP concentration on fuel burnup. A set of reference fuels was identified to compare the performance of uranium-fuels, MOX and IMF with respect to (1) the fraction of initial plutonium being burned, (2) the remaining absolute plutonium concentration in the spent fuel and (3) the shift in the isotopic composition of the remaining plutonium leading to differences in the heat and neutron rate produced. In the case of IMF, the remaining Pu in spent fuel is unattractive for a would be proliferator. This underlines the attractiveness of an IMF approach for disposal of Pu from a non-proliferation perspective.
Determination of filter pore size for use in HB line phase II production of plutonium oxide
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Shehee, T.; Crowder, M.; Rudisill, T.
2014-08-01
H-Canyon and HB-Line are tasked with the production of plutonium oxide (PuO 2) from a feed of plutonium (Pu) metal. The PuO 2 will provide feed material for the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. After dissolution of the Pu metal in H-Canyon, plans are to transfer the solution to HB-Line for purification by anion exchange. Anion exchange will be followed by plutonium(IV) oxalate precipitation, filtration, and calcination to form PuO 2. The filtrate solutions, remaining after precipitation, contain low levels of Pu ions, oxalate ions, and may include solids. These solutions are transferred to H-Canyon for disposition. To mitigatemore » the criticality concern of Pu solids in a Canyon tank, past processes have used oxalate destruction or have pre-filled the Canyon tank with a neutron poison. The installation of a filter on the process lines from the HB-Line filtrate tanks to H-Canyon Tank 9.6 is proposed to remove plutonium oxalate solids. This report describes SRNL’s efforts to determine the appropriate pore size for the filters needed to perform this function. Information provided in this report aids in developing the control strategies for solids in the process.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Adem, ACIR; Eşref, BAYSAL
2018-07-01
In this paper, neutronic analysis in a laser fusion inertial confinement fusion fission energy (LIFE) engine fuelled plutonium and minor actinides using a MCNP codes was investigated. LIFE engine fuel zone contained 10 vol% TRISO particles and 90 vol% natural lithium coolant mixture. TRISO fuel compositions have Mod①: reactor grade plutonium (RG-Pu), Mod②: weapon grade plutonium (WG-Pu) and Mod③: minor actinides (MAs). Tritium breeding ratios (TBR) were computed as 1.52, 1.62 and 1.46 for Mod①, Mod② and Mod③, respectively. The operation period was computed as ∼21 years when the reference TBR > 1.05 for a self-sustained reactor for all investigated cases. Blanket energy multiplication values (M) were calculated as 4.18, 4.95 and 3.75 for Mod①, Mod② and Mod③, respectively. The burnup (BU) values were obtained as ∼1230, ∼1550 and ∼1060 GWd tM–1, respectively. As a result, the higher BU were provided with using TRISO particles for all cases in LIFE engine.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hagen, Gary D.
Export Control Reform has been in motion for six years. In 2014, the ITAR regulations surrendered export control of nuclear weapons technology to the control of DOE. Yet no Federal Register notice by DOE detailed where those new regulations could be found. This article explains the disposition that occurred.
Methodology for worker neutron exposure evaluation in the PDCF facility design.
Scherpelz, R I; Traub, R J; Pryor, K H
2004-01-01
A project headed by Washington Group International is meant to design the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) to convert the plutonium pits from excessed nuclear weapons into plutonium oxide for ultimate disposition. Battelle staff are performing the shielding calculations that will determine appropriate shielding so that the facility workers will not exceed target exposure levels. The target exposure levels for workers in the facility are 5 mSv y(-1) for the whole body and 100 mSv y(-1) for the extremity, which presents a significant challenge to the designers of a facility that will process tons of radioactive material. The design effort depended on shielding calculations to determine appropriate thickness and composition for glove box walls, and concrete wall thicknesses for storage vaults. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) staff used ORIGEN-S and SOURCES to generate gamma and neutron source terms, and Monte Carlo (computer code for) neutron photon (transport) (MCNP-4C) to calculate the radiation transport in the facility. The shielding calculations were performed by a team of four scientists, so it was necessary to develop a consistent methodology. There was also a requirement for the study to be cost-effective, so efficient methods of evaluation were required. The calculations were subject to rigorous scrutiny by internal and external reviewers, so acceptability was a major feature of the methodology. Some of the issues addressed in the development of the methodology included selecting appropriate dose factors, developing a method for handling extremity doses, adopting an efficient method for evaluating effective dose equivalent in a non-uniform radiation field, modelling the reinforcing steel in concrete, and modularising the geometry descriptions for efficiency. The relative importance of the neutron dose equivalent compared with the gamma dose equivalent varied substantially depending on the specific shielding conditions and lessons were learned from this effect. This paper addresses these issues and the resulting methodology.
H CANYON PROCESSING IN CORRELATION WITH FH ANALYTICAL LABS
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Weinheimer, E.
2012-08-06
Management of radioactive chemical waste can be a complicated business. H Canyon and F/H Analytical Labs are two facilities present at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, SC that are at the forefront. In fact H Canyon is the only large-scale radiochemical processing facility in the United States and this processing is only enhanced by the aid given from F/H Analytical Labs. As H Canyon processes incoming materials, F/H Labs provide support through a variety of chemical analyses. Necessary checks of the chemical makeup, processing, and accountability of the samples taken from H Canyon process tanks are performed at themore » labs along with further checks on waste leaving the canyon after processing. Used nuclear material taken in by the canyon is actually not waste. Only a small portion of the radioactive material itself is actually consumed in nuclear reactors. As a result various radioactive elements such as Uranium, Plutonium and Neptunium are commonly found in waste and may be useful to recover. Specific processing is needed to allow for separation of these products from the waste. This is H Canyon's specialty. Furthermore, H Canyon has the capacity to initiate the process for weapons-grade nuclear material to be converted into nuclear fuel. This is one of the main campaigns being set up for the fall of 2012. Once usable material is separated and purified of impurities such as fission products, it can be converted to an oxide and ultimately turned into commercial fuel. The processing of weapons-grade material for commercial fuel is important in the necessary disposition of plutonium. Another processing campaign to start in the fall in H Canyon involves the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel for disposal in improved containment units. The importance of this campaign involves the proper disposal of nuclear waste in order to ensure the safety and well-being of future generations and the environment. As processing proceeds in the fall, H Canyon will have a substantial number of samples being sent to F/H Labs. All analyses of these samples are imperative to safe and efficient processing. The important campaigns to occur would be impossible without feedback from analyses such as chemical makeup of solutions, concentrations of dissolution acids and nuclear material, as well as nuclear isotopic data. The necessity of analysis for radiochemical processing is evident. Processing devoid of F/H Lab's feedback would go against the ideals of a safety-conscious and highly accomplished processing facility such as H Canyon.« less
Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Danker, W.
1996-05-01
This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for anymore » planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.« less
New Organic Scintillators for Neutron Detection
2016-03-01
highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium. Neutrons and gamma rays are two signatures of these materials. Gamma ray detection techniques are...New Organic Scintillators for Neutron Detection Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. March...Title: New Organic Scintillators for Neutron Detection I. Abstract In this project, Radiation Monitoring Devices (RMD) proposes to develop novel
2015-05-01
provide a cross section of the types of programs and activities the Council oversees. Specifically, we selected the B61 -12 life-extension program; the... B61 -12 life-extension program; the W76-1 life-extension program; the plutonium strategy; and budget- related activities,7 such as the Council’s
Plutonium immobilization in glass and ceramics
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Knecht, D.A.; Murphy, W.M.
1996-05-01
The Materials Research Society Nineteenth Annual Symposium on the Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management was held in Boston on November 27 to December 1, 1995. Over 150 papers were presented at the Symposium dealing with all aspects of nuclear waste management and disposal. Fourteen oral sessions and on poster session included a Plenary session on surplus plutonium dispositioning and waste forms. The proceedings, to be published in April, 1996, will provide a highly respected, referred compilation of the state of scientific development in the field of nuclear waste management. This paper provides a brief overview of the selected Symposiummore » papers that are applicable to plutonium immobilization and plutonium waste form performance. Waste forms that were described at the Symposium cover most of the candidate Pu immobilization options under consideration, including borosilicate glass with a melting temperature of 1150 {degrees}C, a higher temperature (1450 {degrees}C) lanthanide glass, single phase ceramics, multi-phase ceramics, and multi-phase crystal-glass composites (glass-ceramics or slags). These Symposium papers selected for this overview provide the current status of the technology in these areas and give references to the relevant literature.« less
Radioisotope contaminations from releases of the Tomsk-Seversk nuclear facility (Siberia, Russia).
Gauthier-Lafaye, F; Pourcelot, L; Eikenberg, J; Beer, H; Le Roux, G; Rhikvanov, L P; Stille, P; Renaud, Ph; Mezhibor, A
2008-04-01
Soils have been sampled in the vicinity of the Tomsk-Seversk facility (Siberia, Russia) that allows us to measure radioactive contaminations due to atmospheric and aquatic releases. Indeed soils exhibit large inventories of man-made fission products including 137Cs (ranging from 33,000 to 68,500 Bq m(-2)) and actinides such as plutonium (i.e. 239+240Pu from 420 to 5900 Bq m(-2)) or 241Am (160-1220 Bq m(-2)). Among all sampling sites, the bank of the Romashka channel exhibits the highest radioisotope concentrations. At this site, some short half-life gamma emitters were detected as well indicating recent aquatic discharge in the channel. In comparison, soils that underwent atmospheric depositions like peat and forest soils exhibit lower activities of actinides and 137Cs. Soil activities are too high to be related solely to global fallout and thus the source of plutonium must be discharges from the Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) plant. This is confirmed by plutonium isotopic ratios measured by ICP-MS; the low 241Pu/239Pu and 240Pu/239Pu atomic ratios with respect to global fallout ratio or civil nuclear fuel are consistent with weapons grade signatures. Up to now, the influence of Tomsk-Seversk plutonium discharges was speculated in the Ob River and its estuary. Isotopic data from the present study show that plutonium measured in SCC probably constitutes a significant source of plutonium in the aquatic environment, together with plutonium from global fallout and other contaminated sites including Tomsk, Mayak (Russia) and Semipalatinsk (Republic of Kazakhstan). It is estimated that the proportion of plutonium from SCC source can reach 45% for 239Pu and 60% for 241Pu in the sediments.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Shoemaker, Paul E.; Hardin, Ernest; Park, HeeHo Daniel
The subject report from High Bridge Associates (HBA) was issued on March 2, 2016, in reaction to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program decision to pursue down-blending of surplus Pu and geologic disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Sandia National Laboratories was requested by the DOE to review the technical arguments presented in the HBA report. Specifically, this review is organized around three technical topics: criticality safety, radiological release limits, and thermal impacts. Questions raised by the report pertaining to legal and regulatory requirements, safeguards and security, international agreements, and costing of alternatives, are beyond the scopemore » of this review.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Chamizo, E.; García-León, M.; Synal, H.-A.; Suter, M.; Wacker, L.
2006-08-01
In 1966, the nuclear fuel of two thermonuclear bombs was released over the Spanish region of Palomares, due to a B52 bomber accident during a refuelling operation. Since then, much effort has been made to assess its impact to the different environmental compartments of this area in South-East Spain, mostly by measuring the 239+240Pu activity concentration and the 238Pu/239+240Pu activity ratio. Nevertheless, these measurements do not give enough information on the problem. In order to recognize unambiguously small traces of the weapon-grade plutonium released in the accident, the ratio of the two major isotopes of plutonium, 240Pu/239Pu, has to be determined. In this work, this ratio has been measured in low- and high-activity samples from Palomares by means of low-energy accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). That way, we will show the potential of the new generation of compact AMS facilities in terms of plutonium characterization at ultra-trace levels.
77 FR 12622 - Records Schedules; Availability and Request for Comments
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-03-01
... chemical weapons convention program records and protocol program records. 3. Department of Defense, Defense... disposition process is available on request. Schedules Pending 1. Department of the Army, Agency-wide (N1-AU... programs, housing, recreation, and travel. 2. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, (N1...
Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism
2007-07-01
lower cost than other gamma radiation detectors (if increased count rate is all one is looking for). Low cost makes plastic scintillation detectors...material, particularly enriched uranium and plutonium, the basic fuel for nuclear bombs. • Measures to strengthen international institutions to... uranium to specifications required for a nuclear weapon.1 This illicit shipment of centrifuges was part of an international nuclear materials
Radiological analysis of plutonium glass batches with natural/enriched boron
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Rainisch, R.
2000-06-22
The disposition of surplus plutonium inventories by the US Department of Energy (DOE) includes the immobilization of certain plutonium materials in a borosilicate glass matrix, also referred to as vitrification. This paper addresses source terms of plutonium masses immobilized in a borosilicate glass matrix where the glass components include both natural boron and enriched boron. The calculated source terms pertain to neutron and gamma source strength (particles per second), and source spectrum changes. The calculated source terms corresponding to natural boron and enriched boron are compared to determine the benefits (decrease in radiation source terms) for to the use ofmore » enriched boron. The analysis of plutonium glass source terms shows that a large component of the neutron source terms is due to (a, n) reactions. The Americium-241 and plutonium present in the glass emit alpha particles (a). These alpha particles interact with low-Z nuclides like B-11, B-10, and O-17 in the glass to produce neutrons. The low-Z nuclides are referred to as target particles. The reference glass contains 9.4 wt percent B{sub 2}O{sub 3}. Boron-11 was found to strongly support the (a, n) reactions in the glass matrix. B-11 has a natural abundance of over 80 percent. The (a, n) reaction rates for B-10 are lower than for B-11 and the analysis shows that the plutonium glass neutron source terms can be reduced by artificially enriching natural boron with B-10. The natural abundance of B-10 is 19.9 percent. Boron enriched to 96-wt percent B-10 or above can be obtained commercially. Since lower source terms imply lower dose rates to radiation workers handling the plutonium glass materials, it is important to know the achievable decrease in source terms as a result of boron enrichment. Plutonium materials are normally handled in glove boxes with shielded glass windows and the work entails both extremity and whole-body exposures. Lowering the source terms of the plutonium batches will make the handling of these materials less difficult and will reduce radiation exposure to operating workers.« less
Supplying the nuclear arsenal: Production reactor technology, management, and policy, 1942--1992
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Carlisle, R.P.; Zenzen, J.M.
1994-01-01
This book focuses on the lineage of America`s production reactors, those three at Hanford and their descendants, the reactors behind America`s nuclear weapons. The work will take only occasional sideways glances at the collateral lines of descent, the reactor cousins designed for experimental purposes, ship propulsion, and electric power generation. Over the decades from 1942 through 1992, fourteen American production reactors made enough plutonium to fuel a formidable arsenal of more than twenty thousand weapons. In the last years of that period, planners, nuclear engineers, and managers struggled over designs for the next generation of production reactors. The story ofmore » fourteen individual machines and of the planning effort to replace them might appear relatively narrow. Yet these machines lay at the heart of the nation`s nuclear weapons complex. The story of these machines is the story of arming the winning weapon, supplying the nuclear arms race. This book is intended to capture the history of the first fourteen production reactors, and associated design work, in the face of the end of the Cold War.« less
Biomedical aspects of natural and manufactured environmental radioactivity
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hodge, V.
1996-12-31
While weapons testing has altered natural radioactivity background, manufactured radioactivity in most parts of the world constitutes but a very small fraction of the total alpha, beta, and gamma radioactivity in soil, air, water, and the biota. For example, in the early 1970s, we found what appeared to be the highest natural concentration of radioactivity ever reported in fish while attempting to measure the manufactured plutonium ({sup 239}Pu and {sup 240}Pu) in organs of oceanic tuna. The natural alpha emitter polonium ({sup 210}Po) was discovered in the same organs at orders of magnitude higher concentrations. In particular, the caecum, whichmore » is a digestive organ composed of many small closed-ended sacs, contained concentrations of polonium as high as 79 pCi/g of wet tissue and lesser amounts of two manufactured isotopes: 0.0001 pCi/g of plutonium and 0.01 pCi/g of radiocesium ({sup 137}Cs). This equates to {approximately}80 rem/yr of radiation dose to this organ, overwhelmingly from the natural polonium, or {approximately}5000 times higher than is found in the human liver, the highest polonium concentration in man. The average background radiation for humans, for comparison, is {approximately}0.2 rem/yr, but the dose for Japanese, whose diet is high in seafood, is {approximately}15 rem/yr. The question arose: {open_quotes}Are these high concentrations of natural polonium limited to oceanic fish?{close_quotes} To answer this question, polonium was determined in the organs of striped bass and catfish from Lake Mead. In a related study, the plutonium and radiocesium ({sup 137}Cs) distributions in soils were determined to ascertain the impact of weapons testing on the natural background radioactivity of soils.« less
``Recycling'' Nuclear Power Plant Waste: Technical Difficulties and Proliferation Concerns
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lyman, Edwin
2007-04-01
One of the most vexing problems associated with nuclear energy is the inability to find a technically and politically viable solution for the disposal of long-lived radioactive waste. The U.S. plan to develop a geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain in Nevada is in jeopardy, as a result of managerial incompetence, political opposition and regulatory standards that may be impossible to meet. As a result, there is growing interest in technologies that are claimed to have the potential to drastically reduce the amount of waste that would require geologic burial and the length of time that the waste would require containment. A scenario for such a vision was presented in the December 2005 Scientific American. While details differ, these technologies share a common approach: they require chemical processing of spent fuel to extract plutonium and other long-lived actinide elements, which would then be ``recycled'' into fresh fuel for advanced reactors and ``transmuted'' into shorter-lived fission products. Such a scheme is the basis for the ``Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,'' a major program unveiled by the Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. This concept is not new, but has been studied for decades. Major obstacles include fundamental safety issues, engineering feasibility and cost. Perhaps the most important consideration in the post-9/11 era is that these technologies involve the separation of plutonium and other nuclear weapon-usable materials from highly radioactive fission products, providing opportunities for terrorists seeking to obtain nuclear weapons. While DOE claims that it will only utilize processes that do not produce ``separated plutonium,'' it has offered no evidence that such technologies would effectively deter theft. It is doubtful that DOE's scheme can be implemented without an unacceptable increase in the risk of nuclear terrorism.
THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIAS ASSOCIATED WITH THORIUM-BASED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES FOR PHWRS
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Prichard, Andrew W.; Niehus, Mark T.; Collins, Brian A.
2011-07-17
This paper reports the continued evaluation of the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with thorium based nuclear fuel cycles. Specifically, this paper examines a thorium fuel cycle in which a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) is fueled with mixtures of natural uranium/233U/thorium. This paper uses a PHWR fueled with natural uranium as a base fuel cycle, and then compares material attractiveness of fuel cycles that use 233U/thorium salted with natural uranium. The results include the material attractiveness of fuel at beginning of life (BoL), end of life (EoL), and the number of fuel assemblies requiredmore » to collect a bare critical mass of plutonium or uranium. This study indicates what is required to render the uranium as having low utility for use in nuclear weapons; in addition, this study estimates the increased number of assemblies required to accumulate a bare critical mass of plutonium that has a higher utility for use in nuclear weapons. This approach identifies that some fuel cycles may be easier to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approach and have a more effective safeguards by design outcome. For this study, approximately one year of fuel is required to be reprocessed to obtain one bare critical mass of plutonium. Nevertheless, the result of this paper suggests that all spent fuel needs to be rigorously safeguarded and provided with high levels of physical protection. This study was performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy /National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). The methodology and key findings will be presented.« less
Using Downhole Probes to Locate and Characterize Buried Transuranic and Mixed Low Level Waste
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Steinman, Donald K; Bramblett, Richard L; Hertzog, Russel C
2012-06-25
Borehole logging probes were developed and tested to locate and quantify transuranic elements in subsurface disposal areas and in contaminated sites at USDOE Weapons Complex sites. A new method of measuring very high levels of chlroine in the subsurface was developed using pulsed neutron technology from oilfield applications. The probes were demonstrated at the Hanford site in wells containing plutonium and other contaminants.
Calorimetry of low mass Pu239 items
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cremers, Teresa L; Sampson, Thomas E
2010-01-01
Calorimetric assay has the reputation of providing the highest precision and accuracy of all nondestructive assay measurements. Unfortunately, non-destructive assay practitioners and measurement consumers often extend, inappropriately, the high precision and accuracy of calorimetric assay to very low mass items. One purpose of this document is to present more realistic expectations for the random uncertainties associated with calorimetric assay for weapons grade plutonium items with masses of 200 grams or less.
International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
2008-05-01
public, plant , and animal), medicine , economics, law enforcement, and the scientific process itself—and thus engage a range of expert and stakeholder...OCCASIONAL PAPER 6 and replace them with fossil fuel plants ; a multilateral effort to dispose of 34 tons of Russian plutonium; and a number of...nonproliferation benefits: there is no technology ‘silver bullet’ that can be built into an enrichment plant or reprocessing plant that can prevent a
Gaffney, Shannon H; Donovan, Ellen P; Shonka, Joseph J; Le, Matthew H; Widner, Thomas E
2013-06-01
In the mid-1940s, the United States began producing atomic weapon components at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In an attempt to better understand historical exposure to nearby residents, this study evaluates plutonium activity in human tissue relative to residential location and length of time at residence. Data on plutonium activity in the lung, vertebrae, and liver of nearby residents were obtained during autopsies as a part of the Los Alamos Tissue Program. Participant residential histories and the distance from each residence to the primary plutonium processing buildings at LANL were evaluated in the analysis. Summary statistics, including Student t-tests and simple regressions, were calculated. Because the biological half-life of plutonium can vary significantly by organ, data were analyzed separately by tissue type (lung, liver, vertebrae). The ratios of plutonium activity (vertebrae:liver; liver:lung) were also analyzed in order to evaluate the importance of timing of exposure. Tissue data were available for 236 participants who lived in a total of 809 locations, of which 677 were verified postal addresses. Residents of Los Alamos were found to have higher plutonium activities in the lung than non-residents. Further, those who moved to Los Alamos before 1955 had higher lung activities than those who moved there later. These trends were not observed with the liver, vertebrae, or vertebrae:liver and liver:lung ratio data, however, and should be interpreted with caution. Although there are many limitations to this study, including the amount of available data and the analytical methods used to analyze the tissue, the overall results indicate that residence (defined as the year that the individual moved to Los Alamos) may have had a strong correlation to plutonium activity in human tissue. This study is the first to present the results of Los Alamos Autopsy Program in relation to residential status and location in Los Alamos. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.
Plutonium isotopes and 241Am in the atmosphere of Lithuania: A comparison of different source terms
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lujanienė, G.; Valiulis, D.; Byčenkienė, S.; Šakalys, J.; Povinec, P. P.
2012-12-01
137Cs, 241Am and Pu isotopes collected in aerosol samples during 1994-2011 were analyzed with special emphasis on better understanding of Pu and Am behavior in the atmosphere. The results from long-term measurements of 240Pu/239Pu atom ratios showed a bimodal frequency distribution with median values of 0.195 and 0.253, indicating two main sources contributing to the Pu activities at the Vilnius sampling station. The low Pu atom ratio of 0.141 could be attributed to the weapon-grade plutonium derived from the nuclear weapon test sites. The frequency of air masses arriving from the North-West and North-East correlated with the Pu atom ratio indicating the input from the sources located in these regions (the Novaya Zemlya test site, Siberian nuclear plants), while no correlation with the Chernobyl region was observed. Measurements carried out during the Fukushima accident showed a negligible impact of this source with Pu activities by four orders of magnitude lower as compared to the Chernobyl accident. The activity concentration of actinides measured in the integrated sample collected in March-April, 2011 showed a small contribution of Pu with unusual activity and atom ratios indicating the presence of the spent fuel of different origin than that of the Chernobyl accident.
Radiochemical determination of 237NP in soil samples contaminated with weapon grade plutonium
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Antón, M. P.; Espinosa, A.; Aragón, A.
2006-01-01
The Palomares terrestrial ecosystem (Spain) constitutes a natural laboratory to study transuranics. This scenario is partially contaminated with weapon-grade plutonium since the burnout and fragmentation of two thermonuclear bombs accidentally dropped in 1966. While performing radiometric measurements in the field, the possible presence of 237Np was observed through its 29 keV gamma emission. To accomplish a detailed characterization of the source term in the contaminated area using the isotopic ratios Pu-Am-Np, the radiochemical isolation and quantification by alpha spectrometry of 237Np was initiated. The selected radiochemical procedure involves separation of Np from Am, U and Pu with ionic resins, given that in soil samples from Palomares 239+240Pu levels are several orders of magnitude higher than 237Np. Then neptunium is isolated using TEVA organic resins. After electrodeposition, quantification is performed by alpha spectrometry. Different tests were done with blank solutions spiked with 236Pu and 237Np, solutions resulting from the total dissolution of radioactive particles and soil samples. Results indicate that the optimal sequential radionuclide separation order is Pu-Np, with decontamination percentages obtained with the ionic resins ranging from 98% to 100%. Also, the addition of NaNO2 has proved to be necessary, acting as a stabilizer of Pu-Np valences.
What Lies Beneath Can Be Imaged
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Johnson, Tim
The Hanford Site was quickly established to help end World War II, making history for producing the plutonium used in the world’s first nuclear weapons. Throughout the Cold War years, Hanford employees produced plutonium for most of the more than 60,000 weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal stockpile. Today, the once highly active nuclear reactors are shut down. And the mission at Hanford turned full-circle as scientists, engineers and specialists work to clean up our nation’s most contaminated nuclear site. PNNL Computational Geophysicist Tim Johnson is helping decision-makers understand the complexity and breadth of the contamination in soils at Hanford.more » Tim and others are applying remote, high-resolution geophysical imaging to determine the extent of contamination in the soil below the surface and understand the processes controlling its movement. They also provide real-time imaging of remediation processes that are working to limit the movement of contaminants below the surface and toward water resources. Geophysical imaging simply means that PNNL scientists are combining the techniques of geology, physics, mathematics and chemistry with supercomputer modeling to create three-dimensional images of the waste and its movement. These real-time, remote images are essential in reducing the uncertainty associated with cleanup costs and remediation technologies.« less
Measurement of 240Pu/239Pu isotopic ratios in soils from the Marshall Islands using ICP-MS.
Muramatsu, Y; Hamilton, T; Uchida, S; Tagami, K; Yoshida, S; Robison, W
2001-10-20
Nuclear weapons tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands produced significant quantities of regional or tropospheric fallout contamination. Here we report on some preliminary inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) measurements of plutonium isolated from seven composite soil samples collected from Bikini, Enewetak and Rongelap Atolls in the northern Marshall Islands. These data show that 240Pu/239Pu isotopic signatures in surface soils from the Marshall Island vary significantly and could potentially be used to help quantify the range and extent of fallout deposition (and associated impacts) from specific weapons tests. 137Cs and 60Co were also determined on the same set of soil samples for comparative purposes.
DOUBLE TRACKS Test Site interim corrective action plan
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
The DOUBLE TRACKS site is located on Range 71 north of the Nellis Air Force Range, northwest of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). DOUBLE TRACKS was the first of four experiments that constituted Operation ROLLER COASTER. On May 15, 1963, weapons-grade plutonium and depleted uranium were dispersed using 54 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT) explosive. The explosion occurred in the open, 0.3 m above the steel plate. No fission yield was detected from the test, and the total amount of plutonium deposited on the ground surface was estimated to be between 980 and 1,600 grams. The test device was composed primarilymore » of uranium-238 and plutonium-239. The mass ratio of uranium to plutonium was 4.35. The objective of the corrective action is to reduce the potential risk to human health and the environment and to demonstrate technically viable and cost-effective excavation, transportation, and disposal. To achieve these objectives, Bechtel Nevada (BN) will remove soil with a total transuranic activity greater then 200 pCI/g, containerize the soil in ``supersacks,`` transport the filled ``supersacks`` to the NTS, and dispose of them in the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site. During this interim corrective action, BN will also conduct a limited demonstration of an alternative method for excavation of radioactive near-surface soil contamination.« less
Hain, Karin; Faestermann, Thomas; Fimiani, Leticia; Golser, Robin; Gómez-Guzmán, José Manuel; Korschinek, Gunther; Kortmann, Florian; Lierse von Gostomski, Christoph; Ludwig, Peter; Steier, Peter; Tazoe, Hirofumi; Yamada, Masatoshi
2017-02-21
The concentration of plutonium (Pu) and the isotopic ratios of 240 Pu to 239 Pu and 241 Pu to 239 Pu were determined by accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) in Pacific Ocean water samples (20 L each) collected in late 2012. The isotopic Pu ratios are important indicators of different contamination sources and were used to identify a possible release of Pu into the ocean by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) accident. In particular, 241 Pu is a well-suited indicator for a recent entry of Pu because 241 Pu from fallout of nuclear weapon testings has already significantly decayed. A total of 10 ocean water samples were prepared at the Radiochemie München of the TUM and analyzed at the Vienna Environmental Research Laboratory (VERA). Several samples showed a slightly elevated 240 Pu/ 239 Pu ratio of up to 0.22 ± 0.02 compared to global fallout ( 240 Pu/ 239 Pu = 0.180 ± 0.007), whereas all measured 241 Pu-to- 239 Pu ratios were consistent with nuclear weapon fallout ( 241 Pu/ 239 Pu < 2.4 × 10 -3 ), which means that no impact from the Fukushima accident was detected. From the average 241 Pu-to- 239 Pu ratio of 8 -2 +3 ×10 -4 at a sampling station located at a distance of 39.6 km to FDNPP, the 1-σ upper limit for the FDNPP contribution to the 239 Pu inventory in the water column was estimated to be 0.2%. Pu, with the signature of weapon-grade Pu was found in a single sample collected around 770 km off the west coast of the United States.
Past Exposure to Densely Ionizing Radiation Leaves a Unique Permanent Signature in the Genome
Hande, M. Prakash; Azizova, Tamara V.; Geard, Charles R.; Burak, Ludmilla E.; Mitchell, Catherine R.; Khokhryakov, Valentin F.; Vasilenko, Evgeny K.; Brenner, David J.
2003-01-01
Speculation has long surrounded the question of whether past exposure to ionizing radiation leaves a unique permanent signature in the genome. Intrachromosomal rearrangements or deletions are produced much more efficiently by densely ionizing radiation than by chemical mutagens, x-rays, or endogenous aging processes. Until recently, such stable intrachromosomal aberrations have been very hard to detect, but a new chromosome band painting technique has made their detection practical. We report the detection and quantification of stable intrachromosomal aberrations in lymphocytes of healthy former nuclear-weapons workers who were exposed to plutonium many years ago. Even many years after occupational exposure, more than half the blood cells of the healthy plutonium workers contain large (>6 Mb) intrachromosomal rearrangements. The yield of these aberrations was highly correlated with plutonium dose to the bone marrow. The control groups contained very few such intrachromosomal aberrations. Quantification of this large-scale chromosomal damage in human populations exposed many years earlier will lead to new insights into the mechanisms and risks of cytogenetic damage. PMID:12679897
Independent verification of plutonium decontamination on Johnston Atoll (1992--1996)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Wilson-Nichols, M.J.; Wilson, J.E.; McDowell-Boyer, L.M.
1998-05-01
The Field Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (FCDSWA) (formerly FCDNA) contracted Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Environmental Technology Section (ETS) to conduct an independent verification (IV) of the Johnston Atoll (JA) Plutonium Decontamination Project by an interagency agreement with the US Department of Energy in 1992. The main island is contaminated with the transuranic elements plutonium and americium, and soil decontamination activities have been ongoing since 1984. FCDSWA has selected a remedy that employs a system of sorting contaminated particles from the coral/soil matrix, allowing uncontaminated soil to be reused. The objective of IV is to evaluate the effectiveness ofmore » remedial action. The IV contractor`s task is to determine whether the remedial action contractor has effectively reduced contamination to levels within established criteria and whether the supporting documentation describing the remedial action is adequate. ORNL conducted four interrelated tasks from 1992 through 1996 to accomplish the IV mission. This document is a compilation and summary of those activities, in addition to a comprehensive review of the history of the project.« less
Plutonium isotopes in the Hungarian environment.
Varga, Beata; Tarján, Sandor; Vajda, Nora
2008-04-01
More than 50 soil samples were analysed from different parts of the country, the activity concentration of 239+240Pu was in the range of 0.01-0.84 Bq/kg dry soil with the average of 0.10 Bq/kg. 238Pu could be detected only in few moss samples and 238Pu/239+240Pu ratio determines the origin of plutonium. 241Pu was determined by liquid scintillation spectrometry. The activity concentration of this isotope in the soil is between 0.04 and 3.74 Bq/kg with the average of 0.82 Bq/kg, while in the moss is also similar 0.01-2.07 Bq/kg fresh mass with the average of 0.43 Bq/kg. Significant difference could not be observed between the different types of soils occurring in the country, but the results could be sorted according to the sampling carried out on undisturbed or cultivated area. The isotope ratios 241Pu/239+240Pu prove that the origin of the plutonium in Hungary is the global fallout determined by the atmospheric nuclear weapon tests.
1969-12-01
a five-year supply of enriched uranium for reactor fuel . Nevertheless, it seems clear that some foreign enrichment developments are approaching a...produc- tion of fissile material could powerfully influence the assessment of risks and benefits of a nuclear weapons development program . Since... program is likely to include the production of its own relatively pure fissile plutonium. This would involve more rapid cycling and reprocessing of fuel
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Albright, D.
1995-07-01
This year, the nuclear proliferation spotlight has swung away from Iraq and North Korea, only to focus on Iran. Western intelligence agencies have assembled a substantial body of evidence suggesting that, although Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is secretly pursuing a broad, organized effort to develop nuclear weapons. US officials say that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear technologies that are not consistent with a strictly peaceful program. Intelligence agencies have detected procurement patterns that point to a weapons program. Iran has a multifaceted strategy to develop options to make nuclear weapons: Iran has sought, with limitedmore » success, to buy nuclear power and research facilities from many countries, particularly China and Russia; Iran has shopped quietly in many countries, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, for a wide range of nuclear-related or dual-use nuclear items that might enable it to put together facilities to enrich uranium, separate plutonium, and make nuclear weapons. There is little public information about how effective this clandestine shopping has been or which countries have been contacted; There is no evidence that Iran has bought any fissile material - but not for wont of trying, and the matter continues to be scrutinized very closely.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P.
2012-02-01
A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of 235U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving 233U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
2002-09-01
This audit is one in a series of audits the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested. As part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, DoD agreed to assist the Russian Federation in disposing of its liquid rocket propellant. Public Law 102-228 (section 2551 NOTE, title 22, United States Code), the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 designates DoD as the executive agent for the CTR Program. Specific objectives of the act are to destroy chemical, nuclear, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation of policy for the CTR Program. The CTR Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency operates the program.
Khalsa, Hari-Mandir K; Denes, Attila C; M Pasini-Hill, Diane; Santelli, Jeffrey C; Baldessarini, Ross J
2018-02-01
This study examined the implementation of crisis intervention teams by law enforcement agencies in Colorado. Rates of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) use, arrests, use of force, and injuries were assessed during 6,353 incidents involving individuals experiencing a mental health crisis. Relationships among original complaint, psychiatric illness, substance abuse, violence risk, and disposition of crisis calls were analyzed. Rates of SWAT use (<1%), injuries (<1%), arrests (<5%), and use of force (<5%) were low. The relative risk of transfer to treatment (versus no transfer) was significantly higher for incidents involving psychiatric illness, suicide threat or attempt, weapons, substance abuse, and violence potential. Use of force or SWAT, arrests, and injuries were infrequent. Suicide risk, psychiatric illness and substance abuse, even in the presence of a weapon or violence threat, increased the odds of transfer to treatment, whereas suicide risk lowered the odds of transfer to jail.
Preserving Plutonium-244 as a National Asset
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Patton, Bradley D; Alexander, Charles W; Benker, Dennis
Plutonium-244 (244 Pu) is an extremely rare and long-lived isotope of plutonium with a half-life of 80 million years. Measureable amounts of 244 Pu are found in neither reactor-grade nor weapons-grade plutonium. Production of this isotope requires a very high thermal flux to permit the two successive neutron captures that convert 242 Pu to 243 Pu to 244 Pu, particularly given the short (about 5 hour) half-life of 243 Pu. Such conditions simply do not exist in plutonium production processes. Therefore, 244 Pu is ideal for precise radiochemical analyses measuring plutonium material properties and isotopic concentrations in items containing plutonium.more » Isotope dilution mass spectrometry is about ten times more sensitive when using 244 Pu rather than 242 Pu for determining plutonium isotopic content. The isotope can also be irradiated in small quantities to produce superheavy elements. The majority of the existing global inventory of 244 Pu is contained in the outer housing of Mark-18A targets at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The total inventory is about 20 grams of 244 Pu in about 400 grams of plutonium distributed among the 65 targets. Currently, there are no specific plans to preserve these targets. Although the cost of separating and preserving this material would be considerable, it is trivial in comparison to new production costs. For all practical purposes, the material is irreplaceable, because new production would cost billions of dollars and require a series of irradiation and chemical separation cycles spanning up to 50 years. This paper will discuss a set of options for overcoming the significant challenges to preserve the 244 Pu as a National Asset: (1) the need to relocate the material from SRS in a timely manner, (2) the need to reduce the volume of material to the extent possible for storage, and (3) the need to establish an operational capability to enrich the 244 Pu in significant quantities. This paper suggests that if all the Mark-18A plutonium is separated, it would occupy a small volume and would be inexpensive to store while an enrichment capability is developed. Very small quantities could be enriched in existing mass separators to support critical needs.« less
A fast semi-quantitative method for Plutonium determination in an alpine firn/ice core
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Gabrieli, J.; Cozzi, G.; Vallelonga, P.; Schwikowski, M.; Sigl, M.; Boutron, C.; Barbante, C.
2009-04-01
Plutonium is present in the environment as a consequence of atmospheric nuclear tests carried out in the 1960s, nuclear weapons production and releases by the nuclear industry over the past 50 years. Plutonium, unlike uranium, is essentially anthropogenic and it was first produced and isolated in 1940 by deuteron bombardment of uranium in the cyclotron of Berkeley University. It exists in five main isotopes, 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu, 242Pu, derived from civilian and military sources (weapons production and detonation, nuclear reactors, nuclear accidents). In the environment, 239Pu is the most abundant isotope. Approximately 6 tons of 239Pu have been released into the environment as a result of 541 atmospheric weapon tests Nuclear Pu fallout has been studied in various environmental archives, such as sediments, soil and herbarium grass. Mid-latitude ice cores have been studied as well, on Mont Blanc, the Western Alps and on Belukha Glacier, Siberian Altai. We present a Pu record obtained by analyzing 52 discrete samples of an alpine firn/ice core from Colle Gnifetti (M. Rosa, 4450 m a.s.l.), dating from 1945 to 1991. The239Pu signal was recorded directly, without preliminary cleaning or preconcentration steps, using an ICP-SFMS (Thermo Element2) equipped with a desolvation system (APEX). 238UH+ interferences were negligible for U concentrations lower than 50 ppt as verified both in spiked fresh snow and pre-1940 ice samples. The shape of 239Pu profile reflects the three main periods of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing: the earliest peak starts in 1954/55 to 1958 and includes the first testing period which reached a maximum in 1958. Despite a temporary halt in testing in 1959/60, the Pu concentration decreased only by half with respect to the 1958 peak. In 1961/62 Pu concentrations rapidly increased reaching a maximum in 1963, which was about 40% more intense than the 1958 peak. After the sign of the "Limited Test Ban Treaty" between USA and URSS in 1964, Pu deposition decreased very sharply reaching a minimum in 1967. The third period (1967-1975) is characterized by irregular Pu profiles with smaller peaks (about 20-30% compared to the 1964 peak) which could be due to French and Chinese tests. Comparison with the Pu profiles obtained from the Col du Dome and Belukha ice cores by AMS (Accelerator Mass Spectrometry) shows very good agreement. Considering the semi-quantitative method and the analytical uncertainty, the results are also quantitatively comparable. However, the Pu concentrations at Colle Gnifetti are normally 2-3 times greater than in Col du Dome. This could be explained by different air mass transport or, more likely, different accumulation rates at each site.
Progress in the Assessment of Waste-forms for the Immobilisation of UK Civil Plutonium
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Harrison, M.T.; Scales, C.R.; Maddrell, E.R.
The alternatives for the disposition of the UK's civil plutonium stocks are currently being investigated by Nexia Solutions Ltd. on behalf of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A number of scenarios are currently being considered depending on the strategic requirements of the UK. The two main disposition options are: re-use as MOX (Mixed Oxide) fuel in reactors, or immobilisation in the event of any material being declared surplus to requirements. The amount of Pu which will require immobilisation will depend on future UK nuclear strategy, along with the extent of any stocks deemed unsuitable for re-use. However, it is likelymore » that some portion will have to be immobilised and therefore three credible waste-forms are under consideration; ceramic, glass and 'immobilisation' MOX. These are currently being developed and assessed in a systematic programme that involves periodic evaluation against a range of criteria. In this way, by down-selecting on the basis of robust and technical review, the most appropriate option for immobilising surplus civil plutonium in the UK can be recommended. The latest results from the immobilisation experimental programme are presented following the de-selection of the least favourable glass and ceramic candidates. The main criteria for this decision were waste loading, durability, processability, criticality and proliferation resistance. In addition, the durability of unirradiated MOX fuel is being examined to determine its potential as a wasteform for Pu, and recent leach test data is discussed. The current evaluation comprises not only a comparison of the relevant physical properties of the various waste-forms, but also key processing parameters, e.g. glass viscosity and melter technology, ceramic fabrication routes, and criticality issues. Other important aspects of the long-term behaviour of the waste-forms under consideration in a potential repository environment, such as radiation damage, criticality control and the properties of any neutron poisons present, are also included. (authors)« less
2. VIEW LOOKING NORTHEAST AT BUILDING 444 UNDER CONSTRUCTION. BUILDING ...
2. VIEW LOOKING NORTHEAST AT BUILDING 444 UNDER CONSTRUCTION. BUILDING 444 WAS THE PRIMARY NON-PLUTONIUM MANUFACTURING FACILITY AT THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT. MANUFACTURING PROCESSES COMPLETED IN THIS BUILDING WERE USED TO FABRICATE WEAPONS COMPONENTS AND ASSEMBLIES FOR A VARIETY OF MATERIALS, INCLUDING DEPLETED URANIUM, BERYLLIUM, STAINLESS STEEL, ALUMINUM, AND VANADIUM. (4/25/52) - Rocky Flats Plant, Non-Nuclear Production Facility, South of Cottonwood Avenue, west of Seventh Avenue & east of Building 460, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Narlesky, Joshua E.; Stroud, Mary Ann; Smith, Paul Herrick
2013-02-15
The Surveillance and Monitoring Program is a joint Los Alamos National Laboratory/Savannah River Site effort funded by the Department of Energy-Environmental Management to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5,000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metalmore » and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on 54 samples of plutonium, with 53 chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper summarizes the characterization data, moisture analysis, particle size, surface area, density, wattage, actinide composition, trace element impurity analysis, and shelf life surveillance data and includes origin and process history information. Limited characterization data on fourteen nonrepresentative samples is also presented.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Smith, Paul H; Narlesky, Joshua E; Worl, Laura A
2010-01-01
The Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SMP) is a joint LANL/SRS effort funded by DOE/EM to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performancemore » of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. The chlorides (NaCl, KCl, CaCl{sub 2}, and MgCl{sub 2}) range from less than half of the impurities present to nearly all the impurities. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on over 60 samples of plutonium chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper will summarize the characterization data, including the origin and process history, particle size, surface area, density, calorimetry, chemical analysis, moisture analysis, prompt gamma, gas generation and corrosion behavior.« less
León Vintró, L; Mitchell, P I; Condren, O M; Downes, A B; Papucci, C; Delfanti, R
1999-09-30
New data on the vertical distributions of plutonium and americium in the waters of the western Mediterranean and the Strait of Gibraltar are examined in terms of the processes governing their delivery to, transport in and removal from the water column within the basin. Residence times for plutonium and americium in surface waters of approximately 15 and approximately 3 years, respectively, are deduced, and it is shown that by the mid 1990s only approximately 35% of the 239,240Pu and approximately 5% of the 241Am deposited as weapons fallout still resided in the water column. Present 239,240Pu inventories in the water column and the underlying sediments are estimated to be approximately 25 TBq and approximately 40 TBq, respectively, which reconcile well with the time-integrated fallout deposition in this zone, taken to be approximately 69 TBq. The data show that there are significant net outward fluxes of plutonium and americium from the basin through the Strait of Gibraltar at the present time. These appear to be compensated by net inward fluxes of similar magnitude through the Strait of Sicily. Thus, the time-integrated fallout deposition in the western basin can be accounted for satisfactorily in terms of present water column and sediment inventories. Enhanced scavenging on the continental shelves, as evidenced by the appreciably higher transuranic concentrations in shelf sediments, supports this contention.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Schwantes, Jon M.; Douglas, Matthew; Bonde, Steven E.
2009-02-15
During World War II, the Hanford Site in Washington was chosen for plutonium production. In 2004, a bottle containing a sample of plutonium was recovered from a Hanford waste trench. Isotopic age dating indicated the sample was separated from the fuel pellet 64 ±2.8 years earlier. Detectable products of secondary nuclear reactions, such as 22Na, proved useful as 1) a detectable analog for alpha emitting actinides, 2) an indicator of sample splitting, and 3) a measure of the time since sample splitting. The sample origin was identified as the X-10 reactor, Oak Ridge, TN. Corroborated by historical documents, we concludedmore » this sample was part of the first batch of Pu separated at T-Plant, Hanford, the world’s first industrial-scale reprocessing facility, on December 9, 1944.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Reed, B. Cameron
2014-10-01
The Manhattan Project was the United States Army’s program to develop and deploy nuclear weapons during World War II. In these devices, which are known popularly as ‘atomic bombs’, energy is released not by a chemical explosion but by the much more violent process of fission of nuclei of heavy elements via a neutron-mediated chain-reaction. Three years after taking on this project in mid-1942, the Army’s Manhattan Engineer District produced three nuclear bombs of two different designs. Two of these devices were fueled with the 239 isotope of the synthetic element plutonium, while the third employed the rare 235 isotope of uranium. One of the plutonium devices, code-named Trinity, was detonated in a test in southern New Mexico on 16 July 1945; this was the world’s first nuclear explosion. Three weeks later, on 6 August, the uranium bomb, Little Boy, was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. On 9 August the second plutonium device, Fat Man, was dropped on Nagasaki. Together, the two bombings killed over 100 000 people and were at least partially responsible for the Japanese government’s 14 August decision to surrender. This article surveys, at an undergraduate level, the science and history of the Manhattan Project.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Fox, T.; Tietjen, G.L.; McInroy, J.F.
The Autopsy Tissue Program was begun in 1960. To date, tissues on 900 or more persons in 7 geographic regions have been collected and analyzed for plutonium content. The tissues generally consist of lung, liver, kidney, lymph, bone, and gonadal tissues for each individual. The original objective of the program was to determine the level of plutonium in human tissues due solely to fallout from weapons testing. The baseline thus established was to be used to evaluate future changes. From the first, this program was beset with chemical and statistical difficulties. Many factors whose effects were not recognized and notmore » planned for were found later to be important. Privacy and ethical considerations hindered the gathering of adequate data. Since the chemists were looking for amounts of plutonium very close to background, possible contamination was a very real problem. Widely used chemical techniques introduced a host of statistical problems. The difficulties encountered touch on areas common to large data sets, unusual outlier detection methods minimum detection limits, problems with aliquot sizes, and time-trends in the data. The conclusions point out areas to which the biologists will have to devote much more careful attention than was believed.« less
History of 232-F, tritium extraction processing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Blackburn, G.W.
1994-08-01
In 1950 the Atomic Energy Commission authorized the Savannah River Project principally for the production of tritium and plutonium-239 for use in thermonuclear weapons. 232-F was built as an interim facility in 1953--1954, at a cost of $3.9M. Tritium extraction operations began in October, 1955, after the reactor and separations startups. In July, 1957 a larger tritium facility began operation in 232-H. In 1958 the capacity of 232-H was doubled. Also, in 1957 a new task was assigned to Savannah River, the loading of tritium into reservoirs that would be actual components of thermonuclear weapons. This report describes the historymore » of 232-F, the process for tritium extraction, and the lessons learned over the years that were eventually incorporated into the new Replacement Tritium Facility.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Remerowski, Mary Lynn; Dozhier, C.; Krenek, K.; VanPelt, C. E.; Reimus, M. A.; Spengler, D.; Matonic, J.; Garcia, L.; Rios, E.; Sandoval, F.; Herman, D.; Hart, R.; Ewing, B.; Lovato, M.; Romero, J. P.
2005-02-01
Pu-238 heat sources are used to fuel radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) used in space missions. The demand for this fuel is increasing, yet there are currently no domestic sources of this material. Much of the fuel is material reprocessed from other sources. One rich source of Pu-238 residual material is that from contaminated combustible materials, such as cheesecloth, ion exchange resins and plastics. From both waste minimization and production efficiency standpoints, the best solution is to recover this material. One way to accomplish separation of the organic component from these residues is a flameless oxidation process using molten salt as the matrix for the breakdown of the organic to carbon dioxide and water. The plutonium is retained in the salt, and can be recovered by dissolution of the carbonate salt in an aqueous solution, leaving the insoluble oxide behind. Further aqueous scrap recovery processing is used to purify the plutonium oxide. Recovery of the plutonium from contaminated combustibles achieves two important goals. First, it increases the inventory of Pu-238 available for heat source fabrication. Second, it is a significant waste minimization process. Because of its thermal activity (0.567 W per gram), combustibles must be packaged for disposition with much lower amounts of Pu-238 per drum than other waste types. Specifically, cheesecloth residues in the form of pyrolyzed ash (for stabilization) are being stored for eventual recovery of the plutonium.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Remerowski, Mary Lynn; Dozhier, C.; Krenek, K.
2005-02-06
Pu-238 heat sources are used to fuel radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) used in space missions. The demand for this fuel is increasing, yet there are currently no domestic sources of this material. Much of the fuel is material reprocessed from other sources. One rich source of Pu-238 residual material is that from contaminated combustible materials, such as cheesecloth, ion exchange resins and plastics. From both waste minimization and production efficiency standpoints, the best solution is to recover this material. One way to accomplish separation of the organic component from these residues is a flameless oxidation process using molten salt asmore » the matrix for the breakdown of the organic to carbon dioxide and water. The plutonium is retained in the salt, and can be recovered by dissolution of the carbonate salt in an aqueous solution, leaving the insoluble oxide behind. Further aqueous scrap recovery processing is used to purify the plutonium oxide. Recovery of the plutonium from contaminated combustibles achieves two important goals. First, it increases the inventory of Pu-238 available for heat source fabrication. Second, it is a significant waste minimization process. Because of its thermal activity (0.567 W per gram), combustibles must be packaged for disposition with much lower amounts of Pu-238 per drum than other waste types. Specifically, cheesecloth residues in the form of pyrolyzed ash (for stabilization) are being stored for eventual recovery of the plutonium.« less
Certification of Plutonium Standards for KAMS Neutron Multiplicity Counter
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Salaymeh, S.R.
2002-05-31
As part of the implementation of the PEIS record of decision in January of 1997, DOE will pursue two technologies to disposition fifty metric tons of its stockpile of plutonium. As a result of this and in order to expedite the closure of Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado, DOE decided to use existing facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) for storing all material containing plutonium at KAMS. A neutron multiplicity counter was designed and built to carry out receipt verification measurement at the facility. Since the material covers a wide range and different levels of impurities, itmore » is essential that we obtain a set of working standards. An agreement was drafted to select the first drums to be these standards. A plan was developed for the certification of these standards using Rocky Flat's existing nondestructive assay equipment. This paper will discuss the types of materials to be shipped to SRS, number of standards to certify for each type of material, and the certification plan. It will also discuss the activities necessary to determine the nuclear content of these working standards to be used at SRS facilities in support of shipment and receipt of the Pu containing materials. Definition of instrument qualifications, measurement control processes, measurement methodologies, and calculations necessary to report the gram quantities and their uncertainties for plutonium, americium-241, uranium-235 (if present) and neptunium-237 (if present) will also be presented.« less
One perspective on stakeholder involvement at Hanford.
Martin, Todd
2011-11-01
The Hanford nuclear site in Washington State had a major role in the production of nuclear weapons materials during the Manhattan Project in World War II and during the Cold War that followed. The production of weapons-grade radionuclides produced a large amount of radioactive byproducts that have been stored since the mid-1900s at the Hanford Site. These by-product radionuclides have leaked from containment facilities into the groundwater, contaminated buildings used for radionuclide processing, and also contaminated the nuclear reactors used to produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. This issue has been a major concern to Hanford stakeholders for several decades, and the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington State Department of Ecology established a Tri-Party Agreement in 1989, at which time Hanford ceased production of nuclear weapons materials and began a major effort to clean up and remediate the Hanford Site's contaminated groundwater, soil, and facilities. This paper describes the concerns of stakeholders in the production of nuclear weapons, the secrecy of Hanford operations, and the potential impacts to public health and the environment from the unintended releases of weapons-grade materials and by-products associated with their production at the Hanford Site. It also describes the involvement of public stakeholders in the development and oversight by the Hanford Advisory Board of the steps that have been taken in cleanup activities at the Hanford Site that began as a major effort about two decades ago. The importance of involvement of the general public and public interest organizations in developing and implementing the Hanford cleanup strategy are described in detail.
The ``Nuclear Renaissance'' and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lyman, Edwin S.
2007-05-01
As interest grows around the world in nuclear power as an energy source that could help control greenhouse gas emissions, some have proclaimed the arrival of a ``nuclear renaissance.'' But can the increased risks of more nuclear power be managed? The political crisis surrounding Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment has exposed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Also, al Qaeda's declared interest in weapons of mass destruction raises the concern that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by stealing materials from poorly secured facilities. Growth of nuclear energy would require the construction of many additional uranium enrichment plants. And the generation of more spent nuclear fuel without a credible waste disposal strategy would increase political support for reprocessing, which separates large quantities of weapon-usable plutonium from spent fuel. There is little evidence that the various institutional arrangements and technical schemes proposed to mitigate the security risks of a major nuclear expansion would be effective. This talk will focus on the measures necessary to allow large-scale global growth of nuclear power without resulting in an unacceptably high risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and will discuss the feasibility of such measures. To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2007.OSS07.E1.2
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Khankhasayev, Zhanat B.; Kurmanov, Hans; Plendl, Mikhail Kh.
1996-12-01
The Table of Contents for the full book PDF is as follows: * Preface * I. Review of Current Status of Nuclear Transmutation Projects * Accelerator-Driven Systems — Survey of the Research Programs in the World * The Los Alamos Accelerator-Driven Transmutation of Nuclear Waste Concept * Nuclear Waste Transmutation Program in the Czech Republic * Tentative Results of the ISTC Supported Study of the ADTT Plutonium Disposition * Recent Neutron Physics Investigations for the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle * Optimisation of Accelerator Systems for Transmutation of Nuclear Waste * Proton Linac of the Moscow Meson Factory for the ADTT Experiments * II. Computer Modeling of Nuclear Waste Transmutation Methods and Systems * Transmutation of Minor Actinides in Different Nuclear Facilities * Monte Carlo Modeling of Electro-nuclear Processes with Nonlinear Effects * Simulation of Hybrid Systems with a GEANT Based Program * Computer Study of 90Sr and 137Cs Transmutation by Proton Beam * Methods and Computer Codes for Burn-Up and Fast Transients Calculations in Subcritical Systems with External Sources * New Model of Calculation of Fission Product Yields for the ADTT Problem * Monte Carlo Simulation of Accelerator-Reactor Systems * III. Data Basis for Transmutation of Actinides and Fission Products * Nuclear Data in the Accelerator Driven Transmutation Problem * Nuclear Data to Study Radiation Damage, Activation, and Transmutation of Materials Irradiated by Particles of Intermediate and High Energies * Radium Institute Investigations on the Intermediate Energy Nuclear Data on Hybrid Nuclear Technologies * Nuclear Data Requirements in Intermediate Energy Range for Improvement of Calculations of ADTT Target Processes * IV. Experimental Studies and Projects * ADTT Experiments at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center * Neutron Multiplicity Distributions for GeV Proton Induced Spallation Reactions on Thin and Thick Targets of Pb and U * Solid State Nuclear Track Detector and Radiochemical Studies on the Transmutation of Nuclei Using Relativistic Heavy Ions * Experimental and Theoretical Study of Radionuclide Production on the Electronuclear Plant Target and Construction Materials Irradiated by 1.5 GeV and 130 MeV Protons * Neutronics and Power Deposition Parameters of the Targets Proposed in the ISTC Project 17 * Multicycle Irradiation of Plutonium in Solid Fuel Heavy-Water Blanket of ADS * Compound Neutron Valve of Accelerator-Driven System Sectioned Blanket * Subcritical Channel-Type Reactor for Weapon Plutonium Utilization * Accelerator Driven Molten-Fluoride Reactor with Modular Heat Exchangers on PB-BI Eutectic * A New Conception of High Power Ion Linac for ADTT * Pions and Accelerator-Driven Transmutation of Nuclear Waste? * V. Problems and Perspectives * Accelerator-Driven Transmutation Technologies for Resolution of Long-Term Nuclear Waste Concerns * Closing the Nuclear Fuel-Cycle and Moving Toward a Sustainable Energy Development * Workshop Summary * List of Participants
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Runde, Wolfgang; Neu, Mary P.
Since the 1950s actinides have been used to benefit industry, science, health, and national security. The largest industrial application, electricity generation from uranium and thorium fuels, is growing worldwide. Thus, more actinides are being mined, produced, used and processed than ever before. The future of nuclear energy hinges on how these increasing amounts of actinides are contained in each stage of the fuel cycle, including disposition. In addition, uranium and plutonium were built up during the Cold War between the United States and the Former Soviet Union for defense purposes and nuclear energy.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Furukawa, Kazuo; Kato, Yoshio; Chigrinov, Sergey E.
1995-09-01
For practical/industrial disposition of Pu(TRU) by accelerator facility, not only physical soundness and safety but also the following technological rationality should be required: (1) few R&D items including radiation damage, heat removal and material compatibility: (2) few operation/maintenance/processing works; (3) few reproduction of radioactivity; (4) effective energy production in parallel. This will be achieved by the new modification of Th-fertilizing Single-Fluid type Accelerator Molten-Salt Breeder (AMSB), by which a global nuclear energy strategy for next century might be prepared.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kushnikov, V.
1996-05-01
The Russian strategy for radioactive waste and plutonium management is based on the concept of the closed fuel cycle that has been adopted in Russia, and, to a great degree, falls under the jurisdiction of the existing Russian nuclear energy structures. From its very beginning, Russian atomic energy policy was based on finding the most effective method of developing the new fuel direction with the maximum possible utilization of the energy potential from the fission of heavy atoms and the achievement of fuel self-sufficiency through the recycling of secondary fuel. Although there can be no doubt about the importance ofmore » economic considerations (for the future), concerns for the safety of the environment are currently of the utmost importance. In this context, spent NPP fuel can be viewed as a waste to be buried only if there is persuasive evidence that such an approach is both economically and environmentally sound. The production of I GW of energy per year is accompanied by the accumulation of up to 800-1000 kg of highly radioactive fission products and approximately 250 kg of plutonium. Currently, spent fuel from the VVER 100 and the RBNK reactors contains approximately 25 tons of plutonium. There is an additional 30 tons of fuel-grade plutonium in the form of purified oxide, separated from spent fuels used in VVER440 reactors and other power production facilities, as well as approximately 100 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from dismantled warheads. The spent fuel accumulates significant amounts of small actinoids - neptunium americium, and curium. Science and technology have not yet found technical solutions for safe and secure burial of non-reprocessed spent fuel with such a broad range of products, which are typically highly radioactive and will continue to pose a threat for hundreds of thousands of years.« less
Tritium and plutonium in waters from the Bering and Chukchi Seas
Landa, E.R.; Beals, D.M.; Halverson, J.E.; Michel, R.L.; Cefus, G.R.
1999-01-01
During the summer of 1993, seawater in the Bering and Chukchi Seas was sampled on a joint Russian-American cruise [BERPAC] of the RV Okean to determine concentrations of tritium, 239Pu and 240Pu. Concentrations of tritium were determined by electrolytic enrichment and liquid scintilation counting. Tritium levels ranged up to 420 mBq L-1 showed no evidence of inputs other than those attribute atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. Plutonium was recovered from water samples by ferric hydroxide precipitation, and concentrations were determined by thermal ionization mass spectrometry. 239+240Pu concentrations ranged from <1 to 5.5 [mu]Bq L-1. These concentrations are lower than those measured in water samples from other parts of the ocean during the mid-1960's to the late 1980's. The 240Pu:239Pu ratios, although associated with large uncertainties, suggest that most of the plutonium is derived from world-wide fallout. As points of comparison, the highest concentrations of tritium and plutonium observed here were about five orders of magnitude lower than the maximum permissible concentrations allowed in water released to the off-site environs from licensed nuclear facilities in the United States. This study and others sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Office of Naval Research's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program are providing data for the assessment of potential radiological impacts in the Arctic regions associated with nuclear waste disposal by the former Soviet Union.
Generalized Rate Theory for Void and Bubble Swelling and its Application to Delta-Plutonium
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Allen, P. G.; Wall, M. A.; Wolfer, W. G.
2016-10-04
A rate theory for void and bubble swelling is derived that allows both vacancies and self-interstitial atoms to be generated by thermal activation at all sinks. In addition, they can also be produced by displacement damage from external and internal radiation. This generalized rate theory (GRT) is applied to swelling of gallium-stabilized δ-plutonium in which α-decay causes the displacement damage. Since the helium atoms produced also become trapped in vacancies, a distinction is made between empty and occupied vacancies. The growth of helium bubbles observed by transmission electron microscopy (TEM) in weapons-grade and in material enriched with Pu238 is analyzed,more » using different values for the formation energy of self-interstitial atoms (SIA) and two different sets of relaxation volumes for the vacancy and for the SIA. One set allows preferential capture of SIA at dislocations, while the other set gives equal preference to both vacancy and SIA. It is found that the helium bubble diameters observed are in better agreement with GRT predictions if no preferential capture occurs at dislocations. Therefore, helium bubbles in δ-plutonium will not evolve into voids. The helium density within the bubbles remains sufficiently high to cause thermal emission of SIA. Based on a helium density between two to three helium atoms per vacant site, the sum of formation and migration energies must be around 2.0 eV for SIA in δ-plutonium.« less
Pettineo, Christopher; Aitchison, Robert; Leikin, Scott M; Vogel, Stephen N; Leikin, Jerrold B
2009-01-01
The objective of this article is to provide updated treatment options for bioterrorism agents. This updated synopsis includes recent clinical cases and treatment recommendations that have arisen in the last 5 years. The decontamination, treatment, and disposition of these biologic and chemical agents are presented alphabetically by agent type: biologic, chemical, and radiologic/nuclear. The information provided outlines only new treatment options since 2003.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
CHARBONEAU, S.L.
The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) consists of a number of process and support buildings for handling plutonium. Building construction began in the late 1940's to meet national priorities and became operational in 1950 producing refined plutonium salts and metal for the United States nuclear weapons program. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material for fabrication into a nuclear device for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race. PFP has nowmore » completed its mission and is fully engaged in deactivation, decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). At this time the PFP buildings are planned to be reduced to ground level (slab-on-grade) and the site remediated to satisfy national, Department of Energy (DOE) and Washington state requirements. The D&D of a highly contaminated plutonium processing facility presents a plethora of challenges. PFP personnel approached the D&D mission with a can-do attitude. They went into D&D knowing they were facing a lot of challenges and unknowns. There were concerns about the configuration control associated with drawings of these old process facilities. There were unknowns regarding the location of electrical lines and process piping containing chemical residues such as strong acids and caustics. The gloveboxes were highly contaminated with plutonium and chemical residues. Most of the glovebox windows were opaque with splashed process chemicals that coated the windows or etched them, reducing visibility to near zero. Visibility into the glovebox was a serious worker concern. Additionally, all the gloves in the gloveboxes were degraded and unusable. Replacing gloves in gloveboxes was necessary to even begin glovebox cleanout. The sheer volume of breathing air needed was also an issue. These and other challenges and PFP's approach to overcome these challengers are described. Many of the challenges to the D&D work at PFP were met with innovative approaches based on new science and/or technology and many were also based on the creativity and motivation of the work force personnel.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Charboneau, S.; Klos, B.; Heineman, R.
The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) consists of a number of process and support buildings for handling plutonium. Building construction began in the late 1940's to meet national priorities and became operational in 1950 producing refined plutonium salts and metal for the United States nuclear weapons program The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material for fabrication into a nuclear device for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race. PFP has nowmore » completed its mission and is fully engaged in deactivation, decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). At this time the PFP buildings are planned to be reduced to ground level (slab-on-grade) and the site remediated to satisfy national, Department of Energy (DOE) and Washington state requirements. The D and D of a highly contaminated plutonium processing facility presents a plethora of challenges. PFP personnel approached the D and D mission with a can-do attitude. They went into D and D knowing they were facing a lot of challenges and unknowns. There were concerns about the configuration control associated with drawings of these old process facilities. There were unknowns regarding the location of electrical lines and the condition and contents of process piping containing chemical residues such as strong acids and caustics. The gloveboxes were highly contaminated with plutonium and chemical residues. Most of the glovebox windows were opaque with splashed process chemicals that coated the windows or etched them, reducing visibility to near zero. Visibility into the glovebox was a serious worker concern. Additionally, all the gloves in the gloveboxes were degraded and unusable. Replacing gloves in gloveboxes was necessary to even begin glovebox clean-out. The sheer volume of breathing air needed was also an issue. These and other challenges and PFP's approach to overcome these challengers are described. Many of the challenges to the D and D work at PFP were met with innovative approaches based on new science and/or technology and many were also based on the creativity and motivation of the work force personnel. (authors)« less
Control of a laser inertial confinement fusion-fission power plant
Moses, Edward I.; Latkowski, Jeffery F.; Kramer, Kevin J.
2015-10-27
A laser inertial-confinement fusion-fission energy power plant is described. The fusion-fission hybrid system uses inertial confinement fusion to produce neutrons from a fusion reaction of deuterium and tritium. The fusion neutrons drive a sub-critical blanket of fissile or fertile fuel. A coolant circulated through the fuel extracts heat from the fuel that is used to generate electricity. The inertial confinement fusion reaction can be implemented using central hot spot or fast ignition fusion, and direct or indirect drive. The fusion neutrons result in ultra-deep burn-up of the fuel in the fission blanket, thus enabling the burning of nuclear waste. Fuels include depleted uranium, natural uranium, enriched uranium, spent nuclear fuel, thorium, and weapons grade plutonium. LIFE engines can meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the highly undesirable stockpiles of depleted uranium, spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials.
A Clear Success for International Transport of Plutonium and MOX Fuels
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Blachet, L.; Jacot, P.; Bariteau, J.P.
2006-07-01
An Agreement between the United States and Russia to eliminate 68 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium provided the basis for the United States government and its agency, the Department of Energy (DOE), to enter into contracts with industry leaders to fabricate mixed oxide (MOX) fuels (a blend of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide) for use in existing domestic commercial reactors. DOE contracted with Duke, COGEMA, Stone and Webster (DCS), a limited liability company comprised of Duke Energy, COGEMA Inc. and Stone and Webster to design a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) which would be built and operated atmore » the DOE Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. During this same time frame, DOE commissioned fabrication and irradiation of lead test assemblies in one of the Mission Reactors to assist in obtaining NRC approval for batch implementation of MOX fuel prior to the operations phase of the MFFF facility. On February 2001, DOE directed DCS to initiate a pre-decisional investigation to determine means to obtain lead assemblies including all international options for manufacturing MOX fuels. This lead to implementation of the EUROFAB project and work was initiated in earnest on EUROFAB by DCS on November 7, 2003. (authors)« less
Cladding and duct materials for advanced nuclear recycle reactors
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Allen, T. R.; Busby, J. T.; Klueh, R. L.; Maloy, S. A.; Toloczko, M. B.
2008-01-01
The expanded use of nuclear energy without risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and with safe nuclear waste disposal is a primary goal of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To achieve that goal the GNEP is exploring advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel that do not separate pure plutonium, and advanced reactors that consume transuranic elements from recycled spent fuel. The GNEP’s objectives will place high demands on reactor clad and structural materials. This article discusses the materials requirements of the GNEP’s advanced nuclear recycle reactors program.
Reconstructed plutonium fallout in the GV7 firn core from Northern Victoria Land, East Antarctica
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hwang, H.; Han, Y.; Kang, J.; Lee, K.; Hong, S.; Hur, S. D.; Narcisi, B.; Frezzotti, M.
2017-12-01
Atmospheric nuclear explosions during the period from the 1940s to the 1980s are the major anthropogenic source of plutonium (Pu) in the environment. In this work, we analyzed fg g-1 levels of artificial Pu, released predominantly by atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. We measured 351 samples which collected a 78 m-depth fire core at the site of GV7 (S 70°41'17.1", E 158°51'48.9", 1950 m a.s.l.), Northern Victoria Land, East Antarctica. To determine the Pu concentration in the samples, we used an inductively coupled plasma sector field mass spectrometry coupled with an Apex high-efficiency sample introduction system, which has the advantages of small sample consumption and simple sample preparation. We reconstructed the firn core Pu fallout record for the period after 1954 CE shows a significant fluctuation in agreement with past atmospheric nuclear testing. These data will contribute to ice core research by providing depth-age information.
High-temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR)
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Abedi, Sajad
2011-05-01
General Atomics (GA) has over 35 years experience in prismatic block High-temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) technology design. During this period, the design has recently involved into a modular have been performed to demonstrate its versatility. This versatility is directly related to refractory TRISO coated - particle fuel that can contain any type of fuel. This paper summarized GA's fuel cycle studies individually and compares each based upon its cycle sustainability, proliferation-resistance capabilities, and other performance data against pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel cycle data. Fuel cycle studies LEU-NV;commercial HEU-Th;commercial LEU-Th;weapons-grade plutonium consumption; and burning of LWR waste including plutonium and minor actinides in the MHR. results show that all commercial MHR options, with the exception of HEU-TH, are more sustainable than a PWR fuel cycle. With LEU-NV being the most sustainable commercial options. In addition, all commercial MHR options out perform the PWR with regards to its proliferation-resistance, with thorium fuel cycle having the best proliferation-resistance characteristics.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Holliday, Kiel Steven
There is a significant buildup in plutonium stockpiles throughout the world, because of spent nuclear fuel and the dismantling of weapons. The radiotoxicity of this material and proliferation risk has led to a desire for destroying excess plutonium. To do this effectively, it must be fissioned in a reactor as part of a uranium free fuel to eliminate the generation of more plutonium. This requires an inert matrix to volumetrically dilute the fissile plutonium. Zirconia-magnesia dual phase ceramic has been demonstrated to be a favorable material for this task. It is neutron transparent, zirconia is chemically robust, magnesia has good thermal conductivity and the ceramic has been calculated to conform to current economic and safety standards. This dissertation contributes to the knowledge of zirconia-magnesia as an inert matrix fuel to establish behavior of the material containing a fissile component. First, the zirconia-magnesia inert matrix is synthesized in a dual phase ceramic containing a fissile component and a burnable poison. The chemical constitution of the ceramic is then determined. Next, the material performance is assessed under conditions relevant to an advanced fuel cycle. Reactor conditions were assessed with high temperature, high pressure water. Various acid solutions were used in an effort to dissolve the material for reprocessing. The ceramic was also tested as a waste form under environmental conditions, should it go directly to a repository as a spent fuel. The applicability of zirconia-magnesia as an inert matrix fuel and waste form was tested and found to be a promising material for such applications.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Furukawa, Kazuo; Kato, Yoshio; Chigrinov, Sergey E.
1995-09-15
For practical/industrial disposition of Pu(TRU) by accelerator facility, not only physical soundness and safety but also the following technological rationality should be required: (1) few R and D items including radiation damage, heat removal and material compatibility: (2) few operation/maintenance/processing works; (3) few reproduction of radioactivity; (4) effective energy production in parallel. This will be achieved by the new modification of Th-fertilizing Single-Fluid type Accelerator Molten-Salt Breeder (AMSB), by which a global nuclear energy strategy for next century might be prepared.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Furukaw, Kazuo; Kato, Yoshio; Chigrinov, Sergey E.
1995-10-01
For practical/industrial disposition of Pu(TRU) by accelerator facility, not only physical soundness and safety but also the following technological rationality should be required: (1) few R&D items including radiation damage, heat removal and material compatibility; (2) few operation/maintenance/processing works: (3) few reproduction of radioactivity; (4) effective energy production in parallel. This will be achieved by the new modification of Th-fertilizing Single-Fluid type Accelerator Molten-Salt Breeder (AMSB), by which a global nuclear energy strategy for next century might be prepared.
Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bates, Cameron Russell
2015-03-11
Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, anmore » experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium disposition treaty.« less
Industrial scale-plant for HLW partitioning in Russia
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dzekun, E.G.; Glagolenko, Y.V.; Drojko, E.G.
1996-12-31
Radiochemical plant of PA <> at Ozersk, which was come on line in December 1948 originally for weapon plutonium production and reoriented on the reprocessing of spent fuel, till now keeps on storage HLW of the military program. Application of the vitrification method since 1986 has not essentially reduced HLW volumes. So, as of September 1, 1995 vitrification installations had been processed 9590 m{sup 3} HLW and 235 MCi of radionuclides was included in glass. However only 1100 m{sup 3} and 20.5 MCi is part of waste of the military program. The reason is the fact, that the technology andmore » equipment of vitrification were developed for current waste of Purex-process, for which low contents of corrosion-dangerous impurity to materials of vitrification installation is characteristic of. With reference to HLW, which are growing at PA <> in the course of weapon plutonium production, the program of Science-Research Works includes the following main directions of work. Development of technology and equipment of installations for immobilising HLW with high contents of impurity into a solid form at induction melter. Application of High-temperature Adsorption Method for sorption of radionuclides from HLW on silica gel. Application of Partitioning Method of radionuclides from HLW, based on extraction cesium and strontium into cobalt dicarbollyde or crown-ethers, but also on recovery of cesium radionuclides by sorption on inorganic sorbents. In this paper the results of work on creation of first industrial scale-plant for partitioning HLW by the extraction and sorption methods are reported.« less
Natural radionuclide and plutonium content in Black Sea bottom sediments
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Strezov, A.; Stoilova, T.; Yordanova, I.
1996-01-01
The content of uranium, thorium, radium, lead, polonium, and plutonium in bottom sediments and algae from two locations at the Bulgarian Black Sea coast have been determined. Some parent:progeny ratios for evaluation of the geochemical behavior of the nuclides have been estimated as well. The extractable and total uranium and thorium are determined by two separate radiochemical procedures to differentiate the more soluble chemical forms of the elements and to estimate the potential hazard for the biosphere and for humans. No distinct seasonal variation as well as no significant change in total and extractable uranium (also for {sup 226}Ra) contentmore » is observed. The same is valid for extractable thorium while the total thorium content in the first two seasons is slightly higher. Our data show that {sup 210}Po content is accumulated more in the sediments than {sup 210}Pb, and the evaluated disequilibria suggest that the two radionuclides belong to more recent sediment layers deposited in the slime samples compared to the silt ones for the different seasons. The obtained values for plutonium are in the lower limits of the data cited in literature, which is quite clear as there are no plutonium discharge facilities at the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. The obtained values for the activity ratio {sup 238}Pu: {sup 239+240}Pu are higher for Bjala sediments compared to those of Kaliakra. The ratio values are out of the variation range for the global contamination with weapon tests fallout plutonium which is probably due to Chernobyl accident contribution. The dependence of natural radionuclide content on the sediment type as well as the variation of nuclide accumulation for two types of algae in two sampling locations for five consecutive seasons is evaluated. No serious contamination with natural radionuclides in the algae is observed. 38 refs., 6 figs., 7 tabs.« less
The Task of Detecting Illicit Nuclear Material: Status and Challenges
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Kouzes, Richard
2006-04-01
In August 1994, police at the Munich airport intercepted a suitcase from Moscow with half a kilogram of nuclear-reactor fuel, of which 363 grams was weapons- grade plutonium. A few months later police seized 2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from a former worker at a Russian nuclear institute and his accomplices in Prague. These are just two of 18 incidents involving the smuggling of weapons grade nuclear materials between 1993 and 2004 reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The consequences of a stolen or improvised nuclear device being exploded in a U.S. city would be world changing. The concern over the possibility of a nuclear weapon, or the material for a weapon or a radiological dispersion device, being smuggled across U.S. borders has led to the deployment of radiation detection equipment at the borders. Related efforts are occurring around the world. Radiation portal monitors are used as the main screening tool, supplemented by handheld detectors, personal radiation detectors, and x-ray imaging systems. Passive detection techniques combined with imaging, and possibly active techniques, are the current available tools for screening cargo for items of concern. There are a number of physics limitations to what is possible with each technology given the presence of naturally occurring radioactive materials, commercial sources, and medical radionuclides in the stream of commerce. There have been a number of lessons learned to date from the various efforts in the U.S. and internationally about the capability for interdicting illicit nuclear material.
Minimizing Glovebox Glove Breaches, Part III: Deriving Service Lifetimes
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cournoyer, M.E.; Wilson, K.V.; Maestas, M.M.
At the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, various isotopes of plutonium along with other actinides are handled in a glove box environment. Weapons-grade plutonium consists mainly in Pu-239. Pu-238 is another isotope used for heat sources. The Pu-238 is more aggressive regarding gloves due to its higher alpha-emitting characteristic ({approx}300 times more active than Pu-239), which modifies the change-out intervals for gloves. Optimization of the change-out intervals for gloves is fundamental since Nuclear Materials Technology (NMT) Division generates approximately 4 m{sup 3}/yr of TRU waste from the disposal of glovebox gloves. To reduce the number of glovebox glove failures, the NMTmore » Division pro-actively investigates processes and procedures that minimize glove failures. Aging studies have been conducted that correlate changes in mechanical (physical) properties with degradation chemistry. This present work derives glovebox glove change intervals based on mechanical data of thermally aged Hypalon{sup R}, and Butasol{sup R} glove samples. Information from this study represent an important baseline in gauging the acceptable standards for polymeric gloves used in a laboratory glovebox environment and will be used later to account for possible presence of dose-rate or synergistic effects in 'combined-environment'. In addition, excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone and excess exposure to the radiological sources associated with unplanned breaches in the glovebox are reduced. (authors)« less
Plutonium weathering on Johnston Atoll
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Wolf, S.E.; Bates, J.K.; Buck, E.C.
1995-12-31
Johnston Atoll was contaminated with transuranic elements, particularly plutonium, by atmospheric nuclear weapons tests and aborted nuclear devices. Initial cleanup operations and and an extensive soil remediation program were performed. However, many areas contained a low-level continuum of activity, and subsurface contamination has been detected. Discrete hot particles and contaminated soil were characterized to determine whether the spread of activity was caused by weathering. Analytical techniques included gamma spectrometry, alpha spectrometry, and inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry to determine transuranic elemental and isotopic composition. Ultrafiltration and small-particle handling techniques were employed to isolate individual particles. Optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, analyticalmore » transmission electron microscopy, energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy, and electron energy loss spectroscopy were used to characterize individual particles. Analyses of the hot particles showed that they are aborted nuclear warhead fragments that been melted and weathered in the presence of water and CaCO{sub 3}. It was concluded that the formation of aqueous ionic (Pu/Am)-CO{sub 3} coordinated complexes, during environmental exposure to large volumes of rainwater and carbonate-satured seawater, enhanced the solubility of transuranic elements. The (Pu/Am)-CO{sub 3} complexes sorbed onto colloidal CaCO{sub 3} and coral soil surfaces as they were exposed to rain and seawater. This mechanism led to greater dispersal of plutonium and americium than would be expected by physical transport of discrete hot particles alone.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Heyes, Alan
2007-07-01
Through the Global Partnership the UK continues to make a significant contribution to improve national and global security. Over the past year the UK has continued to implement a wide range of projects across the breadth of its Global Partnership Programme. As well as ensuring the Programme is robust and capable of dealing with new challenges, the UK has cooperated with other donor countries to help them progress projects associated with submarine dismantling, scientist redirection, enhancing nuclear security and Chemical Weapons Destruction. The Global Partnership, although only five years old, has already achieved a great deal. Some 23 states, plusmore » the European Union, are now working closer together under the Global Partnership, and collectively have enhanced global regional and national security by reducing the availability of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materials and expertise to both states of concern and terrorists. Considerable progress has already been made in, for example: - Improving the security of fissile materials, dangerous biological agents and chemical weapons stocks; - Reducing the number of sites containing radioactive materials; - Working towards closure of reactors still producing weapon-grade plutonium; - Improving nuclear safety to reduce the risks of further, Chernobyl style accidents; - Constructing facilities for destroying Chemical Weapons stocks, and starting actual destruction; - Providing sustainable employment for former WMD scientists to reduce the risk that their expertise will be misused by states or terrorists. By contributing to many of these activities, the UK has helped to make the world safer. This paper reports on the UK's practical and sustainable contribution to the Global Partnership and identifies a number of challenges that remain if it is to have a wider impact on reducing the threats from WMD material. (authors)« less
Technical approaches to reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Priedhorsky, William C.
2005-04-01
The threat of a nuclear attack on the United States by terrorists using a smuggled weapon is now considered more likely than an attack by a nuclear-armed ballistic missle. Consequently it is important to understand what can be done to detect and intercept a nuclear weapon being smuggled into the United States. A significant quantity of smuggled nuclear material has been intercepted already, but science and technology have so far contributed little to its interception. The critical special nuclear materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are only weakly radioactive and detection of their radioactivity is limited both by atmospheric attenuation and by competition with natural backgrounds. Although many schemes for long-range detection of radioactivity have been proposed, none so far appears feasible. Detection of nuclear radiation can be improved using new technologies and sensing systems, but it will still be possible only at relatively small distances. Consequently the best approach to containing dangerous nuclear materials is at their sources; containment within lengthy borders and large areas is extremely difficult.
Evaluation of isotopic composition of fast reactor core in closed nuclear fuel cycle
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Tikhomirov, Georgy; Ternovykh, Mikhail; Saldikov, Ivan; Fomichenko, Peter; Gerasimov, Alexander
2017-09-01
The strategy of the development of nuclear power in Russia provides for use of fast power reactors in closed nuclear fuel cycle. The PRORYV (i.e. «Breakthrough» in Russian) project is currently under development. Within the framework of this project, fast reactors BN-1200 and BREST-OD-300 should be built to, inter alia, demonstrate possibility of the closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies with plutonium as a main source of energy. Russia has a large inventory of plutonium which was accumulated in the result of reprocessing of spent fuel of thermal power reactors and conversion of nuclear weapons. This kind of plutonium will be used for development of initial fuel assemblies for fast reactors. The closed nuclear fuel cycle concept of the PRORYV assumes self-supplied mode of operation with fuel regeneration by neutron capture reaction in non-enriched uranium, which is used as a raw material. Operating modes of reactors and its characteristics should be chosen so as to provide the self-sufficient mode by using of fissile isotopes while refueling by depleted uranium and to support this state during the entire period of reactor operation. Thus, the actual issue is modeling fuel handling processes. To solve these problems, the code REPRORYV (Recycle for PRORYV) has been developed. It simulates nuclide streams in non-reactor stages of the closed fuel cycle. At the same time various verified codes can be used to evaluate in-core characteristics of a reactor. By using this approach various options for nuclide streams and assess the impact of different plutonium content in the fuel, fuel processing conditions, losses during fuel processing, as well as the impact of initial uncertainties on neutron-physical characteristics of reactor are considered in this study.
Chemical interaction matrix between reagents in a Purex based process
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Brahman, R.K.; Hennessy, W.P.; Paviet-Hartmann, P.
2008-07-01
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is the responsible entity for the disposal of the United States excess weapons grade plutonium. DOE selected a PUREX-based process to convert plutonium to low-enriched mixed oxide fuel for use in commercial nuclear power plants. To initiate this process in the United States, a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) is under construction and will be operated by Shaw AREVA MOX Services at the Savannah River Site. This facility will be licensed and regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A PUREX process, similar to the one used at La Hague,more » France, will purify plutonium feedstock through solvent extraction. MFFF employs two major process operations to manufacture MOX fuel assemblies: (1) the Aqueous Polishing (AP) process to remove gallium and other impurities from plutonium feedstock and (2) the MOX fuel fabrication process (MP), which processes the oxides into pellets and manufactures the MOX fuel assemblies. The AP process consists of three major steps, dissolution, purification, and conversion, and is the center of the primary chemical processing. A study of process hazards controls has been initiated that will provide knowledge and protection against the chemical risks associated from mixing of reagents over the life time of the process. This paper presents a comprehensive chemical interaction matrix evaluation for the reagents used in the PUREX-based process. Chemical interaction matrix supplements the process conditions by providing a checklist of any potential inadvertent chemical reactions that may take place. It also identifies the chemical compatibility/incompatibility of the reagents if mixed by failure of operations or equipment within the process itself or mixed inadvertently by a technician in the laboratories. (aut0010ho.« less
SAVANNAH RIVER SITE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT FOR 2010
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mamatey, A.; Dunaway-Ackerman, J.
2011-08-16
This report was prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,' to present summary environmental data for the purpose of: (a) characterizing site's environmental management performance; (b) summarizing environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (c) describing compliance status with respect to environmental standards and requirements; and (d) highlighting significant site programs and efforts. This report is the principal document that demonstrates compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, 'Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,' and is a key component of DOE's effort to keep the publicmore » informed of environmental conditions at Savannah River Site (SRS). SRS has four primary missions: (1) Environmental Management - Cleaning up the legacy of the Cold War efforts and preparing decommissioned facilities and areas for long-term stewardship; (2) Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Support - Meeting the needs of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile through the tritium programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); (3) Nuclear Nonproliferation Support - Meeting the needs of the NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs by safely storing and dispositioning excess special nuclear materials; and (4) Research and Development - Supporting the application of science by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to meet the needs of SRS, the DOE complex, and other federal agencies During 2010, SRS worked to fulfill these missions and position the site for future operations. SRS continued to work with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to find and implement solutions and schedules for waste management and disposition. As part of its mission to clean up the Cold War legacy, SRS will continue to address the highest-risk waste management issues by safely storing and preparing liquid waste and nuclear materials for disposition, and by safely stabilizing any tank waste residues that remain on site.« less
Device for providing high-intensity ion or electron beam
McClanahan, Edwin D.; Moss, Ronald W.
1977-01-01
A thin film of a low-thermionic-work-function material is maintained on the cathode of a device for producing a high-current, low-pressure gas discharge by means of sputter deposition from an auxiliary electrode. The auxiliary electrode includes a surface with a low-work-function material, such as thorium, uranium, plutonium or one of the rare earth elements, facing the cathode but at a disposition and electrical potential so as to extract ions from the gas discharge and sputter the low-work-function material onto the cathode. By continuously replenishing the cathode film, high thermionic emissions and ion plasmas can be realized and maintained over extended operating periods.
Hydrothermal Synthesis and Crystal Structures of Actinide Compounds
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Runde, Wolfgang; Neu, Mary P.
Since the 1950s actinides have been used to benefit industry, science, health, and national security. The largest industrial application, electricity generation from uranium and thorium fuels, is growing worldwide. Thus, more actinides are being mined, produced, used and processed than ever before. The future of nuclear energy hinges on how these increasing amounts of actinides are contained in each stage of the fuel cycle, including disposition. In addition, uranium and plutonium were built up during the Cold War between the United States and the Former Soviet Union for defense purposes and nuclear energy. These stockpiles have been significantly reduced in the last decade.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Adamov, E.O.; Lebedev, V.A.; Kuznetsov, Yu.N.
Zheleznogorsk is situated near the territorial center -- Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisei river. Mining and chemical complex is the main industrial enterprise of the town, which has been constructed for generation and used for isolation of weapons-grade plutonium. Heat supply to the chemical complex and town at the moment is largely provided by nuclear co-generation plant (NCGP) on the basis of the ADEh-2 dual-purpose reactor, generating 430 Gcal/h of heat and, partially, by coal backup peak-load boiler houses. NCGP also provides 73% of electric power consumed. In line with agreements between Russia and USA on strategic arms reduction and phasingmore » out of weapons-grade plutonium production, decommissioning of the ADEh-2 reactor by 2000 is planned. Thus, a problem arises relative to compensation for electric and thermal power generation for the needs of the town and industrial enterprises, which is now supplied by the reactor. A nuclear power plant constructed on the same site as a substituting power source should be considered as the most practical option. Basic requirements to the reactor of substituting nuclear power plant are as follows. It is to be a new generation reactor on the basis of verified technologies, having an operating prototype optimal for underground siting and permitting utmost utilization of the available mining workings and those being disengaged. NCGP with the reactor is to be constructed in the time period required and is to become competitive with other possible power sources. Analysis has shown that the VK-300 simplified vessel-type boiling reactor meets the requirements made in the maximum extent. Its design is based on the experience of the VK-50 reactor operation for a period of 30 years in Dimitrovgrad (Russia) and allows for experience in the development of the SBWR type reactors. The design of the reactor is discussed.« less
Savannah River Site nuclear materials management plan FY 2017-2031
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Magoulas, V.
The purpose of the Nuclear Materials Management Plan (herein referred to as “this Plan”) is to integrate and document the activities required to disposition the legacy and/or surplus Enriched Uranium (EU) and Plutonium (Pu) and other nuclear materials already stored or anticipated to be received by facilities at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) as well as the activities to support the DOE Tritium mission. It establishes a planning basis for EU and Pu processing operations in Environmental Management Operations (EMO) facilities through the end of their program missions and for the tritium through the National Nuclearmore » Security Administration (NNSA) Defense Programs (DP) facilities. Its development is a joint effort among the Department of Energy - Savannah River (DOE-SR), DOE – Environmental Management (EM), NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3), NNSA Savannah River Field Office (SRFO), and the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). Life-cycle program planning for Nuclear Materials Stabilization and Disposition and the Tritium Enterprise may use this Plan as a basis for the development of the nuclear materials disposition scope and schedule. This Plan assumes full funding to accomplish the required project and operations activities. It is recognized that some aspects of this Plan are pre decisional with regard to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); in such cases new NEPA actions will be required.« less
Monterial, Mateusz; Marleau, Peter; Paff, Marc; ...
2017-01-20
Here, we present the results from the first measurements of the Time-Correlated Pulse-Height (TCPH) distributions from 4.5 kg sphere of α-phase weapons-grade plutonium metal in five configurations: bare, reflected by 1.27 cm and 2.54 cm of tungsten, and 2.54 cm and 7.62 cm of polyethylene. A new method for characterizing source multiplication and shielding configuration is also demonstrated. The method relies on solving for the underlying fission chain timing distribution that drives the spreading of the measured TCPH distribution. We found that a gamma distribution fits the fission chain timing distribution well and that the fit parameters correlate with bothmore » multiplication (rate parameter) and shielding material types (shape parameter). The source-to-detector distance was another free parameter that we were able to optimize, and proved to be the most well constrained parameter. MCNPX-PoliMi simulations were used to complement the measurements and help illustrate trends in these parameters and their relation to multiplication and the amount and type of material coupled to the subcritical assembly.« less
Critical assembly: A technical history of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer years, 1943--1945
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hoddeson, L.; Henriksen, P.W.; Meade, R.A.
1993-11-01
This volume treats the technical research that led to the first atomic bombs. The authors explore how the ``critical assembly`` of scientists, engineers, and military Personnel at Los Alamos collaborated during World War II, blending their traditions to create a new approach to large-scale research. The research was characterized by strong mission orientation, multidisciplinary teamwork, expansion of the scientists` traditional methodology with engineering techniques, and a trail-and-error methodology responding to wartime deadlines. The book opens with an introduction laying out major themes. After a synopsis of the prehistory of the bomb project, from the discovery of nuclear fission to themore » start of the Manhattan Engineer District, and an overview of the early materials program, the book examines the establishment of the Los Alamos Laboratory, the implosion and gun assembly programs, nuclear physics research, chemistry and metallurgy, explosives, uranium and plutonium development, confirmation of spontaneous fission in pile-produced plutonium, the thermonuclear bomb, critical assemblies, the Trinity test, and delivery of the combat weapons.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Monterial, Mateusz; Marleau, Peter; Paff, Marc; Clarke, Shaun; Pozzi, Sara
2017-04-01
We present the results from the first measurements of the Time-Correlated Pulse-Height (TCPH) distributions from 4.5 kg sphere of α-phase weapons-grade plutonium metal in five configurations: bare, reflected by 1.27 cm and 2.54 cm of tungsten, and 2.54 cm and 7.62 cm of polyethylene. A new method for characterizing source multiplication and shielding configuration is also demonstrated. The method relies on solving for the underlying fission chain timing distribution that drives the spreading of the measured TCPH distribution. We found that a gamma distribution fits the fission chain timing distribution well and that the fit parameters correlate with both multiplication (rate parameter) and shielding material types (shape parameter). The source-to-detector distance was another free parameter that we were able to optimize, and proved to be the most well constrained parameter. MCNPX-PoliMi simulations were used to complement the measurements and help illustrate trends in these parameters and their relation to multiplication and the amount and type of material coupled to the subcritical assembly.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Narlesky, Joshua E; Padilla, Dennis D; Watts, Joe
2009-01-01
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the former Soviet Union produced and exported Plutonium-Beryllium (PuBe) neutron sources to various Eastern European countries. The Russian sources consist of an intermetallic compound of plutonium and beryllium encapsulated in an inner welded, sealed capsule and consisting of a body and one or more covers. The amount of plutonium in the sources ranges from 0.002 g up to 15 g. A portion of the sources was originally exported to East Germany. A portion of these sources were acquired by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in the late 1990s for destruction in the Offsite Source Recoverymore » Program. When the OSRP was canceled, the remaining 88 PuBe neutron sources were packaged and stored in a 55-gal drum at T A-55. This storage configuration is no longer acceptable for PuBe sources, and the sources must either be repackaged or disposed of. Repackaging would place the sources into Hagan container, and depending on the dose rates, some sources may be packaged individually increasing the footprint and cost of storage. In addition, each source will be subject to leak-checking every six months. Leaks have already been detected in some of the sources, and due to the age of these sources, it is likely that additional leaks may be detected over time, which will increase the overall complexity of handling and storage. Therefore, it was decided that the sources would be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) due to the cost and labor associated with continued storage at TA-55. However, the plutonium in the sources is of Russian origin and needs to be preserved for research purposes. Therefore, it is important that a representative sample of the sources retained and archived for future studies. This report describes the criteria used to obtain a representative sample of the sources. Nine Russian PuBe neutron sources have been selected out of a collection of 77 sources for inclusion in the NMIP archive. Selection criteria were developed so that the largest sources that are representative of the collection are included. One representative source was chosen for every 20 sources in the collection, and effort was made to preserve sources unique to the collection. In total, four representative sources and five unique sources were selected for the archive. The archive samples contain 40 grams of plutonium with an isotopic composition similar to that of weapon grade material and three grams of plutonium with an isotopic composition similar to that of reactor grade plutonium.« less
Method for removal of metal atoms from aqueous solution using suspended plant cells
Jackson, Paul J.; Torres, deceased, Agapito P.; Delhaize, Emmanuel
1992-01-01
The use of plant suspension cultures to remove ionic metallic species and TNT-based explosives and their oxidation products from aqueous solution is described. Several plant strains were investigated including D. innoxia, Citrus citrus, and Black Mexican Sweet Corn. All showed significant ability to remove metal ions. Ions removed to sub-ppm levels include barium, iron, and plutonium. D. innoxia cells growing in media containing weapons effluent contaminated with Ba.sup.2+ also remove TNT, other explosives and oxidation products thereof from solution. The use of dead, dehydrated cells were also found to be of use in treating waste directly.
Method for removal of explosives from aqueous solution using suspended plant cells
Jackson, Paul J.; Torres, deceased, Agapito P.; Delhaize, Emmanuel
1994-01-01
The use of plant suspension cultures to remove ionic metallic species and TNT-based explosives and their oxidation products from aqueous solution is described. Several plant strains were investigated including D. innoxia, Citrus citrus, and Black Mexican Sweet Corn. All showed significant ability to remove metal ions. Ions removed to sub-ppm levels include barium, iron, and plutonium. D. innoxia cells growing in media containing weapons effluent contaminated with Ba.sup.2+ also remove TNT, other explosives and oxidation products thereof from solution. The use of dead, dehydrated cells was also found to be of use in treating waste directly.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Benton, J; Wall, D; Parker, E
This paper presents the latest information on one of the Accelerated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Disposition initiatives that resulted from the May 2002 Summit meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin. These initiatives are meant to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation objectives by accelerating the disposition of nuclear weapons-useable materials. The HEU Transparency Implementation Program (TIP), within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is working to implement one of the selected initiatives that would purchase excess Russian HEU (93% 235U) for use as fuel in U.S. research reactors over the next ten years. This will parallel efforts to convertmore » the reactors' fuel core from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) material, where feasible. The paper will examine important aspects associated with the U.S. research reactor HEU purchase. In particular: (1) the establishment of specifications for the Russian HEU, and (2) transportation safeguard considerations for moving the HEU from the Mayak Production Facility in Ozersk, Russia, to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E
2008-12-23
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spentmore » nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to divert in large quantities. This report discusses the application of the LIFE concept to nonproliferation issues, initially looking at the LIFE (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) engine as a means of completely burning WG Pu and HEU. By combining a neutron-rich inertial fusion point source with energy-rich fission, the once-through closed fuel-cycle LIFE concept has the following characteristics: it is capable of efficiently burning excess weapons or separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium; the fission blanket is sub-critical at all times (keff < 0.95); because LIFE can operate well beyond the point at which light water reactors (LWRs) need to be refueled due to burn-up of fissile material and the resulting drop in system reactivity, fuel burn-up of 99% or more appears feasible. The objective of this work is to develop LIFE technology for burning of WG-Pu and HEU.« less
On the distribution and inventories of radionuclides in dated sediments around the Swedish coast.
Olszewski, Grzegorz; Andersson, Pål; Lindahl, Patric; Eriksson, Mats
2018-06-01
The activity concentrations and distribution of 137 Cs, 238 Pu, 239+240 Pu, 241 Am, and 210 Pb was determined by the analysis of six sediment cores from the Baltic Sea and Kattegat. The chronology of the sediment cores has been used to evaluate the origin and time trend of the radionuclide sources in these sediments. The sediment cores were dated with a 210 Pb model and the results were validated with fallout peaks, assumed to originate from the global nuclear weapons testing and the Chernobyl accident. Source identification, using the isotopic and radionuclide activity ratios, showed that the Chernobyl accident is the main source of 137 Cs in the Baltic Sea; for 239+240 Pu and 241 Am the dominant source was shown to be fallout from nuclear weapons tests. For 238 Pu and 241 Am the Chernobyl accident had a significant impact on the direct fallout into the Baltic Proper, with up to a 65% contribution in the sediment slices dated to 1986. In these sediment slices the maximum activity ratios of 238 Pu/ 239+240 Pu and 241 Am/ 239+240 Pu were 0.314 ± 0.008 and 1.29 ± 0.06, respectively. The ratios clearly deviate from the corresponding ratios for global nuclear weapons fallout (around 0.028 and 0.54, respectively). Calculated inventories were 63-175 Bq·m -2 for 239+240 Pu, 2.8-7.8 for 238 Pu Bq·m -2 and 0.92-44.4 kBq·m -2 for 137 Cs. Different fallout patterns for 137 Cs and plutonium isotopes from the Chernobyl accident were confirmed through depth profiles analyses. The maximum inventory of 137 Cs was observed in the Bothnian Sea, while Chernobyl-derived plutonium was found to be mostly present in Northern Baltic Proper. The radionuclides distribution in the depth profiles shows how contaminated water affects the sediment as it passes sampling stations according to the current circulation pattern in the Baltic Sea. Additionally, the effect of increased activity concentrations from of river discharges in the most contaminated area in the Bothnian Sea was observed. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY, IN-SITU DECOMMISSIONING OF THE P AND R REACTORS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Musall, J.; Blankenship, J.; Griffin, W.
2012-01-09
SRS recently completed an approximately three year effort to decommission two SRS reactors: P-Reactor (Building 105-P) and R-Reactor (Building 105-R). Completed in December 2011, the concurrent decommissionings marked the completion of two relatively complex and difficult facility disposition projects at the SRS. Buildings 105-P and 105-R began operating as production reactors in the early 1950s with the mission of producing weapons material (e.g., tritium and plutonium-239). The 'P' Reactor and was shutdown in 1991 while the 'R' Reactor and was shutdown in 1964. In the intervening period between shutdown and deactivation & decommissioning (D&D), Buildings 105-P and 105-R saw limitedmore » use (e.g., storage of excess heavy water and depleted uranium oxide). For Building 105-P, deactivation was initiated in April 2007 and was essentially complete by June 2010. For Building 105-R, deactivation was initiated in August 2008 and was essentially complete by September 2010. For both buildings, the primary objective of deactivation was to remove/mitigate hazards associated with the remaining hazardous materials, and thus prepare the buildings for in-situ decommissioning. Deactivation removed the following hazardous materials to the extent practical: combustibles/flammables, residual heavy water, acids, friable asbestos (as needed to protect workers performing deactivation and decommissioning), miscellaneous chemicals, lead/brass components, Freon(reg sign), oils, mercury/PCB containing components, mold and some radiologically-contaminated equipment. In addition to the removal of hazardous materials, deactivation included the removal of hazardous energy, exterior metallic components (representing an immediate fall hazard), and historical artifacts along with the evaporation of water from the two Disassembly Basins. Finally, so as to facilitate occupancy during the subsequent in-situ decommissioning, deactivation implemented repairs to the buildings and provided temporary power.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dougherty, D.; Fainberg, A.; Sanborn, J.
On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed {open_quotes}... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as {open_quotes}the Cutoff Convention{close_quotes}) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced aftermore » entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. {open_quotes}Production{close_quotes} would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards.« less
Proliferation resistance of small modular reactors fuels
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Polidoro, F.; Parozzi, F.; Fassnacht, F.
2013-07-01
In this paper the proliferation resistance of different types of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) has been examined and classified with criteria available in the literature. In the first part of the study, the level of proliferation attractiveness of traditional low-enriched UO{sub 2} and MOX fuels to be used in SMRs based on pressurized water technology has been analyzed. On the basis of numerical simulations both cores show significant proliferation risks. Although the MOX core is less proliferation prone in comparison to the UO{sub 2} core, it still can be highly attractive for diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material. Inmore » the second part of the paper, calculations to assess the proliferation attractiveness of fuel in typical small sodium cooled fast reactor show that proliferation risks from spent fuel cannot be neglected. The core contains a highly attractive plutonium composition during the whole life cycle. Despite some aspects of the design like the sealed core that enables easy detection of unauthorized withdrawal of fissile material and enhances proliferation resistance, in case of open Non-Proliferation Treaty break-out, weapon-grade plutonium in sufficient quantities could be extracted from the reactor core.« less
10. AERIAL VIEW LOOKING NORTHWEST AT THE 400AREA COMPLEX. THIS ...
10. AERIAL VIEW LOOKING NORTHWEST AT THE 400-AREA COMPLEX. THIS AREA OF THE PLANT MANUFACTURED NON-PLUTONIUM WEAPONS COMPONENTS FROM BERYLLIUM, DEPLETED URANIUM, AND STAINLESS STEEL. THE 400 - AREA ALSO INCLUDED A FACILITY FOR THE MODIFICATION OF SAFE SECURE TRANSPORT VEHICLES FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS BEING SHIPPED TO AND FROM THE SITE. BUILDING 444, IN THE UPPER RIGHT EDGE OF THE PHOTOGRAPH, WAS THE ORIGINAL PLANT A. THE LARGE BUILDING IN THE TOP OF THE PHOTOGRAPH IS BUILDING 460, BUILT AS A STATE-OF-THE-ART STAINLESS STEEL MANUFACTURING FACILITY (6/27/95). - Rocky Flats Plant, Bounded by Indiana Street & Routes 93, 128 & 72, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
The physics design of accelerator-driven transmutation systems
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Venneri, F.
1995-10-01
Nuclear systems under study in the Los Alamos Accelerator-Driven Transmutation Technology program (ADTT) will allow the destruction of nuclear spent fuel and weapons-return plutonium, as well as the production of nuclear energy from the thorium cycle, without a long-lived radioactive waste stream. The subcritical systems proposed represent a radical departure from traditional nuclear concepts (reactors), yet the actual implementation of ADTT systems is based on modest extrapolations of existing technology. These systems strive to keep the best that the nuclear technology has developed over the years, within a sensible conservative design envelope and eventually manage to offer a safe, lessmore » expensive and more environmentally sound approach to nuclear power.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Reed, Bruce Cameron
2015-06-01
This volume, prepared by an acknowledged expert on the Manhattan Project, gives a concise, fast-paced account of all major aspects of the project at a level accessible to an undergraduate college or advanced high-school student familiar with some basic concepts of energy, atomic structure, and isotopes. The text describes the underlying scientific discoveries that made nuclear weapons possible, how the project was organized, the daunting challenges faced and overcome in obtaining fissile uranium and plutonium, and in designing workable bombs, the dramatic Trinity test carried out in the desert of southern New Mexico in July 1945, and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mendenhall, M.; Bowden, N.; Brodsky, J.
Electron anti-neutrino ( e) detectors can support nuclear safeguards, from reactor monitoring to spent fuel characterization. In recent years, the scientific community has developed multiple detector concepts, many of which have been prototyped or deployed for specific measurements by their respective collaborations. However, the diversity of technical approaches, deployment conditions, and analysis techniques complicates direct performance comparison between designs. We have begun development of a simulation framework to compare and evaluate existing and proposed detector designs for nonproliferation applications in a uniform manner. This report demonstrates the intent and capabilities of the framework by evaluating four detector design concepts, calculatingmore » generic reactor antineutrino counting sensitivity, and capabilities in a plutonium disposition application example.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ethan W. Brown
2001-09-01
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials. Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities. Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites inmore » the complex. Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the Department's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure plan and contractor integration analysis. Interstate waste and materials shipments. Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the period from April 1, 2001 through June 30, 2001, under the NGA grant.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wang, Zhong-liang; Yamada, Masatoshi
2005-05-01
Plutonium concentrations and 240Pu/ 239Pu atom ratios in the East China Sea and Okinawa Trough sediment cores were determined by isotope dilution inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry after separation using ion-exchange chromatography. The results showed that 240Pu/ 239Pu atom ratios in the East China Sea and Okinawa Trough sediments, ranging from 0.21 to 0.33, were much higher than the reported value of global fallout (0.18). The highest 240Pu/ 239Pu ratios (0.32-0.33) were observed in the deepest Okinawa Trough sediment samples. These ratios suggested the US nuclear weapons tests in the early 1950s at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands were a major source of plutonium in the East China Sea and Okinawa Trough sediments, in addition to the global fallout source. It was proposed that close-in fallout plutonium was delivered from the Pacific Proving Grounds test sites via early direct tropospheric fallout and transportation by the North Pacific Equatorial Circulation system and Kuroshio Current into the Okinawa Trough and East China Sea. The total 239 + 240 Pu inventories in the cores were about 150-200% of that expected from direct global fallout; about 46-67% of the total inventories were delivered from the Pacific Proving Grounds. Much higher 239 + 240 Pu inventories were observed in the East China Sea sediments than in sediments of the Okinawa Trough, because in the open oceans, part of the 239 + 240 Pu was still retained in the water column, and continued Pu scavenging was higher over the margin than the trough. According to the vertical distributions of 239 + 240 Pu activities and 240Pu/ 239Pu atom ratios in these cores, it was concluded that sediment mixing was the dominant process in controlling profiles of plutonium in this area. Faster mixing in the coastal samples has homogenized the entire 240Pu/ 239Pu ratio record today; slightly slower mixing and less scavenging in the Okinawa Trough have left the surface sediment ratios closer to the modern North Pacific water end member and higher ratios (0.30-0.34) at the bottom of the cores.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Maggs, William Ward
Calling the Department of Energy's management of the nation's crippled nuclear weapons production complex “a 35-year secret chemical war waged against people living near DOE's sites,” Representative Thomas Luken (D-OH) opened a congressional hearing on February 23 with an appeal to DOE Secretary-designate James Watkins to release secret health records of workers at the plants. In testimony that followed, Comptroller General Charles Bowsher told a subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee that President Bush's new budget does not go far enough on the long and costly road of cleaning up and modernizing the contaminated and aging facilities. The renovation is expected to cost up to $155 billion.By next month, 11 of the 17 installations that make up the DOE complex will be on the EPA's Superfund list of the nation's most contaminated waste sites. Some o f the DOE facilities, including the Rocky Flats plant in Denver, Colo., the Hanford Reservation in eastern Washington, and the Savannah River plant in South Carolina, are among the most polluted sites ever identified by EPA. The principal function of the facilities, the production of tritium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, has stopped, creating what DOE has characterized as a looming national security crisis.
HOW OLD IS IT? - 241PU/241AM NUCLEAR FORENSIC CHRONOLOGY REFERENCE MATERIALS
Fitzgerald, Ryan; Inn, Kenneth G.W.; Horgan, Christopher
2018-01-01
One material attribute for nuclear forensics is material age. 241Pu is almost always present in uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest threat to our security. The in-growth of 241Am due to the decay of 241Pu provides an excellent chronometer of the material. A well-characterized 241Pu/241Am standard is needed to validate measurement capability, as a basis for between-laboratory comparability, and as material for verifying laboratory performance. This effort verifies the certification of a 38 year old 241Pu Standard Reference Material (SRM4340) through alpha-gamma anticoincidence counting, and also establishes the separation date to two weeks of the documented date. PMID:29720779
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
J.P. Nicot
The objective of this calculation is to estimate the quantity of fissile material that could accumulate in fractures in the rock beneath plutonium-ceramic (Pu-ceramic) and Mixed-Oxide (MOX) waste packages (WPs) as they degrade in the potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. This calculation is to feed another calculation (Ref. 31) computing the probability of criticality in the systems described in Section 6 and then ultimately to a more general report on the impact of plutonium on the performance of the proposed repository (Ref. 32), both developed concurrently to this work. This calculation is done in accordance with the developmentmore » plan TDP-DDC-MD-000001 (Ref. 9), item 5. The original document described in item 5 has been split into two documents: this calculation and Ref. 4. The scope of the calculation is limited to only very low flow rates because they lead to the most conservative cases for Pu accumulation and more generally are consistent with the way the effluent from the WP (called source term in this calculation) was calculated (Ref. 4). Ref. 4 (''In-Drift Accumulation of Fissile Material from WPs Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Forms'') details the evolution through time (breach time is initial time) of the chemical composition of the solution inside the WP as degradation of the fuel and other materials proceed. It is the chemical solution used as a source term in this calculation. Ref. 4 takes that same source term and reacts it with the invert; this calculation reacts it with the rock. In addition to reactions with the rock minerals (that release Si and Ca), the basic mechanisms for actinide precipitation are dilution and mixing with resident water as explained in Section 2.1.4. No other potential mechanism such as flow through a reducing zone is investigated in this calculation. No attempt was made to use the effluent water from the bottom of the invert instead of using directly the effluent water from the WP. This calculation supports disposal criticality analysis and has been prepared in accordance with AP-3.12Q, Calculations (Ref. 49). This calculation uses results from Ref. 4 on actinide accumulation in the invert and more generally does reference heavily the cited calculation. In addition to the information provided in this calculation, the reader is referred to the cited calculation for a more thorough treatment of items applying to both the invert and fracture system such as the choice of the thermodynamic database, the composition of J-13 well water, tuff composition, dissolution rate laws, Pu(OH){sub 4} solubility and also for details on the source term composition. The flow conditions (seepage rate, water velocity in fractures) in the drift and the fracture system beneath initially referred to the TSPA-VA because this work was prepared before the release of the work feeding the TSPA-SR. Some new information feeding the TSPA-SR has since been included. Similarly, the soon-to-be-qualified thermodynamic database data0.ymp has not been released yet.« less
Xu, Yihong; Pan, Shaoming; Gao, Jianhua; Hou, Xiaolin; Ma, Yongfu; Hao, Yongpei
2018-09-01
Plutonium (Pu) isotopes were first determined in surface and core sediment samples collected from the northern North Yellow Sea (NYS) to elucidate their source terms and deposition process as well as the response to catchment environmental changes of inflow rivers. 240 Pu/ 239 Pu atom ratios in all sediments showed the typical global fallout value of ∼0.18 without any influences from the nuclear weapons tests conducted recently in the North Korea or early in the Pacific Proving Ground. The large variation of 239+240 Pu activities (0.022-0.515 mBq/g) observed in surface sediments should be mainly attributed to the re-suspension and transportation of fine sediments influenced by the Liaonan Costal Current. Based on the two 239+249 Pu depth profiles with easily observed onset fallout levels (1952) and global fallout peaks (1963), 239+240 Pu served as a valid time mark in the coastal sedimentary system. Riverine input Pu contributed only 15-27% to the total global fallout inventory (92.5-108.8 Bq/m 2 ) in the northern NYS, much lower than that in the Yangtze River estuary (77-80%), indicating a better soil conservation in the northeast China due to higher forest coverage compared to the Yangtze River's drainage basin. The increase of riverine input Pu after 1980s reflected the more intense soil erosion degree caused by the land use and cover change due to the increment of human activities in the northeast China at the same period. Our results demonstrated that plutonium is a good indicator for studying sedimentary process and its response to the environment in the coastal area. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Yamamoto, M; Oikawa, S; Sakaguchi, A; Tomita, J; Hoshi, M; Apsalikov, K N
2008-09-01
Information on the 240Pu/239Pu isotope ratios in human tissues for people living around the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) was deduced from 9 sets of soft tissues and bones, and 23 other bone samples obtained by autopsy. Plutonium was radiochemically separated and purified, and plutonium isotopes (239Pu and 240Pu) were determined by sector-field high resolution inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry. For most of the tissue samples from the former nine subjects, low 240Pu/239Pu isotope ratios were determined: bone, 0.125 +/- 0.018 (0.113-0.145, n = 4); lungs, 0.063 +/- 0.010 (0.051-0.078, n = 5); and liver, 0.148 +/- 0.026 (0.104-0.189, n = 9). Only 239Pu was detected in the kidney samples; the amount of 240Pu was too small to be measured, probably due to the small size of samples analyzed. The mean 240Pu/239Pu isotope ratio for bone samples from the latter 23 subjects was 0.152 +/- 0.034, ranging from 0.088 to 0.207. A significant difference (a two-tailed Student's t test; 95% significant level, alpha = 0.05) between mean 240Pu/239Pu isotope ratios for the tissue samples and for the global fallout value (0.178 +/- 0.014) indicated that weapons-grade plutonium from the atomic bombs has been incorporated into the human tissues, especially lungs, in the residents living around the SNTS. The present 239,240Pu concentrations in bone, lung, and liver samples were, however, not much different from ranges found for human tissues from other countries that were due solely to global fallout during the 1970's-1980's.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Boryta, J. R.; Wolfsberg, A. V.
2003-12-01
The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is the United States continental nuclear weapons testing site. The larger underground tests, including BENHAM and TYBO, were conducted at Pahute Mesa. The BENHAM test, conducted in 1968, was detonated 1.4 km below the surface and the TYBO test, conducted in 1975, was detonated at a depth of 765 m. Between 1996 and 1998, several radionuclides were discovered in trace concentrations in a monitoring well complex 273 m from TYBO and 1300 m from BENHAM. Previous studies associated with these measurements have focused primarily on a) plutonium discovered in the observation wells, which was identified through isotopic finger printing as originating at BENHAM, b) colloid-facilitated plutonium transport processes, and c) vertical convection in subsurface nuclear test collapse chimneys. In addition to plutonium, several other non-, weakly-, and strongly-sorbing radionuclides were discovered in trace concentrations in the observation wells, including tritium, carbon-14, chlorine-36, iodine-129, technetium-99, neptunium-237, strontium-90, cesium-137, americium-241, and europium-152,154,155. The range in retardation processes affecting these different radionuclides provides additional information for assessing groundwater solute transport model formulations. For all radionuclides, simulation results are most sensitive to the fracture porosity and fracture aperture. Additionally, for weakly sorbing Np, simulation results are highly sensitive to the matrix sorption coefficient. For strongly sorbing species, migration in the absence of colloids can only be simulated if fracture apertures are set very large, reducing the amount of diffusion that can occur. For these species, colloid-facilitated transport appears to be a more likely explanation for the measurements. This is corroborated with colloid-transport model simulations.
Plutonium in the WIPP environment: its detection, distribution and behavior.
Thakur, P; Ballard, S; Nelson, R
2012-05-01
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the only operating deep underground geologic nuclear repository in the United States. It is located in southeastern New Mexico, approximately 655 m (2150 ft) below the surface of the Earth in a bedded Permian evaporite salt formation. This mined geologic repository is designed for the safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated from the US defense program. Aerosol and soil samples have been collected near the WIPP site to investigate the sources of plutonium in the WIPP environment since the late 1990s, well before WIPP received its first shipment. Activities of (238)Pu, (239+240)Pu and (241)Am were determined by alpha spectrometry following a series of chemical separations. The concentrations of Al and U were determined in a separate set of samples by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. The annual airborne concentrations of (239+240)Pu during the period from 1998 to 2010 show no systematic interannual variations. However, monthly (239+240)Pu particulate concentrations show a typical seasonal variation with a maximum in spring, the time when strong and gusty winds frequently give rise to blowing dust. Resuspension of soil particles containing weapons fallout is considered to be the predominant source of plutonium in the WIPP area. Further, this work characterizes the source, temporal variation and its distribution with depth in a soil profile to evaluate the importance of transport mechanisms affecting the fate of these radionuclides in the WIPP environment. The mean (137)Cs/(239+240)Pu, (241)Am/(239+240)Pu activity ratio and (240)Pu/(239)Pu atom ratio observed in the WIPP samples are consistent with the source being largely global fallout. There is no evidence of any release from the WIPP contributing to radionuclide concentrations in the environment.
[Detachment of man from life].
Wendland, K L
1979-01-01
As an instrument and a weapon in the struggle for existence man has at his disposal the intellect which enables him, by means of language, to make use of conceptional thinking. But if he uses the intellect in order to manage the interactions with his equals, he unaffectedly has to observe and to manipulate the behaviour of his fellow-men as well as his own psychic processes like functions of intricate technical apparatuses, disregarding or violating the incalculable 'endothymic' part (strivings and feelings) of human being. Innate dispositions of behaviour, urges, moods, and emotions, however, constitute real life. Suppression of vital powers by the laws of rationality makes civilized people suffer.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Goddard, Braden
The ability of inspection agencies and facility operators to measure powders containing several actinides is increasingly necessary as new reprocessing techniques and fuel forms are being developed. These powders are difficult to measure with nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques because neutrons emitted from induced and spontaneous fission of different nuclides are very similar. A neutron multiplicity technique based on first principle methods was developed to measure these powders by exploiting isotope-specific nuclear properties, such as the energy-dependent fission cross sections and the neutron induced fission neutron multiplicity. This technique was tested through extensive simulations using the Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) code and by one measurement campaign using the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and two measurement campaigns using the Epithermal Neutron Multiplicity Counter (ENMC) with various (alpha,n) sources and actinide materials. Four potential applications of this first principle technique have been identified: (1) quantitative measurement of uranium, neptunium, plutonium, and americium materials; (2) quantitative measurement of mixed oxide (MOX) materials; (3) quantitative measurement of uranium materials; and (4) weapons verification in arms control agreements. This technique still has several challenges which need to be overcome, the largest of these being the challenge of having high-precision active and passive measurements to produce results with acceptably small uncertainties.
Critical Need for Plutonium and Uranium Isotopic Standards with Lower Uncertainties
Mathew, Kattathu Joseph; Stanley, Floyd E.; Thomas, Mariam R.; ...
2016-09-23
Certified reference materials (CRMs) traceable to national and international safeguards database are a critical prerequisite for ensuring that nuclear measurement systems are free of systematic biases. CRMs are used to validate measurement processes associated with nuclear analytical laboratories. Diverse areas related to nuclear safeguards are impacted by the quality of the CRM standards available to analytical laboratories. These include: nuclear forensics, radio-chronometry, national and international safeguards, stockpile stewardship, nuclear weapons infrastructure and nonproliferation, fuel fabrication, waste processing, radiation protection, and environmental monitoring. For the past three decades the nuclear community is confronted with the strange situation that improvements in measurementmore » data quality resulting from the improved accuracy and precision achievable with modern multi-collector mass spectrometers could not be fully exploited due to large uncertainties associated with CRMs available from New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) that are used for instrument calibration and measurement control. Similar conditions prevail for both plutonium and uranium isotopic standards and for impurity element standards in uranium matrices. Herein, the current status of U and Pu isotopic standards available from NBL is reviewed. Critical areas requiring improvement in the quality of the nuclear standards to enable the U. S. and international safeguards community to utilize the full potential of modern multi-collector mass spectrometer instruments are highlighted.« less
Site restoration: Estimation of attributable costs from plutonium-dispersal accidents
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Chanin, D.I.; Murfin, W.B.
1996-05-01
A nuclear weapons accident is an extremely unlikely event due to the extensive care taken in operations. However, under some hypothetical accident conditions, plutonium might be dispersed to the environment. This would result in costs being incurred by the government to remediate the site and compensate for losses. This study is a multi-disciplinary evaluation of the potential scope of the post-accident response that includes technical factors, current and proposed legal requirements and constraints, as well as social/political factors that could influence decision making. The study provides parameters that can be used to assess economic costs for accidents postulated to occurmore » in urban areas, Midwest farmland, Western rangeland, and forest. Per-area remediation costs have been estimated, using industry-standard methods, for both expedited and extended remediation. Expedited remediation costs have been evaluated for highways, airports, and urban areas. Extended remediation costs have been evaluated for all land uses except highways and airports. The inclusion of cost estimates in risk assessments, together with the conventional estimation of doses and health effects, allows a fuller understanding of the post-accident environment. The insights obtained can be used to minimize economic risks by evaluation of operational and design alternatives, and through development of improved capabilities for accident response.« less
Critical Need for Plutonium and Uranium Isotopic Standards with Lower Uncertainties
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mathew, Kattathu Joseph; Stanley, Floyd E.; Thomas, Mariam R.
Certified reference materials (CRMs) traceable to national and international safeguards database are a critical prerequisite for ensuring that nuclear measurement systems are free of systematic biases. CRMs are used to validate measurement processes associated with nuclear analytical laboratories. Diverse areas related to nuclear safeguards are impacted by the quality of the CRM standards available to analytical laboratories. These include: nuclear forensics, radio-chronometry, national and international safeguards, stockpile stewardship, nuclear weapons infrastructure and nonproliferation, fuel fabrication, waste processing, radiation protection, and environmental monitoring. For the past three decades the nuclear community is confronted with the strange situation that improvements in measurementmore » data quality resulting from the improved accuracy and precision achievable with modern multi-collector mass spectrometers could not be fully exploited due to large uncertainties associated with CRMs available from New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) that are used for instrument calibration and measurement control. Similar conditions prevail for both plutonium and uranium isotopic standards and for impurity element standards in uranium matrices. Herein, the current status of U and Pu isotopic standards available from NBL is reviewed. Critical areas requiring improvement in the quality of the nuclear standards to enable the U. S. and international safeguards community to utilize the full potential of modern multi-collector mass spectrometer instruments are highlighted.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E.
2013-07-01
A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reactionmore » rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Williams, R.C.; Cantelon, P.L.
1984-01-01
In selecting these historical documents the authors have applied three general tests: first, does the document help tell the story of the development of American nuclear policy in a nontechnical way; second, is the source primary rather than secondary, written by an actor in the drama rather than by a member of the audience; third, does the document provide coverage of the major chapters in the story. The Manhattan Project was America's $2 billion secret project to build an atomic bomb. Many documents associated with the project have come to light only in recent years. In Section II they usemore » the letters of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the recently declassified minutes of policy committees to tell the story of how the bomb was designed and built and how the decision was made to drop the first uranium and plutonium devices on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. How did a weapon of war become the key to a peacetime industry. In considering atomic energy after World War II, they focus in Section III on the legislative enabling acts that established the Atomic Energy Commission, the short-lived dream of international control of nuclear weapons under the Baruch Plan, and the ''atoms for peace'' program of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. By 1954 the highly classified work on nuclear weapons paralleled a new development of nuclear energy and power reactors. Knowledge was shared with both private industry and other countries. The fruits of this program are considered in the later section on nuclear power.« less
Accelerator-driven Transmutation of Waste
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Venneri, Francesco
1998-04-01
Nuclear waste from commercial power plants contains large quantities of plutonium, other fissionable actinides, and long-lived fission products that are potential proliferation concerns and create challenges for the long-term storage. Different strategies for dealing with nuclear waste are being followed by various countries because of their geologic situations and their views on nuclear energy, reprocessing and non-proliferation. The current United States policy is to store unprocessed spent reactor fuel in a geologic repository. Other countries are opting for treatment of nuclear waste, including partial utilization of the fissile material contained in the spent fuel, prior to geologic storage. Long-term uncertainties are hampering the acceptability and eventual licensing of a geologic repository for nuclear spent fuel in the US, and driving up its cost. The greatest concerns are with the potential for radiation release and exposure from the spent fuel for tens of thousands of years and the possible diversion and use of the actinides contained in the waste for weapons construction. Taking advantage of the recent breakthroughs in accelerator technology and of the natural flexibility of subcritical systems, the Accelerator-driven Transmutation of Waste (ATW) concept offers the United States and other countries the possibility to greatly reduce plutonium, higher actinides and environmentally hazardous fission products from the waste stream destined for permanent storage. ATW does not eliminate the need for, but instead enhances the viability of permanent waste repositories. Far from being limited to waste destruction, the ATW concept also brings to the table new technologies that could be relevant for next-generation power producing reactors. In the ATW concept, spent fuel would be shipped to the ATW site where the plutonium, transuranics and selected long-lived fission products would be destroyed by fission or transmutation in their first and only pass through the facility, using an accelerator-driven subcritical burner cooled by liquid lead/bismuth and limited pyrochemical treatment of the spent fuel and residual waste. This approach contrasts with the present-day practices of aqueous reprocessing (Europe and Japan), in which high purity plutonium is produced and used in the fabrication of fresh mixed oxide fuel (MOX) that is shipped off-site for use in light water reactors.
Detecting special nuclear material using a neutron time projection chamber
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Carosi, G.; Bernstein, A.; Bowden, N.; Burke, J.; Carter, D.; Foxe, M.; Heffner, M.; Jovanovic, I.; Mintz, J.; O'Malley, P.
2010-02-01
Time projection chambers are 3-dimensional charged particle cameras based on drifting ionization tracks at a known velocity onto an electronic readout plane. These instruments are capable of detecting fast neutrons which are unique signatures of special nuclear material with low natural background rates. Here we describe a neutron Time Projection Chamber (nTPC) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) which has demonstrated directional sensitivity to fission neutrons along with high rejection of background gamma-ray and electron events. Using a combination hydrogen/methane drift gas at several atmospheres we've demonstrated the ability to point to a Cf-252 source simulating 6kg of weapons grade plutonium at 10's of meters with one hour integration time. Plans for future field deployable devices will also be outlined. )
1997-10-10
At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, workers are installing three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13
1997-10-10
At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, workers are installing three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13
1997-10-10
At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, workers are installing three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13
1997-10-10
At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, workers are installing three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13
Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) at PNNL
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Peurrung, Tony; Clark, Sue; Bryan, Sam
2017-03-23
Nuclear research is one of the core components of PNNL's mission. The centerpiece of PNNL's nuclear research is the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL), a Category 2 nuclear facility with state-of-the-art instrumentation, scientific expertise, and specialized capabilities that enable research with significant quantities of fissionable materials and other radionuclides—from tritium to plutonium. High impact radiological research has been conducted in the RPL since the 1950's, when nuclear weapons and energy production at Hanford were at the forefront of national defense. Since then, significant investments have been made in the RPL to maintain it as a premier nuclear science research facility supportingmore » multiple programs. Most recently, PNNL is developing a world-class analytical electron microscopy facility dedicated to the characterization of radiological materials.« less
High level radioactive waste vitrification process equipment component testing
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Siemens, D. H.; Health, W. C.; Larson, D. E.; Craig, S. N.; Berger, D. N.; Goles, R. W.
1985-04-01
Remote operability and maintainability of vitrification equipment were assessment under shielded cell conditions. The equipment tested will be applied to immobilize high level and transuranic liquid waste slurries that resulted from plutonium production for defense weapons. Equipment tested included: a turntable for handling waste canisters under the melter; a removable discharge cone in the melter overflow section; a thermocouple jumper that extends into a shielded cell; remote instrument and electrical connectors; remote, mechanical, and heat transfer aspects of the melter glass overflow section; a reamer to clean out plugged nozzles in the melter top; a closed circuit camera to view the melter interior; and a device to retrieve samples of the glass product. A test was also conduucted to evaluate liquid metals for use in a liquid metal sealing system.
Upward movement of plutonium to surface sediments during an 11-year field study.
Kaplan, D I; Demirkanli, D I; Molz, F J; Beals, D M; Cadieux, J R; Halverson, J E
2010-05-01
An 11-year lysimeter study was established to monitor the movement of Pu through vadose zone sediments. Sediment Pu concentrations as a function of depth indicated that some Pu moved upward from the buried source material. Subsequent numerical modeling suggested that the upward movement was largely the result of invading grasses taking up the Pu and translocating it upward. The objective of this study was to determine if the Pu of surface sediments originated from atmosphere fallout or from the buried lysimeter source material (weapons-grade Pu), providing additional evidence that plants were involved in the upward migration of Pu. The (240)Pu/(239)Pu and (242)Pu/(239)Pu atomic fraction ratios of the lysimeter surface sediments, as determined by Thermal Ionization Mass Spectroscopy (TIMS), were 0.063 and 0.00045, respectively; consistent with the signatures of the weapons-grade Pu. Our numerical simulations indicate that because plants create a large water flux, small concentrations over multiple years may result in a measurable accumulation of Pu on the ground surface. These results may have implications on the conceptual model for calculating risk associated with long-term stewardship and monitored natural attenuation management of Pu contaminated subsurface and surface sediments. Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Medical Effects of a Transuranic "Dirty Bomb".
Durakovic, Asaf
2017-03-01
The modern military battlefields are characterized by the use of nonconventional weapons such as encountered in the conflicts of the Gulf War I and Gulf War II. Recent warfare in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans has introduced radioactive weapons to the modern war zone scenarios. This presents the military medicine with a new area of radioactive warfare with the potential large scale contamination of military and civilian targets with the variety of radioactive isotopes further enhanced by the clandestine use of radioactive materials in the terrorist radioactive warfare. Radioactive dispersal devices (RDDs), including the "dirty bomb," involve the use of organotropic radioisotopes such as iodine 131, cesium 137, strontium 90, and transuranic elements. Some of the current studies of RDDs involve large-scale medical effects, social and economic disruption of the society, logistics of casualty management, cleanup, and transportation preparedness, still insufficiently addressed by the environmental and mass casualty medicine. The consequences of a dirty bomb, particularly in the terrorist use in urban areas, are a subject of international studies of multiple agencies involved in the management of disaster medicine. The long-term somatic and genetic impact of some from among over 400 radioisotopes released in the nuclear fission include somatic and transgenerational genetic effects with the potential challenges of the genomic stability of the biosphere. The global contamination is additionally heightened by the presence of transuranic elements in the modern warzone, including depleted uranium recently found to contain plutonium 239, possibly the most dangerous substance known to man with one pound of plutonium capable of causing 8 billion cancers. The planning for the consequences of radioactive dirty bomb are being currently studied in reference to the alkaline earths, osteotropic, and stem cell hazards of internally deposited radioactive isotopes, in particular uranium and transuranic elements. The spread of radioactive materials in the area of the impact would expose both military and civilian personnel to the blast and dust with both inhalational, somatic, and gastrointestinal exposure, in the aftermath of the deployment of RDDs. The quantities of radioactive materials have proliferated from the original quantity of plutonium first isolated in 1941 from 0.5 mg to the current tens of thousands of kilograms in the strategic nuclear arsenal with the obvious potential consequences to the biosphere and mankind. In an event of RDD employment, the immediate goal of disaster and mass casualty medicine would be a synchronized effort to contain the scope of the event, followed by cleanup and treatment procedures. A pragmatic approach to this problem is not always possible because of unpredictability of the terrorist-use scenarios. Reprint & Copyright © 2017 Association of Military Surgeons of the U.S.
Sorption/Desorption Interactions of Plutonium with Montmorillonite
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Begg, J.; Zavarin, M.; Zhao, P.; Kersting, A. B.
2012-12-01
Plutonium (Pu) release to the environment through nuclear weapon development and the nuclear fuel cycle is an unfortunate legacy of the nuclear age. In part due to public health concerns over the risk of Pu contamination of drinking water, predicting the behavior of Pu in both surface and sub-surface water is a topic of continued interest. Typically it was assumed that Pu mobility in groundwater would be severely restricted, as laboratory adsorption studies commonly show that naturally occurring minerals can effectively remove plutonium from solution. However, evidence for the transport of Pu over significant distances at field sites highlights a relative lack of understanding of the fundamental processes controlling plutonium behavior in natural systems. At several field locations, enhanced mobility is due to Pu association with colloidal particles that serve to increase the transport of sorbed contaminants (Kersting et al., 1999; Santschi et al., 2002, Novikov et al., 2006). The ability for mineral colloids to transport Pu is in part controlled by its oxidation state and the rate of plutonium adsorption to, and desorption from, the mineral surface. Previously we have investigated the adsorption affinity of Pu for montmorillonite colloids, finding affinities to be similar over a wide range of Pu concentrations. In the present study we examine the stability of adsorbed Pu on the mineral surface. Pu(IV) at an initial concentration of 10-10 M was pre-equilibrated with montmorillonite in a background electrolyte at pH values of 4, 6 and 8. Following equilibration, aliquots of the suspensions were placed in a flow cell and Pu-free background electrolyte at the relevant pH was passed through the system. Flow rates were varied in order to investigate the kinetics of desorption and hence gain a mechanistic understanding of the desorption process. The flow cell experiments demonstrate that desorption of Pu from the montmorillonite surface cannot be modeled as a simple first order process. Furthermore, a pH dependence was observed, with less desorbed at pH 4 compared to pH 8. We suggest the pH dependence is likely controlled by reoxidation of Pu(IV) to Pu(V) and aqueous speciation. We will present models used to describe desorption behavior and discuss the implications for Pu transport. References: Kersting, A.B.; Efurd, D.W.; Finnegan, D.L.; Rokop, D.J.; Smith, D.K.; Thompson J.L. (1999) Migration of plutonium in groundwater at the Nevada Test Site, Nature, 397, 56-59. Novikov A.P.; Kalmykov, S.N.; Utsunomiya, S.; Ewing, R.C.; Horreard, F.; Merkulov, A.; Clark, S.B.; Tkachev, V.V.; Myasoedov, B.F. (2006) Colloid transport of plutonium in the far-field of the Mayak Production Association, Russia, Science, 314, 638-641. Santschi, P.H.; Roberts, K.; Guo, L. (2002) The organic nature of colloidal actinides transported in surface water environments. Environ. Sci. Technol., 36, 3711-3719. This work was funded by U. S. DOE Office of Biological & Environmental Sciences, Subsurface Biogeochemistry Research Program, and performed under the auspices of the U. S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. LLNL-ABS-570161
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
TODOSOW,M.; KAZIMI,M.
2004-08-01
Issues affecting the implementation, public perception and acceptance of nuclear power include: proliferation, radioactive waste, safety, and economics. The thorium cycle directly addresses the proliferation and waste issues, but optimization studies of core design and fuel management are needed to ensure that it fits within acceptable safety and economic margins. Typical pressurized water reactors, although loaded with uranium fuel, produce 225 to 275 kg of plutonium per gigawatt-year of operation. Although the spent fuel is highly radioactive, it nevertheless offers a potential proliferation pathway because the plutonium is relatively easy to separate, amounts to many critical masses, and does notmore » present any significant intrinsic barrier to weapon assembly. Uranium 233, on the other hand, produced by the irradiation of thorium, although it too can be used in weapons, may be ''denatured'' by the addition of natural, depleted or low enriched uranium. Furthermore, it appears that the chemical behavior of thoria or thoria-urania fuel makes it a more stable medium for the geological disposal of the spent fuel. It is therefore particularly well suited for a once-through fuel cycle. The use of thorium as a fertile material in nuclear fuel has been of interest since the dawn of nuclear power technology due to its abundance and to potential neutronic advantages. Early projects include homogeneous mixtures of thorium and uranium oxides in the BORAX-IV, Indian Point I, and Elk River reactors, as well as heterogeneous mixtures in the Shippingport seed-blanket reactor. However these projects were developed under considerably different circumstances than those which prevail at present. The earlier applications preceded the current proscription, for non-proliferation purposes, of the use of uranium enriched to more than 20 w/o in {sup 235}U, and has in practice generally prohibited the use of uranium highly enriched in {sup 235}U. They were designed when the expected burnup of light water fuel was on the order of 25 MWD/kgU--about half the present day value--and when it was expected that the spent fuel would be recycled to recover its fissile content.« less
Wendel, Cato Christian; Fifield, L Keith; Oughton, Deborah H; Lind, Ole Christian; Skipperud, Lindis; Bartnicki, Jerzy; Tims, Stephen G; Høibråten, Steinar; Salbu, Brit
2013-09-01
A combination of state-of-the-art isotopic fingerprinting techniques and atmospheric transport modelling using real-time historical meteorological data has been used to demonstrate direct tropospheric transport of radioactive debris from specific nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan to Norway via large areas of Europe. A selection of archived air filters collected at ground level at 9 stations in Norway during the most intensive atmospheric nuclear weapon testing periods (1957-1958 and 1961-1962) has been screened for radioactive particles and analysed with respect to the concentrations and atom ratios of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Digital autoradiography screening demonstrated the presence of radioactive particles in the filters. Concentrations of (236)U (0.17-23nBqm(-3)) and (239+240)Pu (1.3-782μBqm(-3)) as well as the atom ratios (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.237) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.7) varied widely indicating several different sources. Filter samples from autumn and winter tended to have lower atom ratios than those sampled in spring and summer, and this likely reflects a tropospheric influence in months with little stratospheric fallout. Very high (236)U, (239+240)Pu and gross beta activity concentrations as well as low (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.077), (241)Pu/(239)Pu (0.00025-0.00062) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.046) atom ratios, characteristic of close-in and tropospheric fallout, were observed in filters collected at all stations in Nov 1962, 7-12days after three low-yield detonations at Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). Atmospheric transport modelling (NOAA HYSPLIT_4) using real-time meteorological data confirmed that long range transport of radionuclides, and possibly radioactive particles, from Semipalatinsk to Norway during this period was plausible. The present work shows that direct tropospheric transport of fallout from atmospheric nuclear detonations periodically may have had much larger influence on radionuclide air concentrations and deposition than previously anticipated. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Simpson, A.; Pitts, M.; Ludowise, J.D.
The Hanford burial grounds contains a broad spectrum of low activity radioactive wastes, transuranic (TRU) wastes, and hazardous wastes including fission products, byproduct material (thorium and uranium), plutonium and laboratory chemicals. A passive neutron non-destructive assay technique has been developed for characterization of shielded concreted drums exhumed from the burial grounds. This method facilitates the separation of low activity radiological waste containers from TRU waste containers exhumed from the burial grounds. Two identical total neutron counting systems have been deployed, each consisting of He-3 detectors surrounded by a polyethylene moderator. The counts are processed through a statistical filter that removesmore » outliers in order to suppress cosmic spallation events and electronic noise. Upon completion of processing, a 'GO / NO GO' signal is provided to the operator based on a threshold level equivalent to 0.5 grams of weapons grade plutonium in the container being evaluated. This approach allows instantaneous decisions to be made on how to proceed with the waste. The counting systems have been set up using initial on-site measurements (neutron emitting standards loaded into surrogate waste containers) combined with Monte Carlo modeling techniques. The benefit of this approach is to allow the systems to extend their measurement ranges, in terms of applicable matrix types and container sizes, with minimal interruption to the operations at the burial grounds. (authors)« less
Agnew, Kieran; Cundy, Andrew B; Hopkinson, Laurence; Croudace, Ian W; Warwick, Phillip E; Purdie, Philip
2011-02-28
This paper examines the field-scale application of a novel low-energy electrokinetic technique for the remediation of plutonium-contaminated nuclear site soils, using soil wastes from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston site, Berkshire, UK as a test medium. Soils and sediments with varying composition, contaminated with Pu through historical site operations, were electrokinetically treated at laboratory-scale with and without various soil pre-conditioning agents. Results from these bench-scale trials were used to inform a larger on-site remediation trial, using an adapted containment pack with battery power supply. 2.4 m(3) (ca. 4t onnes) of Pu-contaminated soil was treated for 60 days at a power consumption of 33 kWh/m(3), and then destructively sampled. Radiochemical data indicate mobilisation of Pu in the treated soil, and migration (probably as a negatively charged Pu-citrate complex) towards the anodic compartment of the treatment cell. Soil in the cathodic zone of the treatment unit was remediated to a level below free-release disposal thresholds (1.7 Bq/g, or <0.4 Bq/g above background activities). The data show the potential of this method as a low-cost, on-site tool for remediation of radioactively contaminated soils and wastes which can be operated remotely on working sites, with minimal disruption to site infrastructure or operations. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Satkowiak, Lawrence
2014-05-01
The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.
Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Satkowiak, Lawrence
2014-05-09
The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversionmore » of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.« less
Moscow meltdown: Can Russia survive
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Stern, J.E.
Western intelligence analysts and policy makers should pay closer attention to the centrifugal forces in Russia for two primary reasons: nuclear weapons are located in some of the most volatile regions, and central control of the armed forces is eroding. If Russia were to fragment, thousands of weapons and tons of fissile materials would be dispersed to new states with little safeguards infrastructure and little experience in controlling borders, a situation potentially far more dangerous than the breakup of the Soviet Union. Nuclear research, production, maintenance, and dismantlement facilities, plus uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities, could be inherited bymore » new, unstable states. Further devolution of political authority could loosen control over sensitive exports and increase the risk of terrorist acquisition of fissile materials. This article discusses the confusion over the legitimacy of the physical and political boundaries of the Russian Federation; then, the economic incentives for regionalism in Russia; next, the main ethnic groups in Russia and the roots of ethnic nationalism in the Russian Federation. It then discusses political disarray in the center and in the regions, and the lack of unity among order-enforcing entities; focuses in somewhat more detail on the Volga-Ural region, where there is a concentration of nuclear weapons and facilities, and which is especially volatile politically. These factors taken together call into question Russia's viability as a state. In post-communist Russia, chaos has replaced order; license has replaced terror. Order-enforcing entities are eviscerated or in conflict. Neither economic shock therapy nor Group of Seven funds can help with these problems; Russia will not be a state until new unifying institutions are created, whether they are democratic or authoritarian.« less
Toward the framework and implementation for clearance of materials from regulated facilities.
Chen, S Y; Moeller, D W; Dornsife, W P; Meyer, H R; Lamastra, A; Lubenau, J O; Strom, D J; Yusko, J G
2005-08-01
The disposition of solid materials from nuclear facilities has been a subject of public debate for several decades. The primary concern has been the potential health effects resulting from exposure to residual radioactive materials to be released for unrestricted use. These debates have intensified in the last decade as many regulated facilities are seeking viable management decisions on the disposition of the large amounts of materials potentially containing very low levels of residual radioactivity. Such facilities include the nuclear weapons complex sites managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, commercial power plants licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and other materials licensees regulated by the NRC or the Agreement States. Other facilities that generate radioactive material containing naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) or technologically enhanced NORM (TENORM) are also seeking to dispose of similar materials that may be radioactively contaminated. In contrast to the facilities operated by the DOE and the nuclear power plants licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NORM and TENORM facilities are regulated by the individual states. Current federal laws and regulations do not specify criteria for releasing these materials that may contain residual radioactivity of either man-made or natural origin from regulatory controls. In fact, the current regulatory scheme offers no explicit provision to permit materials being released as "non-radioactive," including those that are essentially free of contamination. The only method used to date with limited success has been case-by-case evaluation and approval. In addition, there is a poorly defined and inconsistent regulatory framework for regulating NORM and TENORM. Some years ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency introduced the concept of clearance, that is, controlling releases of any such materials within the regulatory domain. This paper aims to clarify clearance as an important disposition option for solid materials, establish the framework and basis of release, and discuss resolutions regarding the implementation of such a disposition option.
APPLICATION OF VACUUM SALT DISTILLATION TECHNOLOGY FOR THE REMOVAL OF FLUORIDE
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Pierce, R.; Pak, D.
2011-08-10
Vacuum distillation of chloride salts from plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) and simulant PuO{sub 2} has been previously demonstrated at Department of Energy (DOE) sites using kilogram quantities of chloride salt. The apparatus for vacuum distillation contains a zone heated using a furnace and a zone actively cooled using either recirculated water or compressed air. During a vacuum distillation operation, a sample boat containing the feed material is placed into the apparatus while it is cool, and the system is sealed. The system is evacuated using a vacuum pump. Once a sufficient vacuum is attained, heating begins. Volatile salts distill frommore » the heated zone to the cooled zone where they condense, leaving behind the non-volatile materials in the feed boat. The application of vacuum salt distillation (VSD) is of interest to the HB-Line Facility and the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Both facilities are involved in efforts to disposition excess fissile materials. Many of these materials contain chloride and fluoride salt concentrations which make them unsuitable for dissolution without prior removal of the chloride and fluoride salts. Between September 2009 and January 2011, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and HB-Line designed, developed, tested, and successfully deployed a system for the distillation of chloride salts. Subsequent efforts are attempting to adapt the technology for the removal of fluoride. Fluoride salts of interest are less-volatile than the corresponding chloride salts. Consequently, an alternate approach is required for the removal of fluoride without significantly increasing the operating temperature. HB-Line Engineering requested SRNL to evaluate and demonstrate the feasibility of an alternate approach using both non-radioactive simulants and plutonium-bearing materials. Whereas the earlier developments targeted the removal of sodium chloride (NaCl) and potassium chloride (KCl), the current activities are concerned with the removal of the halide ions associated with plutonium trifluoride (PuF{sub 3}), plutonium tetrafluoride (PuF{sub 4}), calcium fluoride (CaF{sub 2}), and calcium chloride (CaCl{sub 2}). This report discusses non-radioactive testing of small-scale and pilot-scale systems and radioactive testing of a small-scale system. Experiments focused on demonstrating the chemistry for halide removal and addressing the primary engineering questions associated with a change in the process chemistry.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Anderson, K.K.; Collins, J.L.; Hunt, R.D.
1999-02-01
The Department of Energy (DOE) is required by law to treat and safely dispose of the radioactive wastes from its nuclear weapon production activities. The primary radionuclide in the DOE liquid wastes or supernatants is {sup 137}Cs. At the Savannah River Site (SRS), the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) process was selected as the baseline technology to remove {sup 137}Cs from the supernatants, which are stored in underground storage tanks. In the ITP process, tetraphenylborate reacts with the water-soluble cesium to form a precipitant. The treated supernatant can then be immobilized in grout or saltstone and stored in vaults at the SRS.more » However, problems were encountered during the full-scale ITP processing. These difficulties have led to the evaluation of alternative technologies and/or concepts to the currently configured ITP process. The High-Level Waste Salt Disposition Team at the SRS is currently performing this assessment. After an initial screening of all potential alternatives, the Salt Disposition Team selected four primary options to evaluate further before the final down-selection. Crystalline silicotitanate (CST), an inorganic ion exchanger, was chosen as one of the leading alternatives. Since nearly all of the CST tests have been performed on supernatants from Hanford and Oak Ridge, the Salt Disposition Team has requested that personnel at the SRS and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) determine the performance of the engineered form of CST, IONSIV{reg_sign} IE-911, with actual and simulated SRS supernatants.« less
1997-10-10
At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, one of three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) is being installed on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13
1997-10-10
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, workers are installing three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13
1997-10-10
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, workers are installing three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13
Workers install the RTGs on the Cassini spacecraft at LC 40, CCAS
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1997-01-01
At Launch Complex 40 on Cape Canaveral Air Station, workers are installing three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) on the Cassini spacecraft. RTGs are lightweight, compact spacecraft electrical power systems that have flown successfully on 23 previous U.S. missions over the past 37 years. These generators produce power by converting heat into electrical energy; the heat is provided by the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 dioxide, a non-weapons-grade material. RTGs enable spacecraft to operate at significant distances from the Sun where solar power systems would not be feasible. Cassini will travel two billion miles to reach Saturn and another 1.1 billion miles while in orbit around Saturn. Cassini is undergoing final preparations for liftoff on a Titan IVB/Centaur launch vehicle, with the launch window opening at 4:55 a.m. EDT, Oct. 13.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Singledecker, Steven John
The purpose of this document is to describe the waste stream from Z-Pinch Residual Waste Project that due to worker safety concerns and operational efficiency is a candidate for blending Transuranic and low level waste together and can be safely packaged as low-level waste consistent with DOE Order 435.1 requirements and NRC guidance 10 CFR 61.42. This waste stream consists of the Pu-ICE post-shot containment systems, including plutonium targets, generated from the Z Machine experiments requested by LANL and conducted by SNL/NM. In the past, this TRU waste was shipped back to LANL after Sandia sends the TRU data packagemore » to LANL to certify the characterization (by CCP), transport and disposition at WIPP (CBFO) per LANL MOU-0066. The Low Level Waste is managed, characterized, shipped and disposed of at NNSS by SNL/NM per Sandia MOU # 11-S-560.« less
Reactors as a Source of Antineutrinos: Effects of Fuel Loading and Burnup for Mixed-Oxide Fuels
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Bernstein, Adam; Bowden, Nathaniel S.; Erickson, Anna S.
2018-01-01
In a conventional light-water reactor loaded with a range of uranium and plutonium-based fuel mixtures, the variation in antineutrino production over the cycle reflects both the initial core fissile inventory and its evolution. Under an assumption of constant thermal power, we calculate the rate at which antineutrinos are emitted from variously fueled cores, and the evolution of that rate as measured by a representative ton-scale antineutrino detector. We find that antineutrino flux decreases with burnup for low-enriched uranium cores, increases for full mixed-oxide (MOX) cores, and does not appreciably change for cores with a MOX fraction of approximately 75%. Accounting for uncertainties in the fission yields in the emitted antineutrino spectra and the detector response function, we show that the difference in corewide MOX fractions at least as small as 8% can be distinguished using a hypothesis test. The test compares the evolution of the antineutrino rate relative to an initial value over part or all of the cycle. The use of relative rates reduces the sensitivity of the test to an independent thermal power measurement, making the result more robust against possible countermeasures. This rate-only approach also offers the potential advantage of reducing the cost and complexity of the antineutrino detectors used to verify the diversion, compared to methods that depend on the use of the antineutrino spectrum. A possible application is the verification of the disposition of surplus plutonium in nuclear reactors.
U, Pu, and Am nuclear signatures of the Thule hydrogen bomb debris.
Eriksson, Mats; Lindahl, Patric; Roos, Per; Dahlgaard, Henning; Holm, Elis
2008-07-01
This study concerns an arctic marine environment that was contaminated by actinide elements after a nuclear accident in 1968, the so-called Thule accident In this study we have analyzed five isolated hot particles as well as sediment samples containing particles from the weapon material for the determination of the nuclear fingerprint of the accident. We report that the fissile material in the hydrogen weapons involved in the Thule accident was a mixture of highly enriched uranium and weapon-grade plutonium and that the main fissile material was 235U (about 4 times more than the mass of 239Pu). In the five hot particles examined, the measured uranium atomic ratio was 235U/238U = 1.02 +/- 0.16 and the Pu-isotopic ratios were as follows: 24Pu/239Pu = 0.0551 +/- 0.0008 (atom ratio), 238Pu/239+240Pu = 0.0161 +/- 0.0005 (activity ratio), 241Pu/239+240Pu = 0.87 +/- 0.12 (activity ratio), and 241Am/ 239+240Pu = 0.169 +/- 0.005 (activity ratio) (reference date 2001-10-01). From the activity ratios of 241Pu/241Am, we estimated the time of production of this weapon material to be from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. The results from reanalyzed bulk sediment samples showed the presence of more than one Pu source involved in the accident, confirming earlier studies. The 238Pu/239+240PU activity ratio and the 240Pu/ 239Pu atomic ratio were divided into at least two Pu-isotopic ratio groups. For both Pu-isotopic ratios, one ratio group had identical ratios as the five hot particles described above and for the other groups the Pu isotopic ratios were lower (238Pu/ 239+240PU activity ratio approximately 0.01 and the 240Pu/P239Pu atomic ratio 0.03). On the studied particles we observed that the U/Pu ratio decreased as a function of the time these particles were present in the sediment. We hypothesis that the decrease in the ratio is due to a preferential leaching of U relative to Pu from the particle matrix.
Was Nazi Germany on the Road to an Atomic Bomb after all?
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lustig, Harry
2006-04-01
The story of Germany's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon during World War II is a much written about and contentious subject. However there has been agreement on one thing: by the end of the War the Germans had not achieved and were nowhere near to building a bomb. The dispute therefore has been about why Germany did not succeed. Now, from Germany, comes a challenge to this truth, in the provocative book Hitlers Bombe by Rainer Karlsch. The bombshell in Hitler's Bombe is the assertion that German scientists developed and tested a primitive fission and fusion nuclear weapon in March 1945. Karlsch bases this claim on testimony of witnesses in 1962, previously secret Russian documents, and the results of soil tests carried out in 2004 and 2005. However the physics is very murky and it seems out of the question that Germany had enough Uranium 235 or produced any Plutonium for a bomb. Hitlers Bombe also makes other, better documented and more credible revisionist assertions. These include the claim that the Nazis did continue to try to build a bomb after 1942 and that not Werner Heisenberg, but Kurt Diebner and Walther Gerlach were then the leaders of the German Uranium project. Karlsch's book therefore deserves more attention from physicists and historians than it has received in the United States.
Historic Manhattan Project Sites at Los Alamos
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
McGehee, Ellen
The Manhattan Project laboratory constructed at Los Alamos, New Mexico, beginning in 1943, was intended from the start to be temporary and to go up with amazing speed. Because most of those WWII-era facilities were built with minimal materials and so quickly, much of the original infrastructure was torn down in the late '40s and early '50s and replaced by more permanent facilities. However, a few key facilities remained, and are being preserved and maintained for historic significance. Four such sites are visited briefly in this video, taking viewers to V-Site, the buildings where the first nuclear explosive device wasmore » pre-assembled in preparation for the Trinity Test in Southern New Mexico. Included is another WWII area, Gun Site. So named because it was the area where scientists and engineers tested the so-called "gun method" of assembling nuclear materials -- the fundamental design of the Little Boy weapon that was eventually dropped on Hiroshima. The video also goes to Pajarito Site, home of the "Slotin Building" and "Pond Cabin." The Slotin Building is the place where scientist Louis Slotin conducted a criticality experiment that went awry in early 1946, leading to his unfortunate death, and the Pond Cabin served the team of eminent scientist Emilio Segre who did early chemistry work on plutonium that ultimately led to the Fat Man weapon.« less
Historic Manhattan Project Sites at Los Alamos
McGehee, Ellen
2018-05-11
The Manhattan Project laboratory constructed at Los Alamos, New Mexico, beginning in 1943, was intended from the start to be temporary and to go up with amazing speed. Because most of those WWII-era facilities were built with minimal materials and so quickly, much of the original infrastructure was torn down in the late '40s and early '50s and replaced by more permanent facilities. However, a few key facilities remained, and are being preserved and maintained for historic significance. Four such sites are visited briefly in this video, taking viewers to V-Site, the buildings where the first nuclear explosive device was pre-assembled in preparation for the Trinity Test in Southern New Mexico. Included is another WWII area, Gun Site. So named because it was the area where scientists and engineers tested the so-called "gun method" of assembling nuclear materials -- the fundamental design of the Little Boy weapon that was eventually dropped on Hiroshima. The video also goes to Pajarito Site, home of the "Slotin Building" and "Pond Cabin." The Slotin Building is the place where scientist Louis Slotin conducted a criticality experiment that went awry in early 1946, leading to his unfortunate death, and the Pond Cabin served the team of eminent scientist Emilio Segre who did early chemistry work on plutonium that ultimately led to the Fat Man weapon.
Iammarino, Marco; Dell'Oro, Daniela; Bortone, Nicola; Mangiacotti, Michele; Chiaravalle, Antonio Eugenio
2018-03-31
Strontium-90 (90Sr) is a fission product, resulting from the use of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors and weapons. Consequently, it may be found in the environment as a consequence of nuclear fallouts, nuclear weapon testing, and not correct waste management. When present in the environment, strontium-90 may be taken into animal body by drinking water, eating food, or breathing air. The primary health effects are bone tumors and tumors of the blood-cell forming organs, due to beta particles emitted by both 90Sr and yttrium-90 (90Y). Moreover, another health concern is represented by inhibition of calcification and bone deformities in animals. Actually, radiometric methods for the determination of 90Sr in animal bones are lacking. This article describers a radiochemical method for the determination of 90Sr in animal bones, by ultra low-level liquid scintillation counting. The method precision and trueness have been demonstrated through validation tests (CV% = 12.4%; mean recovery = 98.4%). Detection limit and decision threshold corresponding to 8 and 3 mBecquerel (Bq) kg-1, respectively, represent another strong point of this analytical procedure. This new radiochemical method permits the selective extraction of 90Sr, without interferences, and it is suitable for radiocontamination surveillance programs, and it is also an improvement with respect to food safety controls.
Experimental validation of a coupled neutron-photon inverse radiation transport solver
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Mattingly, John; Mitchell, Dean J.; Harding, Lee T.
2011-10-01
Sandia National Laboratories has developed an inverse radiation transport solver that applies nonlinear regression to coupled neutron-photon deterministic transport models. The inverse solver uses nonlinear regression to fit a radiation transport model to gamma spectrometry and neutron multiplicity counting measurements. The subject of this paper is the experimental validation of that solver. This paper describes a series of experiments conducted with a 4.5 kg sphere of α-phase, weapons-grade plutonium. The source was measured bare and reflected by high-density polyethylene (HDPE) spherical shells with total thicknesses between 1.27 and 15.24 cm. Neutron and photon emissions from the source were measured using three instruments: a gross neutron counter, a portable neutron multiplicity counter, and a high-resolution gamma spectrometer. These measurements were used as input to the inverse radiation transport solver to evaluate the solver's ability to correctly infer the configuration of the source from its measured radiation signatures.
Isotopic signatures: An important tool in today`s world
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Rokop, D.J.; Efurd, D.W.; Benjamin, T.M.
1995-12-01
High-sensitivity/high-accuracy actinide measurement techniques developed to support weapons diagnostic capabilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory are now being used for environmental monitoring. The measurement techniques used are Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS), Alpha Spectrometry(AS), and High Resolution Gamma Spectrometry(HRGS). These techniques are used to address a wide variety of actinide inventory issues: Environmental surveillance, site characterizations, food chain member determination, sedimentary records of activities, and treaty compliance concerns. As little as 10 femtograms of plutonium can be detected in samples and isotopic signatures determined on samples containing sub-100 femtogram amounts. Uranium, present in all environmental samples, can generally yieldmore » isotopic signatures of anthropogenic origin when present at the 40 picogam/gram level. Solid samples (soils, sediments, fauna, and tissue) can range from a few particles to several kilograms in size. Water samples can range from a few milliliters to as much as 200 liters.« less
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- Members of the media view the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida during a tour regarding safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- Randy Scott, director of Kennedy Space Center's Radiological Control Center (RADCC), speaks to media during a tour regarding safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. Behind him is Steve Homann, senior advisor for the Department of Energy. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- Members of the media take a tour of the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The tour focused on safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- Surrounded by monitors and consoles, Randy Scott, director of Kennedy Space Center's Radiological Control Center (RADCC), speaks to media during a tour regarding safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- Steve Homann, senior advisor for the Department of Energy, speaks to media during a tour of the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The tour focused on safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- Several instruments are displayed for the media during a tour of the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The tour focused on safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- During a tour of the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida, members of the media listen as Ryan Bechtel of the U.S. Department of Energy explains safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
2011-11-21
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- Steve Homann, senior advisor for the Department of Energy, speaks to media during a tour of the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The tour focused on safety equipment and procedures for the upcoming launch of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. The MSL spacecraft includes a multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) that will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. MSL's components include a car-sized rover, Curiosity, which has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is targeted for Nov. 26 from Space Launch Complex 41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: NASA/Frankie Martin
Residual radioactivity in the soil of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site in the former USSR.
Yamamoto, M; Tsukatani, T; Katayama, Y
1996-08-01
This paper deals with our efforts to survey residual radioactivity in the soil sampled at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site and at off-site areas in Kazakhstan. The soil was sampled at the hypocenter where the first Soviet nuclear explosion was carried out on 29 August 1949, and at the bank of the crater called "Bolapan," which was formed by an underground nuclear detonation on 15 January 1965 along the Shagan River. As a comparison, other soil was also sampled in the cities of Kurchatov and Almaty. These data have allowed a preliminary evaluation of the contemporary radioactive contamination of the land in and around the test site. At the first nuclear explosion site and at Bolapan, higher than background levels of 239,240Pu with weapons-grade plutonium were detected together with fission and activation products such as 137Cs, 60Co, 152Eu, and 154Eu.
Enrico Fermi - And the Revolutions of Modern Physics
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Cooper, Dan
1999-02-01
In 1938, at the age of 37, Enrico Fermi was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics. That same year he emigrated from Italy to the United States and, in the course of his experiments, discovered nuclear fission--a process which forms the basis of nuclear power and atomic bombs. Soon the brilliant physicist was involved in the top secret race to produce the deadliest weapon on Earth. He created the first self-sustaining chain reaction, devised new methods for purifying plutonium, and eventually participated in the first atomic test. This compelling biography traces Fermis education in Italy, his meteoric career in the scientific world, his escape from fascism to America, and the ingenious experiments he devised and conducted at the University of Rome, Columbia University, and the Los Alamos laboratory. The book also presents a mini-course in quantum and nuclear physics in an accessible, fast-paced narrative that invokes all the dizzying passion of Fermis brilliant discoveries.
Presence of plutonium contamination in soils from Palomares (Spain).
Jiménez-Ramos, M C; García-Tenorio, R; Vioque, I; Manjón, G; García-León, M
2006-08-01
More than 30 years after the occurrence of an aircraft accident which involved the detonation of two nuclear weapons in the surrounding area of the village of Palomares (Spain), the affected terrestrial area has been investigated for remaining transuranic contamination. Evidence from the presence of this contamination was initially found through the analysis of the 241Am inventories in superficial soil samples collected in the region, and was confirmed through the analysis of the (239+240)Pu inventories and their associated 238Pu/(239+240)Pu activity ratios in the same samples. However, it was also observed that a considerable fraction of the remaining contamination in the area was present in particulate form, i.e. as "hot particles". The work performed in our laboratory for identification, isolation and characterisation of these "hot particles" as well as some conclusions obtained from these analyses are outlined in this paper.
A Report to Congress on Long-Term Stewardship. Volume II, Site Summaries
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
None, None
2001-01-01
During World War II and the Cold War, the Federal government developed and operated a vast network of industrial facilities for the research, production, and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as for other scientific and engineering research. These processes left a legacy of radioactive and chemical waste, environmental contamination, and hazardous facilities and materials at well over a 100 sites in 30 States and one U.S. Territory. Hundreds of thousand of acres of residually contaminated soils, contaminated groundwater, surface water and sediment contamination, and contaminated buildings are present at many sites across the country. These sites range in sizemore » from less than one acre, containing only a single facility, to large sites spanning over 100,000 acres with huge uranium enrichment plants and plutonium processing canyons. Since 1989, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) program has made significant progress in addressing this environmental legacy. Millions of cubic meters of waste have been removed, stabilized, or disposed of, resulting in significant risk and cost reduction. In addition, DOE began disposing of transuranic (i.e., plutonium-contaminated) waste in the nation’s first deep geologic repository – the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. DOE is now carrying out its long-term stewardship obligations at dozens of sites, including smaller sites where DOE has completed cleanup work for the entire site and many larger sites where DOE has remediated portions of the site.« less
The rarity of "unusual" [corrected] dispositions of victim bodies: staging and posing.
Keppel, Robert D; Weis, Joseph G
2004-11-01
The act of leaving a victim's body in an unusual position is a conscious criminal action by an offender to thwart an investigation, shock the finder and investigators of the crime scene, or give perverted pleasure to the killer. The unusual position concepts of posing and staging a murder victim have been documented thoroughly and have been accepted by the courts as a definable phenomenon. One staging case and one posing case are outlined and reveal characteristics of those homicides. From the Washington State Attorney General's Homicide Investigation and Tracking System's database on murder covering the years 1981-2000 (a total of 5,224 cases), the relative frequency of unusual body dispositions is revealed as a very rare occurrence. Only 1.3% of victims are left in an unusual position, with 0.3% being posed and 0.1% being staged. The characteristics of these types of murders also set them apart: compared to all other murders, in staged murders the victims and killers are, on average, older. All victims and offenders in the staged murders are white, with victims being disproportionately white in murders with any kind of unusual body disposition. Likewise, females stand out as victims when the body is posed, staged, or left in other unusual positions. Whereas posed bodies are more likely to include sexual assault, often in serial murders, there is no evidence of either in the staged cases. Lastly, when a body is left in an unusual position, binding is more likely, as well as the use of more "hands on" means of killing the victim, such as stabbing or cutting weapons, bludgeons, ligatures, or hands and feet.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1998-01-01
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials. Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities. Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites inmore » the complex. Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the EM 2006 cleanup plans and contractor integration analysis. Interstate waste and materials shipments. Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from October 1, 1997 through December 31, 1997, under the NGA project. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; and maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, DOE activities in the area of the Hazardous Waste Identification Rule, and DOE's proposed National Dialogue.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Snarski, Steve; Menozzi, Alberico; Sherrill, Todd; Volpe, Chris; Wille, Mark
2010-04-01
This paper describes experimental results from recent live-fire data collects that demonstrate the capability of a prototype system for projectile detection and tracking. This system, which is being developed at Applied Research Associates, Inc., under the FightSight program, consists of a high-speed thermal camera and sophisticated image processing algorithms to detect and track projectiles. The FightSight operational vision is automated situational intelligence to detect, track, and graphically map large-scale firefights and individual shooting events onto command and control (C2) systems in real time (shot location and direction, weapon ID, movements and trends). Gaining information on enemy-fire trajectories allows educated inferences on the enemy's intent, disposition, and strength. Our prototype projectile detection and tracking system has been tested at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Ft Polk, LA) during live-fire convoy and mortar registration exercises, in the summer of 2009. It was also tested during staged military-operations- on-urban-terrain (MOUT) firefight events at Aberdeen Test Center (Aberdeen, MD) under the Hostile Fire Defeat Army Technology Objective midterm experiment, also in the summer of 2009, where we introduced fusion with acoustic and EO sensors to provide 3D localization and near-real time display of firing events. Results are presented in this paper that demonstrate effective and accurate detection and localization of weapon fire (5.56mm, 7.62mm, .50cal, 81/120mm mortars, 40mm) in diverse and challenging environments (dust, heat, day and night, rain, arid open terrain, urban clutter). FightSight's operational capabilities demonstrated under these live-fire data collects can support closecombat scenarios. As development continues, FightSight will be able to feed C2 systems with a symbolic map of enemy actions.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Flynn, Karen; McCormick, Matt
Hanford's DOE offices are responsible for one of the largest nuclear cleanup efforts in the world, cleaning up the legacy of nearly five decades of nuclear weapons production. Nowhere in the DOE Complex is cleanup more challenging than at the Hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Hanford cleanup entails remediation of hundreds of large complex hazardous waste sites; disposition of nine production reactors and the preservation of one as a National Historic Landmark; demolition of hundreds of contaminated facilities including five enormous process canyons; remediation of billions of gallons of contaminated groundwater; disposition of millions of tons of low-level, mixed low-level,more » and transuranic waste; disposition of significant quantities of special nuclear material; storage and ultimate disposition of irradiated nuclear fuel; remediation of contamination deep in the soil that could impact groundwater; decontamination and decommissioning of hundreds of buildings and structures; and treatment of 56 million gallons of radioactive waste in 177 large underground tanks through the construction of a first-of-its-kind Waste Treatment Plant. Cleanup of the Hanford Site is a complex and challenging undertaking. The DOE Richland Operations Office has a vision and a strategy for completing Hanford's cleanup including the transition to post-cleanup activities. Information on the strategy is outlined in the Hanford Site Completion Framework. The framework describes three major components of cleanup - River Corridor, Central Plateau, and Tank Waste. It provides the context for individual cleanup actions by describing the key challenges and approaches for the decisions needed to complete cleanup. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), as regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology), is implementing a strategy to achieve final cleanup decisions for the River Corridor portion of the Hanford Site. The DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) and DOE Office of River Protection (ORP) have prepared this document to describe the strategy and to begin developing the approach for making cleanup decisions for the remainder of the Hanford Site. DOE's intent is that the Completion Framework document will facilitate dialogue among the Tri-Parties and with Hanford's diverse interest groups, including Tribal Nations, State of Oregon, Hanford Advisory Board, Natural Resource Trustees, and the public. Future cleanup decisions will be enhanced by an improved understanding of the challenges facing cleanup and a common understanding of the goals and approaches for cleanup completion. The overarching goals for cleanup are sevenfold. - Goal 1: Protect the Columbia River. - Goal 2: Restore groundwater to its beneficial use to protect human health, the environment, and the Columbia River. - Goal 3: Clean up River Corridor waste sites and facilities to: Protect groundwater and the Columbia River. Shrink the active cleanup footprint to the Central Plateau, and support anticipated future uses of the land. - Goal 4: Clean up Central Plateau waste sites, tank farms, and facilities to: Protect groundwater. Minimize the footprint of areas requiring long-term waste management activities. Support anticipated future uses of the land. - Goal 5: Safely manage and transfer legacy materials scheduled for off-site disposition including special nuclear material (including plutonium), spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, and immobilized high-level waste. - Goal 6: Consolidate waste treatment, storage, and disposal operations on the Central Plateau. - Goal 7: Develop and implement institutional controls and long-term stewardship activities that protect human health, the environment, and Hanford's unique cultural, historical and ecological resources after cleanup activities are completed. These goals embody more than 20 years of dialogue among the Tri-Party Agencies, Tribal Nations, State of Oregon, stakeholders, and the public. They carry forward key values captured in forums such as the Hanford Future Site Uses Working Group, Tank Waste Task Force, Hanford Summits, and Hanford Advisory Board Exposure Scenario Workshops, as well as more than 200 advice letters issued by the Hanford Advisory Board (http://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/hab). These goals help guide all aspects of Hanford Site cleanup. Cleanup activities at various areas of the site support the achievement of one or more of these goals. These goals help set priorities to apply resources and sequence cleanup efforts for the greatest benefit. These goals reflect DOE's recognition that the Columbia River is a critical resource for the people and ecology of the Pacific Northwest. The 50-mile stretch of the river known as the Hanford Reach is home to the last free-flowing section of the river in the U.S. As one of the largest rivers in North America, its waters support a multitude of uses that are vital to the economic and environmental well being of the region and it is particularly important in sustaining the culture of Native Americans. Cleanup actions must protect this river. (authors)« less
CONVERSION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE TO PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE
Fried, S.; Davidson, N.R.
1957-09-10
A large proportion of the trifluoride of plutonium can be converted, in the absence of hydrogen fluoride, to the tetrafiuoride of plutonium. This is done by heating plutonium trifluoride with oxygen at temperatures between 250 and 900 deg C. The trifiuoride of plutonium reacts with oxygen to form plutonium tetrafluoride and plutonium oxide, in a ratio of about 3 to 1. In the presence of moisture, plutonium tetrafluoride tends to hydrolyze at elevated temperatures and therefore it is desirable to have the process take place under anhydrous conditions.
Pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from an electrolyte salt
Mullins, L.J.; Christensen, D.C.
1982-09-20
A pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from a plutonium-bearing salt is disclosed. The process is particularly useful in the recovery of plutonium for electrolyte salts which are left over from the electrorefining of plutonium. In accordance with the process, the plutonium-bearing salt is melted and mixed with metallic calcium. The calcium reduces ionized plutonium in the salt to plutonium metal, and also causes metallic plutonium in the salt, which is typically present as finely dispersed metallic shot, to coalesce. The reduced and coalesced plutonium separates out on the bottom of the reaction vessel as a separate metallic phase which is readily separable from the overlying salt upon cooling of the mixture. Yields of plutonium are typically on the order of 95%. The stripped salt is virtually free of plutonium and may be discarded to low-level waste storage.
Pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from an electrolyte salt
Mullins, Lawrence J.; Christensen, Dana C.
1984-01-01
A pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from a plutonium-bearing salt is disclosed. The process is particularly useful in the recovery of plutonium from electrolyte salts which are left over from the electrorefining of plutonium. In accordance with the process, the plutonium-bearing salt is melted and mixed with metallic calcium. The calcium reduces ionized plutonium in the salt to plutonium metal, and also causes metallic plutonium in the salt, which is typically present as finely dispersed metallic shot, to coalesce. The reduced and coalesced plutonium separates out on the bottom of the reaction vessel as a separate metallic phase which is readily separable from the overlying salt upon cooling of the mixture. Yields of plutonium are typically on the order of 95%. The stripped salt is virtually free of plutonium and may be discarded to low-level waste storage.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Volpe, Tristan A.
Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits?more » My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the United States. By clarifying when countries are able to leverage steps towards the bomb for international political gain, my work advances our understanding of proliferation and coercive diplomacy.« less
Challenges associated with the behaviour of radioactive particles in the environment.
Salbu, Brit; Kashparov, Valery; Lind, Ole Christian; Garcia-Tenorio, Rafael; Johansen, Mathew P; Child, David P; Roos, Per; Sancho, Carlos
2018-06-01
A series of different nuclear sources associated with the nuclear weapon and fuel cycles have contributed to the release of radioactive particles to the environment. Following nuclear weapon tests, safety tests, conventional destruction of weapons, reactor explosions and fires, a major fraction of released refractory radionuclides such as uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were present as entities ranging from sub microns to fragments. Furthermore, radioactive particles and colloids have been released from reprocessing facilities and civil reactors, from radioactive waste dumped at sea, and from NORM sites. Thus, whenever refractory radionuclides are released to the environment following nuclear events, radioactive particles should be expected. Results from many years of research have shown that particle characteristics such as elemental composition depend on the source, while characteristics such as particle size distribution, structure, and oxidation state influencing ecosystem transfer depend also on the release scenarios. When radioactive particles are deposited in the environment, weathering processes occur and associated radionuclides are subsequently mobilized, changing the apparent K d . Thus, particles retained in soils or sediments are unevenly distributed, and dissolution of radionuclides from particles may be partial. For areas affected by particle contamination, the inventories can therefore be underestimated, and impact and risk assessments may suffer from unacceptable large uncertainties if radioactive particles are ignored. To integrate radioactive particles into environmental impact assessments, key challenges include the linking of particle characteristics to specific sources, to ecosystem transfer, and to uptake and retention in biological systems. To elucidate these issues, the EC-funded COMET and RATE projects and the IAEA Coordinated Research Program on particles have revisited selected contaminated sites and archive samples. This COMET position paper summarizes new knowledge on key sources that have contributed to particle releases, including particle characteristics based on advanced techniques, with emphasis on particle weathering processes as well as on heterogeneities in biological samples to evaluate potential uptake and retention of radioactive particles. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
PLUTONIUM-CERIUM-COBALT AND PLUTONIUM-CERIUM-NICKEL ALLOYS
Coffinberry, A.S.
1959-08-25
>New plutonium-base teroary alloys useful as liquid reactor fuels are described. The alloys consist of 10 to 20 atomic percent cobalt with the remainder plutonium and cerium in any desired proportion, with the plutonium not in excess of 88 atomic percent; or, of from 10 to 25 atomic percent nickel (or mixture of nickel and cobalt) with the remainder plutonium and cerium in any desired proportion, with the plutonium not in excess of 86 atomic percent. The stated advantages of these alloys over unalloyed plutonium for reactor fuel use are a lower melting point and a wide range of permissible plutonium dilution.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Avedon, Roger Edmond
This dissertation addresses the value of developing diversion- and theft-resistant nuclear power technology, given uncertain future demand for nuclear power, and uncertain risks of nuclear terrorism and of proliferation from the reprocessing of civilian plutonium. The methodology comprises four elements: Economics. An economic growth model coupled with market penetration effects for plutonium and for the hypothetical new technology provides a range of estimates for future nuclear demand. A flow model accounts for the longevity of capital assets (nuclear plants) over time. Terrorism. The commercial nuclear fuel cycle may provide a source of fissile material for terrorists seeking to construct a crude nuclear device. An option value model is used to estimate the effects of the hypothetical new technology on reducing the probability of theft. A game theoretic model is used to explore the deterrence value of physical security and then to draw conclusions about how learning on the part of terrorists or security forces might affect the theft estimate. The principal uncertainties in the theft model can be updated using Bayesian techniques as new data emerge. Proliferation. Access to fissile material is the principal technical impediment to a state's acquisition of nuclear weapons. A game theoretic model is used to determine the circumstances under which a state may proliferate via diversion. The model shows that the hypothetical new technology will have little value for counter-proliferation if diversion is not a preferred proliferation method. A technology policy analysis of the choice of proliferation method establishes that diversion is unlikely to be used because it has no constituency among the important parties to the decision, namely the political leadership, the scientific establishment, and the military. Value. The decision whether to develop a diversion- and theft-resistant fuel cycle depends on the perceived value of avoiding nuclear terrorism and proliferation. The opportunity cost of such events is prohibitively difficult to assess. Instead, recent nonproliferation efforts and long term funding of organizations with nonproliferation objectives suggest a willingness-to-pay to avoid breaches in nuclear security. The cancellation of the Integral Fast Reactor in 1994 is analyzed using the methodology developed in the dissertation.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Dewi Syarifah, Ratna; Su'ud, Zaki; Basar, Khairul; Irwanto, Dwi
2017-01-01
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is one of candidates which can support electricity demand in the world. The Generation IV NPP has fourth main objective, i.e. sustainability, economics competitiveness, safety and reliability, and proliferation and physical protection. One of Gen-IV reactor type is Gas Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR). In this study, the analysis of fuel fraction in small GFR with nitride fuel has been done. The calculation was performed by SRAC code, both Pij and CITATION calculation. SRAC2002 system is a code system applicable to analyze the neutronics of variety reactor type. And for the data library used JENDL-3.2. The step of SRAC calculation is fuel pin calculated by Pij calculation until the data homogenized, after it homogenized we calculate core reactor. The variation of fuel fraction is 40% up to 65%. The optimum design of 500MWth GFR without refueling with 10 years burn up time reach when radius F1:F2:F3 = 50cm:30cm:30cm and height F1:F2:F3 = 50cm:40cm:30cm, variation percentage Plutonium in F1:F2:F3 = 7%:10%:13%. The optimum fuel fraction is 41% with addition 2% Plutonium weapon grade mix in the fuel. The excess reactivity value in this case 1.848% and the k-eff value is 1.01883. The high burn up reached when the fuel fraction is low. In this study 41% fuel fraction produce faster fissile fuel, so it has highest burn-up level than the other fuel fraction.
Background Radioactivity in River and Reservoir Sediments near Los Alamos, New Mexico
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
S.G.McLin; D.W. Lyons
2002-05-05
As part of its continuing Environmental Surveillance Program, regional river and lake-bottom sediments have been collected annually by Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) since 1974 and 1979, respectively. These background samples are collected from three drainage basins at ten different river stations and five reservoirs located throughout northern New Mexico and southern Colorado. Radiochemical analyses for these sediments include tritium, strontium-90, cesium-137, total uranium, plutonium-238, plutonium-239,-240, americium-241, gross alpha, gross beta, and gross gamma radioactivity. Detection-limit radioactivity originates as worldwide fallout from aboveground nuclear weapons testing and satellite reentry into Earth's atmosphere. Spatial and temporal variations in individual analytemore » levels originate from atmospheric point-source introductions and natural rate differences in airborne deposition and soil erosion. Background radioactivity values on sediments reflect this variability, and grouped river and reservoir sediment samples show a range of statistical distributions that appear to be analyte dependent. Traditionally, both river and reservoir analyte data were blended together to establish background levels. In this report, however, we group background sediment data according to two criteria. These include sediment source (either river or reservoir sediments) and station location relative to the Laboratory (either upstream or downstream). These grouped data are statistically evaluated through 1997, and background radioactivity values are established for individual analytes in upstream river and reservoir sediments. This information may be used to establish the existence and areal extent of trace-level environmental contamination resulting from historical Laboratory research activities since the early 1940s.« less
Development of a Universal Canister for Disposal of High-Level Waste in Deep Boreholes.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Price, Laura L.; Gomberg, Steve
2015-11-01
The mission of the United States Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. Some of the wastes that must be managed have been identified as good candidates for disposal in a deep borehole in crystalline rock. In particular, wastes that can be disposed of in a small package are good candidates for this disposal concept. A canister-based system that can be used for handling these wastes during the disposition process (i.e., storage, transfer, transportation, and disposal)more » could facilitate the eventual disposal of these wastes. Development of specifications for the universal canister system will consider the regulatory requirements that apply to storage, transportation, and disposal of the capsules, as well as operational requirements and limits that could affect the design of the canister (e.g., deep borehole diameter). In addition, there are risks and technical challenges that need to be recognized and addressed as Universal Canister system specifications are developed. This paper provides an approach to developing specifications for such a canister system that is integrated with the overall efforts of the DOE’s Used Fuel Disposition Campaign's Deep Borehole Field Test and compatible with planned storage of potential borehole-candidate wastes.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Dautray, Robert
2001-12-01
Electronuclear energy associated with hydrogen production can replace fossil fuels while emitting as few greenhouse gases as renewable energies. Besides waste management for which a solution has to be rapidly demonstrated, other key issues are to be examined to complete the demonstration of the viability of electronuclear energy. First, waste management and evolution of plutonium and its daughters must be considered together. A basic study has already been performed but what else to be done is huge and cannot be achieved in France (because of its geological and geographic features, because of the rural distribution of its population, etc.), except if a substantial and quite focused endeavour could bring concerned populations and workers, protection and confidence - which requires from the latter, represented by their elected representatives and thus by a public authority, that they work out "a general protection and confidence criterion for concerned populations and workers". The unique solution in order to protect public health from a potential major danger is to bury as soon as possible all of the ultimate waste products, keeping in mind all of the unfavourable factors such as residual power of these products, their mobility in the confining geological beds and then through aquifers. There are so many categories of waste products whose treatment requires different durations, that storing is necessary in order to make them compatible after sorting by means of chemical separation (called reprocessing). Among all of these potential risks, the present-day most serious one, by far, is that of plutonium and its daughters, which are the most potentially radiotoxic. The unique solution consists in a separation of plutonium (and its daughters), followed by its fissions until a rather complete reduction in a product able to be buried after dilution in a matrix (for example, vitrification). But that solution faces serious handicaps. The examination of waste products and especially of the potentially most dangerous and difficult to treat, that is plutonium (and its daughters), leads thus necessarily to a 'plutonium (and its daughters) plan'. Nuclear safety is a major preoccupation. The French electronuclear stock is a recognized success and when it will be necessary to replace the latter, it will be possible to use the European Pressurized Reactor French-German project; the latter includes protections against very unlikely events and its implementation would be a factor of substantial progress for nuclear safety. Radioprotection, as well as its scientific bases, epidemiology and radiobiology, have funding that is not at the level of the funding devoted to the technical and industrial realizations. As for proliferation, it can be noticed that the countries that have recently at their disposal nuclear weapons have done it independently of their eventual electronuclear stock and furthermore each of the latter used a different scientific and technical process. As for the eventual relations between reprocessing and proliferation, the problem should be solved if the total produced plutonium could be denatured in the reactors of the electronuclear stock. It must be noticed that the major potential danger would rather be the dispersion of radiotoxic products about which the department of ONU in charge of all of these questions is aware of increasing contraband from eastern Europe since some years.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Johnson, Bradley R.
The Hidden Cost of Nuclear Weapons The Cold War arms race drove an intense plutonium production program in the U.S. This campaign produced approximately 100 tons of plutonium over 40 years. The epicenter of plutonium production in the United States was the Hanford site, a 586 square mile reservation owned by the Department of Energy and located on the Colombia River in Southeastern Washington. Plutonium synthesis relied on nuclear reactors to convert uranium to plutonium within the reactor fuel rods. After a sufficient amount of conversion occurred, the rods were removed from the reactor and allowed to cool. They weremore » then dissolved in an acid bath and chemically processed to separate and purify plutonium from the rest of the constituents in the used reactor fuel. The acidic waste was then neutralized using sodium hydroxide and the resulting mixture of liquids and precipitates (small insoluble particles) was stored in huge underground waste tanks. The byproducts of the U.S. plutonium production campaign include over 53 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored in 177 large underground tanks at Hanford and another 34 million gallons stored at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This legacy nuclear waste represents one of the largest environmental clean-up challenges facing the world today. The nuclear waste in the Hanford tanks is a mixture of liquids and precipitates that have settled into sludge. Some of these tanks are now over 60 years old and a small number of them are leaking radioactive waste into the ground and contaminating the environment. The solution to this nuclear waste challenge is to convert the mixture of solids and liquids into a durable material that won't disperse into the environment and create hazards to the biosphere. What makes this difficult is the fact that the radioactive half-lives of some of the radionuclides in the waste are thousands to millions of years long. (The half-life of a radioactive substance is the amount of time it takes for one-half of the material to undergo radioactive decay.) In general, the ideal material would need to be durable for approximately 10 half-lives to allow the activity to decay to negligible levels. However, the potential health effects of each radionuclide vary depending on what type of radiation is emitted, the energy of that emission, and the susceptibility for the human body to accumulate and concentrate that particular element. Consequently, actual standards tend to be based on limiting the dose (energy deposited per unit mass) that is introduced into the environment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the responsibility to establish standards for nuclear waste disposal to protect the health and safety of the public. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the EPA to establish radiation protection standards for the Yucca Mountain geologic repository for nuclear wastes. The standards for Yucca Mountain were promulgated in 2008, and limit the dose to 15 millirem per year for the first 10,000 years, and 100 milirem per year between 10,000 years and 1 million years (40 CFR Part 197; http://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca/2008factsheet.html). So, the challenge is two-fold: (1) develop a material (a waste form) that is capable of immobilizing the waste over geologic time scales, and (2) develop a process to convert the radioactive sludge in the tanks into this durable waste form material. Glass: Hard, durable, inert, and with infinite chemical versatility Molten glass is a powerful solvent liquid, which can be designed to dissolve almost anything. When solidified, it can be one of the most chemically inert substances known to man. Nature's most famous analogue to glass is obsidian, a vitreous product of volcanic activity; formations over 17 million years old have been found. Archaeologists have found man-made glass specimens that are five thousand years old.« less
Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Streeper, Charles Blamires
2009-01-01
In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMDmore » related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logged 1562 incidents, of which only 18 include weapons grade nuclear materials. As much as 66% of the radioactive material involved in these incidents was not recovered. Since 2004, there has been a 75% increase in incidents of unrecoverable material, much of which is labeled dangerous with potential for deterministic health affects if misused. This makes clear that a black market of illicit trade in sources exists. The incidents reported to the IAEA's database rely only on voluntary state reporting; therefore, the number of lost or stolen sources is expected to be much higher.« less
Solvent extraction system for plutonium colloids and other oxide nano-particles
Soderholm, Lynda; Wilson, Richard E; Chiarizia, Renato; Skanthakumar, Suntharalingam
2014-06-03
The invention provides a method for extracting plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, the method comprising supplying plutonium in a first aqueous phase; contacting the plutonium aqueous phase with a mixture of a dielectric and a moiety having a first acidity so as to allow the plutonium to substantially extract into the mixture; and contacting the extracted plutonium with second a aqueous phase, wherein the second aqueous phase has a second acidity higher than the first acidity, so as to allow the extracted plutonium to extract into the second aqueous phase. The invented method facilitates isolation of plutonium polymer without the formation of crud or unwanted emulsions.
Maddock, A.G.; Smith, F.
1959-08-25
A method is described for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products by treating a nitrate solution of fission products, uranium, and hexavalent plutonium with a relatively water-insoluble fluoride to adsorb fission products on the fluoride, treating the residual solution with a reducing agent for plutonium to reduce its valence to four and less, treating the reduced plutonium solution with a relatively insoluble fluoride to adsorb the plutonium on the fluoride, removing the solution, and subsequently treating the fluoride with its adsorbed plutonium with a concentrated aqueous solution of at least one of a group consisting of aluminum nitrate, ferric nitrate, and manganous nitrate to remove the plutonium from the fluoride.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dunn, Darrell; Poinssot, Christophe; Begg, Bruce
Management of nuclear waste remains an important international topic that includes reprocessing of commercial nuclear fuel, waste-form design and development, storage and disposal packaging, the process of repository site selection, system design, and performance assessment. Requirements to manage and dispose of materials from the production of nuclear weapons, and the renewed interest in nuclear power, in particular through the Generation IV Forum and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, can be expected to increase the need for scientific advances in waste management. A broad range of scientific and engineering disciplines is necessary to provide safe and effective solutions and address complexmore » issues. This volume offers an interdisciplinary perspective on materials-related issues associated with nuclear waste management programs. Invited and contributed papers cover a wide range of topics including studies on: spent fuel; performance assessment and models; waste forms for low- and intermediate-level waste; ceramic and glass waste forms for plutonium and high-level waste; radionuclides; containers and engineered barriers; disposal environments and site characteristics; and partitioning and transmutation.« less
Potential Signatures of Semi-volatile Compounds Associated With Nuclear Processing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Probasco, Kathleen M.; Birnbaum, Jerome C.; Maughan, A. D.
2002-06-01
Semi-volatile chemicals associated with nuclear processes (e.g., the reprocessing of uranium to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, or the separation of actinides from processing waste streams), can provide sticky residues or signatures that will attach to piping, ducting, soil, water, or other surface media. Volatile compounds, that are more suitable for electro-optical sensing, have been well studied. However, the semi-volatile compounds have not been well documented or studied. A majority of these semi-volatile chemicals are more robust than typical gaseous or liquid chemicals and can have lifetimes of several weeks, months, or years in the environment. However, large data gapsmore » exist concerning these potential signature compounds and more research is needed to fill these data gaps so that important signature information is not overlooked or discarded. This report investigates key semi-volatile compounds associated with nuclear separations, identifies available chemical and physical properties, and discusses the degradation products that would result from hydrolysis, radiolysis and oxidation reactions on these compounds.« less
Applications of a Fast Neutron Detector System to Verification of Special Nuclear Materials
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Mayo, Douglas R.; Byrd, Roger C.; Ensslin, Norbert; Krick, Merlyn S.; Mercer, David J.; Miller, Michael C.; Prettyman, Thomas H.; Russo, Phyllis A.
1998-04-01
An array of boron-loaded plastic optically coupled to bismuth germanate scintillators has been developed to detect neutrons for measurement of special nuclear materials. The phoswiched detection system has the advantage of a high neutron detection efficiency and short die-away time. This is achieved by mixing the moderator (plastic) and the detector (^10B) at the molecular level. Simulations indicate that the neutron capture probabilities equal or exceed those of the current thermal neutron multiplicity techniques which have the moderator (polyethylene) and detectors (^3He gas proportional tubes) macroscopically separate. Experiments have been performed to characterize the response of these detectors and validate computer simulations. The fast neutron detection system may be applied to the quantitative assay of plutonium in high (α,n) backgrounds, with emphasis on safeguards and enviromental scenarios. Additional applications of the insturment, in a non-quantative mode, has been tested for possible verification activities involving dismantlement of nuclear weapons. A description of the detector system, simulations and preliminary data will be presented.
2011-11-17
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- In the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex-41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, spacecraft technicians install the multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) for NASA's Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission on the Curiosity rover. The MMRTG will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. Heat given off by this natural decay will provide constant power through the day and night during all seasons. Curiosity, MSL's car-sized rover, has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Waste heat from the MMRTG will be circulated throughout the rover system to keep instruments, computers, mechanical devices and communications systems within their operating temperature ranges. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is scheduled for Nov. 25. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: Department of Energy/Idaho National Laboratory
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Bernstein, A.; Allen, M.; Bowden, N.; Brennan, J.; Carr, D. J.; Estrada, J.; Hagmann, C.; Lund, J. C.; Madden, N. W.; Winant, C. D.
2005-09-01
Our Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory/Sandia National Laboratories collaboration has deployed a cubic-meter-scale antineutrino detector to demonstrate non-intrusive and automatic monitoring of the power levels and plutonium content of a nuclear reactor. Reactor monitoring of this kind is required for all non-nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and is implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since the antineutrino count rate and energy spectrum depend on the relative yields of fissioning isotopes in the reactor core, changes in isotopic composition can be observed without ever directly accessing the core. Data from a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector, coupled with the well-understood principles that govern the core's evolution in time, can be used to determine whether the reactor is being operated in an illegitimate way. Our group has deployed a detector at the San Onofre reactor site in California to demonstrate this concept. This paper describes the concept and shows preliminary results from 8 months of operation.
Location analysis and strontium-90 concentrations in deer antlers on the Hanford Site
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Tiller, B L; Eberhardt, L E; Poston, T M
1995-05-01
The primary objective of this study was to examine the levels of strontium-90 ({sup 90}Sr) in deer antlers collected from near previously active reactor sites and distant from the reactor sites along that portion of the Columbia River which borders the Hanford Site. A second objective was to analyze the movements and home-ranges of mule deer residing within these areas and determine to what extent this information contributes to the observed {sup 90}Sr concentrations. {sup 90}Sr is a long-lived radionuclide (29.1 year half life) produced by fission in irradiated fuel in plutonium production reactors on the Hanford Site. It ismore » also a major component of atmospheric fallout from weapons testing. Concentrations of radionuclides found in the developed environment onsite do not pose a health concern to humans or various wildlife routinely monitored. However, elevated levels of radionuclides in found biota may indicate routes of exposure requiring attention.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Solarz, R. W.
1985-02-01
Atomic vapor laster isotope separation (AVLIS) represents the largest-scale potential application of tunable lasers that has received serious attention. The underlying physical principles were identified and optimized, the major technology components were developed, and the integrated enrichment performance of the process was tested. The central physical processes are outlined, progress to date on the technology elements is reviewed, and scaling laws are fomulated. Two primary applications are the production of light-water reactor fuel and the conversion of fuel-grade plutonium to weapons-grade material. A variety of applications exist that all potentially use a common base of AVLIS technology. These include missions such as the enrichment of mercury isotopes to improve fluorescent lamp efficiency, the enrichment of iodine isotopes for medical isotope use, and the cleanup of strontium from defense waste for recovering strontium isotopes for radiothermal mechanical generators. The ability to radidly assess the economic and technical feasibility of each mission is derived from the general applicability of AVLIS physics and AVLIS technology.
Neutralization of Plutonium and Enriched Uranium Solutions Containing Gadolinium as a Neutron Poison
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
BRONIKOWSKI, MG.
2004-04-01
Materials currently being dissolved in the HB-Line Facility will result in an accumulated solution containing an estimated uranium:plutonium (U:Pu) ratio of 4.3:1 and an 235U enrichment estimated at 30 per cent The U:Pu ratio and the enrichment are outside the evaluated concentration range for disposition to high level waste (HLW) using gadolinium (Gd) as a neutron poison. To confirm that the solution generated during the current HB-Line dissolving campaign can be poisoned with Gd, neutralized and discarded to the Savannah River Site (SRS) high level waste (HLW) system without undue nuclear safety concerns the caustic precipitation of surrogate solutions wasmore » examined. Experiments were performed with a U/Pu/Gd solution representative of the HB-Line estimated concentration ratio and also a U/Gd solution. Depleted U was used in the experiments as the enrichment of the U will not affect the chemical behavior during neutralization, but will affect the amount of Gd added to the solution. Settling behavior of the neutralized solutions was found to be comparable to previous studies. The neutralized solutions mixed easily and had expected densities of typical neutralized waste. The neutralized solids were found to be homogeneous and less than 20 microns in size. Partially neutralized solids were more amorphous than the fully neutralized solids. Based on the results of these experiments, Gd was found to be a viable poison for neutralizing a U/Pu/Gd solution with a U:Pu mass ratio of 4.3:1 thus extending the U:Pu mass ratio from the previously investigated 0-3:1 to 4.3:1. However, further work is needed to allow higher U concentrations or U:Pu ratios greater than investigated in this work.« less
Thorium-based mixed oxide fuel in a pressurized water reactor: A feasibility analysis with MCNP
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Tucker, Lucas Powelson
This dissertation investigates techniques for spent fuel monitoring, and assesses the feasibility of using a thorium-based mixed oxide fuel in a conventional pressurized water reactor for plutonium disposition. Both non-paralyzing and paralyzing dead-time calculations were performed for the Portable Spectroscopic Fast Neutron Probe (N-Probe), which can be used for spent fuel interrogation. Also, a Canberra 3He neutron detector's dead-time was estimated using a combination of subcritical assembly measurements and MCNP simulations. Next, a multitude of fission products were identified as candidates for burnup and spent fuel analysis of irradiated mixed oxide fuel. The best isotopes for these applications were identified by investigating half-life, photon energy, fission yield, branching ratios, production modes, thermal neutron absorption cross section and fuel matrix diffusivity. 132I and 97Nb were identified as good candidates for MOX fuel on-line burnup analysis. In the second, and most important, part of this work, the feasibility of utilizing ThMOX fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) was first examined under steady-state, beginning of life conditions. Using a three-dimensional MCNP model of a Westinghouse-type 17x17 PWR, several fuel compositions and configurations of a one-third ThMOX core were compared to a 100% UO2 core. A blanket-type arrangement of 5.5 wt% PuO2 was determined to be the best candidate for further analysis. Next, the safety of the ThMOX configuration was evaluated through three cycles of burnup at several using the following metrics: axial and radial nuclear hot channel factors, moderator and fuel temperature coefficients, delayed neutron fraction, and shutdown margin. Additionally, the performance of the ThMOX configuration was assessed by tracking cycle length, plutonium destroyed, and fission product poison concentration.
Method for dissolving plutonium dioxide
Tallent, Othar K.
1978-01-01
The fluoride-catalyzed, non-oxidative dissolution of plutonium dioxide in HNO.sub.3 is significantly enhanced in rate by oxidizing dissolved plutonium ions. It is believed that the oxidation of dissolved plutonium releases fluoride ions from a soluble plutonium-fluoride complex for further catalytic action.
METHOD FOR OBTAINING PLUTONIUM METAL AND ALLOYS OF PLUTONIUM FROM PLUTONIUM TRICHLORIDE
Reavis, J.G.; Leary, J.A.; Maraman, W.J.
1962-11-13
A process is given for both reducing plutonium trichloride to plutonium metal using cerium as the reductant and simultaneously alloying such plutonium metal with an excess of cerium or cerium and cobalt sufficient to yield the desired nuclear reactor fuel composition. The process is conducted at a temperature from about 550 to 775 deg C, at atmospheric pressure, without the use of booster reactants, and a substantial decontamination is effected in the product alloy of any rare earths which may be associated with the source of the plutonium. (AEC)
METHOD OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM
Brown, H.S.; Hill, O.F.
1958-02-01
Plutonium hexafluoride is a satisfactory fluorinating agent and may be reacted with various materials capable of forming fluorides, such as copper, iron, zinc, etc., with consequent formation of the metal fluoride and reduction of the plutonium to the form of a lower fluoride. In accordance with the present invention, it has been found that the reactivity of plutonium hexafluoride with other fluoridizable materials is so great that the process may be used as a method of separating plutonium from mixures containing plutonium hexafluoride and other vaporized fluorides even though the plutonium is present in but minute quantities. This process may be carried out by treating a mixture of fluoride vapors comprising plutonium hexafluoride and fluoride of uranium to selectively reduce the plutonium hexafluoride and convert it to a less volatile fluoride, and then recovering said less volatile fluoride from the vapor by condensation.
ADSORPTION-BISMUTH PHOSPHATE METHOD FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM
Russell, E.R.; Adamson, A.W.; Boyd, G.E.
1960-06-28
A process is given for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products. Plutonium and uranium are adsorbed by a cation exchange resin, plutonium is eluted from the adsorbent, and then, after oxidation to the hexavalent state, the plutonium is contacted with a bismuth phosphate carrier precipitate.
PLUTONIUM-HYDROGEN REACTION PRODUCT, METHOD OF PREPARING SAME AND PLUTONIUM POWDER THEREFROM
Fried, S.; Baumbach, H.L.
1959-12-01
A process is described for forming plutonlum hydride powder by reacting hydrogen with massive plutonium metal at room temperature and the product obtained. The plutonium hydride powder can be converted to plutonium powder by heating to above 200 deg C.
Wing, Steve; Richardson, David; Wolf, Susanne; Mihlan, Gary
2004-02-01
Health effects of working with plutonium remain unclear. Plutonium workers at the United States Department of Energy (US-DOE) Hanford Site in Washington State, USA were evaluated for increased risks of cancer and non-cancer mortality. Periods of employment in jobs with routine or non-routine potential for plutonium exposure were identified for 26,389 workers hired between 1944 and 1978. Life table regression was used to examine associations of length of employment in plutonium jobs with confirmed plutonium deposition and with cause specific mortality through 1994. Incidence of confirmed internal plutonium deposition in all plutonium workers was 15.4 times greater than in other Hanford jobs. Plutonium workers had low death rates compared to other workers, particularly for cancer causes. Mortality for several causes was positively associated with length of employment in routine plutonium jobs, especially for employment at older ages. At ages 50 and above, death rates for non-external causes of death, all cancers, cancers of tissues where plutonium deposits, and lung cancer, increased 2.0 +/- 1.1%, 2.6 +/- 2.0%, 4.9 +/- 3.3%, and 7.1 +/- 3.4% (+/-SE) per year of employment in routine plutonium jobs, respectively. Workers employed in jobs with routine potential for plutonium exposure have low mortality rates compared to other Hanford workers even with adjustment for demographic, socioeconomic, and employment factors. This may be due, in part, to medical screening. Associations between duration of employment in jobs with routine potential for plutonium exposure and mortality may indicate occupational exposure effects. Copyright 2004 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
Lyon, W.L.; Moore, R.H.
1961-01-17
A process is given for producing plutonium metal by the reduction of plutonium chloride, dissolved in alkali metal chloride plus or minus aluminum chloride, with magnesium or a magnesium-aluminum alloy at between 700 and 800 deg C and separating the plutonium or plutonium-aluminum alloy formed from the salt.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1998-04-01
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials. Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities. Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites inmore » the complex. Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in DOE's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure strategy and contractor integration analysis. Interstate waste and materials shipments. Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from December 31, 1997 through April 30, 1998 under the NGA project. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; and provided ongoing support to state-DOE interactions in preparation for the March 30-31, 1998 NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force Meeting with DOE. maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, DOE's Environmental Management Budget, and DOE's proposed Intersite Discussions.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ann M. Beauchesne
1999-04-30
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials; Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities; Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites inmore » the complex; Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the Department's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure plan and contractor integration analysis; Interstate waste and materials shipments; and Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from February 1, 1999, through April 30, 1999, under the NGA grant. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, external regulation of DOE; and EM Integration activities; and continued to serve as a liaison between the NGA FFCA Task Force states and the Department.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1998-07-01
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials. Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities. Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites inmore » the complex. Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in DOE's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure strategy and contractor integration analysis. Interstate waste and materials shipments. Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from April 30, 1998 through June 30, 1998 under the NGA project. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; and provided ongoing support to state-DOE interactions. maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, DOE's Environmental Management Budget, and DOE's proposed Intersite Discussions.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ann B. Beauchesne
1998-09-30
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: (1) Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials; (2) Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities; (3) Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect onmore » individual sites in the complex; (4) Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the Department's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure plan and contractor integration analysis; (5) Interstate waste and materials shipments; and (6) Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from June 1, 1998 through September 30, 1998, under the NGA grant. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: (1) maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; (2) maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, external regulation of DOE; and EM Integration activities; and (3) continued to serve as a liaison between the NGA FFCA Task Force states and the Department.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ann M. Beauchesne
1999-07-30
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials; Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities; Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites inmore » the complex; Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the Department's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure plan and contractor integration analysis; Interstate waste and materials shipments; and Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from May 1, 1999, through July 30, 1999, under the NGA grant. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, external regulation of DOE; and continued to facilitate interactions between the states and DOE to develop a foundation for an ongoing substantive relationship between the Governors of key states and Secretary Richardson.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ann M. Beauchesne
1999-01-31
Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: (1) Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials; (2) Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities; (3) Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect onmore » individual sites in the complex; (4) Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the Department's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure plan and contractor integration analysis; (5) Interstate waste and materials shipments; and (6) Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from October 1, 1998 through January 31, 1999, under the NGA grant. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: (1) maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; (2) maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, external regulation of DOE; and EM Integration activities; and (3) continued to serve as a liaison between the NGA FFCA Task Force states and the Department.« less
PROCESS OF FORMING PLUOTONIUM SALTS FROM PLUTONIUM EXALATES
Garner, C.S.
1959-02-24
A process is presented for converting plutonium oxalate to other plutonium compounds by a dry conversion method. According to the process, lower valence plutonium oxalate is heated in the presence of a vapor of a volatile non- oxygenated monobasic acid, such as HCl or HF. For example, in order to produce plutonium chloride, the pure plutonium oxalate is heated to about 700 deg C in a slow stream of hydrogen plus HCl. By the proper selection of an oxidizing or reducing atmosphere, the plutonium halide product can be obtained in either the plus 3 or plus 4 valence state.
EXAFS/XANES studies of plutonium-loaded sodalite/glass waste forms
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Richmann, Michael K.; Reed, Donald T.; Kropf, A. Jeremy; Aase, Scott B.; Lewis, Michele A.
2001-09-01
A sodalite/glass ceramic waste form is being developed to immobilize highly radioactive nuclear wastes in chloride form, as part of an electrochemical cleanup process. Two types of simulated waste forms were studied: where the plutonium was alone in an LiCl/KCl matrix and where simulated fission-product elements were added representative of the electrometallurgical treatment process used to recover uranium from spent nuclear fuel also containing plutonium and a variety of fission products. Extended X-ray absorption fine structure spectroscopy (EXAFS) and X-ray absorption near-edge spectroscopy (XANES) studies were performed to determine the location, oxidation state, and particle size of the plutonium within these waste form samples. Plutonium was found to segregate as plutonium(IV) oxide with a crystallite size of at least 4.8 nm in the non-fission-element case and 1.3 nm with fission elements present. No plutonium was observed within the sodalite in the waste form made from the plutonium-loaded LiCl/KCl eutectic salt. Up to 35% of the plutonium in the waste form made from the plutonium-loaded simulated fission-product salt may be segregated with a heavy-element nearest neighbor other than plutonium or occluded internally within the sodalite lattice.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Chrzanowski, P; Walter, K
For the Laboratory and staff, 2006 was a year of outstanding achievements. As our many accomplishments in this annual report illustrate, the Laboratory's focus on important problems that affect our nation's security and our researchers breakthroughs in science and technology have led to major successes. As a national laboratory that is part of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Livermore is a key contributor to the Stockpile Stewardship Program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The program has been highly successful, and our annual report features some of the Laboratory'smore » significant stockpile stewardship accomplishments in 2006. A notable example is a long-term study with Los Alamos National Laboratory, which found that weapon pit performance will not sharply degrade from the aging effects on plutonium. The conclusion was based on a wide range of nonnuclear experiments, detailed simulations, theoretical advances, and thorough analyses of the results of past nuclear tests. The study was a superb scientific effort. The continuing success of stockpile stewardship enabled NNSA in 2006 to lay out Complex 2030, a vision for a transformed nuclear weapons complex that is more responsive, cost efficient, and highly secure. One of the ways our Laboratory will help lead this transformation is through the design and development of reliable replacement warheads (RRWs). Compared to current designs, these warheads would have enhanced performance margins and security features and would be less costly to manufacture and maintain in a smaller, modernized production complex. In early 2007, NNSA selected Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories-California to develop ''RRW-1'' for the U.S. Navy. Design efforts for the RRW, the plutonium aging work, and many other stockpile stewardship accomplishments rely on computer simulations performed on NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program supercomputers at Livermore. ASC Purple and BlueGene/L, the world's fastest computer, together provide nearly a half petaflop (500 trillion operations per second) of computer power for use by the three NNSA national laboratories. Livermore-led teams were awarded the Gordon Bell Prize for Peak Performance in both 2005 and 2006. The winning simulations, run on BlueGene/L, investigated the properties of materials at the length and time scales of atomic interactions. The computing power that makes possible such detailed simulations provides unprecedented opportunities for scientific discovery. Laboratory scientists are meeting the extraordinary challenge of creating experimental capabilities to match the resolution of supercomputer simulations. Working with a wide range of collaborators, we are developing experimental tools that gather better data at the nanometer and subnanosecond scales. Applications range from imaging biomolecules to studying matter at extreme conditions of pressure and temperature. The premier high-energy-density experimental physics facility in the world will be the National Ignition Facility (NIF) when construction is completed in 2009. We are leading the national effort to perform the first fusion ignition experiments using NIF's 192-beam laser and prepare to explore some of the remaining important issues in weapons physics. With scientific colleagues from throughout the nation, we are also designing revolutionary experiments on NIF to advance the fields of astrophysics, planetary physics, and materials science. Mission-directed, multidisciplinary science and technology at Livermore is also focused on reducing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their acquisition and use by terrorists. The Laboratory helps this important national effort by providing its unique expertise, integration analyses, and operational support to the Department of Homeland Security. For this vital facet of the Laboratory's national security mission, we are developing advanced technologies, such as a pocket-size explosives detector and an airborne persistent surveillance system, both of which earned R&D 100 Awards. Altogether, Livermore won seven R&D 100 Awards in 2006, the most for any organization. Emerging threats to national and global security go beyond defense and homeland security. Livermore pursues major scientific and technical advances to meet the need for a clean environment; clean, abundant energy; better water management; and improved human health. Our annual report highlights the link between human activities and the warming of tropical oceans, as well as techniques for imaging biological molecules and detecting bone cancer in its earliest stages. In addition, we showcase many scientific discoveries: distant planets, the composition of comets, a new superheavy element.« less
STRIPPING PROCESS FOR PLUTONIUM
Kolodney, M.
1959-10-01
A method for removing silver, nickel, cadmium, zinc, and indium coatings from plutonium objects while simultaneously rendering the plutonium object passive is described. The coated plutonium object is immersed as the anode in an electrolyte in which the plutonium is passive and the coating metal is not passive, using as a cathode a metal which does not dissolve rapidly in the electrolyte. and passing an electrical current through the electrolyte until the coating metal is removed from the plutonium body.
PLUTONIUM-CUPFERRON COMPLEX AND METHOD OF REMOVING PLUTONIUM FROM SOLUTION
Potratz, H.A.
1959-01-13
A method is presented for separating plutonium from fission products present in solutions of neutronirradiated uranium. The process consists in treating such acidic solutions with cupferron so that the cupferron reacts with the plutonium present to form an insoluble complex. This plutonium cupferride precipitates and may then be separated from the solution.
Lithium metal reduction of plutonium oxide to produce plutonium metal
Coops, Melvin S.
1992-01-01
A method is described for the chemical reduction of plutonium oxides to plutonium metal by the use of pure lithium metal. Lithium metal is used to reduce plutonium oxide to alpha plutonium metal (alpha-Pu). The lithium oxide by-product is reclaimed by sublimation and converted to the chloride salt, and after electrolysis, is removed as lithium metal. Zinc may be used as a solvent metal to improve thermodynamics of the reduction reaction at lower temperatures. Lithium metal reduction enables plutonium oxide reduction without the production of huge quantities of CaO--CaCl.sub.2 residues normally produced in conventional direct oxide reduction processes.
SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM URANIUM AND FISSION PRODUCTS
Boyd, G.E.; Adamson, A.W.; Schubert, J.; Russell, E.R.
1958-10-01
A chromatographic adsorption process is presented for the separation of plutonium from other fission products formed by the irradiation of uranium. The plutonium and the lighter element fission products are adsorbed on a sulfonated phenol-formaldehyde resin bed from a nitric acid solution containing the dissolved uranium. Successive washes of sulfuric, phosphoric, and nitric acids remove the bulk of the fission products, then an eluate of dilute phosphoric and nitric acids removes the remaining plutonium and fission products. The plutonium is selectively removed by passing this solution through zirconium phosphate, from which the plutonium is dissolved with nitric acid. This process provides a convenient and efficient means for isolating plutonium.
Characterizing subcritical assemblies with time of flight fixed by energy estimation distributions
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Monterial, Mateusz; Marleau, Peter; Pozzi, Sara
2018-04-01
We present the Time of Flight Fixed by Energy Estimation (TOFFEE) as a measure of the fission chain dynamics in subcritical assemblies. TOFFEE is the time between correlated gamma rays and neutrons, subtracted by the estimated travel time of the incident neutron from its proton recoil. The measured subcritical assembly was the BeRP ball, a 4.482 kg sphere of α-phase weapons grade plutonium metal, which came in five configurations: bare, 0.5, 1, and 1.5 in iron, and 1 in nickel closed fitting shell reflectors. We extend the measurement with MCNPX-PoliMi simulations of shells ranging up to 6 inches in thickness, and two new reflector materials: aluminum and tungsten. We also simulated the BeRP ball with different masses ranging from 1 to 8 kg. A two-region and single-region point kinetics models were used to model the behavior of the positive side of the TOFFEE distribution from 0 to 100 ns. The single region model of the bare cases gave positive linear correlations between estimated and expected neutron decay constants and leakage multiplications. The two-region model provided a way to estimate neutron multiplication for the reflected cases, which correlated positively with expected multiplication, but the nature of the correlation (sub or superlinear) changed between material types. Finally, we found that the areal density of the reflector shells had a linear correlation with the integral of the two-region model fit. Therefore, we expect that with knowledge of reflector composition, one could determine the shell thickness, or vice versa. Furthermore, up to a certain amount and thickness of the reflector, the two-region model provides a way of distinguishing bare and reflected plutonium assemblies.
Baseline Caesium-137 and Plutonium-239+240 inventory assessment for Central Europe
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Meusburger, Katrin; Borelli, Pasquale; Evrard, Olivier; Ketterer, Michael; Mabit, Lionel; van Oost, Kristof; Alewell, Christine; Panagos, Panos
2017-04-01
Artificial fallout radionuclides (FRNs) such as Caesium-137 and Plutonium-239+240 released as products of the thermonuclear weapons testing that took place from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s and from nuclear power plant accidents (e.g. Chernobyl) are useful tools to quantify soil redistribution. In combination with geostatistics, FRNs may have the potential to bridge the gap between small scale process oriented studies and modelling that simplifies processes and effects over large spatial scales. An essential requirement for the application of FRNs as soil erosion tracers is the establishment of the baseline fallout at undisturbed sites before its comparison to those inventories found at sites undergoing erosion/accumulation. For this purpose, undisturbed topsoil (0-20cm) samples collected in 2009 within the framework of the Land Use/Cover Area frame Survey (LUCAS) have been measured by gamma-spectrometry and ICP-MS to determine 137Cs (n=145) and 239+240Pu (n=108) activities. To restrict the analysis to undisturbed reference sites a geospatial database query selecting only sites having a slope angle <2 degree, outside riparian zones (to avoid depositional sites) and under permanent grassland cover (according to CORINE Land Cover and Landsat) was applied. This study reports preliminary results on the feasibility of establishing a 137Cs and 239+240Pu baseline inventory map for Central Europe. The 137Cs/239+240Pu activity ratios will further allow assessing the rate and the spatial variability of 137Cs Chernobyl fallout. The establishment of such baseline inventory map will provide a unique opportunity to assess soil redistribution for a comparable time-frame (1953-2009) following a harmonised methodological protocol across national boundaries.
Buesseler, Ken O; Kaplan, Daniel I; Dai, Minhan; Pike, Steven
2009-03-01
Plutonium (Pu) was characterized for its isotopic composition, oxidation states, and association with colloids in groundwater samples near disposal basins in F-Area of the Savannah River Site and compared to similar samples collected six years earlier. Two sources of Pu were identified, the disposal basins, which contained a 24Pu/l39Pu isotopic signature consistent with weapons grade Pu, and 244Cm, a cocontaminant that is a progenitor radionuclide of 24Pu. 24Pu that originated primarily from 244Cm tended to be appreciably more oxidized (Pu(V/VI)), less associated with colloids (approximately 1 kDa - 0.2 microm), and more mobile than 239Pu, as suggested by our prior studies at this site. This is not evidence of isotope fractionation but rather "source-dependent" controls on 240Pu speciation which are processes that are not at equilibrium, i.e., processes that appear kinetically hindered. There were also "source-independent" controls on 239Pu speciation, which are those processes that follow thermodynamic equilibrium with their surroundings. For example, a groundwater pH increase in one well from 4.1 in 1998 to 6.1 in 2004 resulted in an order of magnitude decrease in groundwater 239Pu concentrations. Similarly, the fraction of 239Pu in the reduced Pu(III/IV) and colloidal forms increased systematically with decreases in redox condition in 2004 vs 1998. This research demonstrates the importance of source-dependent and source-independent controls on Pu speciation which would impact Pu mobility during changes in hydrological, chemical, or biological conditions on both seasonal and decadal time scales, and over short spatial scales. This implies more dynamic shifts in Pu speciation, colloids association, and transport in groundwater than commonly believed.
Volatile fluoride process for separating plutonium from other materials
Spedding, F. H.; Newton, A. S.
1959-04-14
The separation of plutonium from uranium and/or fission products by formation of the higher fluorides off uranium and/or plutonium is described. Neutronirradiated uranium metal is first converted to the hydride. This hydrided product is then treated with fluorine at about 315 deg C to form and volatilize UF/sub 6/ leaving plutonium behind. Thc plutonium may then be separated by reacting the residue with fluorine at about 5004DEC and collecting the volatile plutonium fluoride thus formed.
VOLATILE FLUORIDE PROCESS FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM OTHER MATERIALS
Spedding, F.H.; Newton, A.S.
1959-04-14
The separation of plutonium from uranium and/or tission products by formation of the higher fluorides of uranium and/or plutonium is discussed. Neutronirradiated uranium metal is first convcrted to the hydride. This hydrided product is then treatced with fluorine at about 315 deg C to form and volatilize UF/sup 6/ leaving plutonium behind. The plutonium may then be separated by reacting the residue with fluorine at about 500 deg C and collecting the volatile plutonium fluoride thus formed.
SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM LANTHANUM BY CHELATION-EXTRACTION
James, R.A.; Thompson, S.G.
1958-12-01
Plutonium can be separated from a mixture of plutonlum and lanthanum in which the lanthanum to plutonium molal ratio ls at least five by adding the ammonium salt of N-nitrosoarylhydroxylamine to an aqueous solution having a pH between about 3 and 0.2 and containing the plutonium in a valence state of at least +3, to form a plutonium chelate compound of N-nitrosoarylhydroxylamine. The plutonium chelate compound may be recovered from the solution by extracting with an immiscible organic solvent such as chloroform.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Caviness, Michael L; Mann, Paul T; Yoshimura, Richard H
2010-01-01
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has submitted an application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the air shipment of plutonium metal within the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging. The PAT-1 packaging is currently authorized for the air transport of plutonium oxide in solid form only. The INMM presentation will provide a limited overview of the scope of the plutonium metal initiative and provide a status of the NNSA application to the NRC.
Priest, N D; Hunt, B W
1979-05-01
Values of the annual limit of intake (ALI) for plutonium-239 in man have been calculated using committed dose equivalent limits as recommended by ICRP in Publication 26. The calculations were made using a multicompartment bone model which allows for plutonium burial and recycling in the skeleton. In one skeletal compartment, the growing surfaces of cortical bone, it is assumed that plutonium deposits are retained and are not subject to resorption or recycling. In the trabecular bone compartment plutonium is taken to be resorbed with either subsequent redeposition onto bone surfaces or retention in the bone marrow. ALIs for plutonium-239 have been calculated assuming a range of rates of bone accretion (0-32 micron yr-1), different amounts of plutonium retained in the marrow (0-60%) and a 20%, 45% or 70% deposition of plutonium in the skeleton from the blood. The calculations made using this bone model suggest that 750 Bq (20 nCi) is an appropriate ALI for the inhalation of class W and class Y plutonium compounds and that 830 kBq and 5 MBq (23 muCi and 136 muCi) are the appropriate ALIs for the ingestion of soluble and insoluble forms of plutonium respectively.
Merritt, Stephanie M; Ilgen, Daniel R
2008-04-01
We provide an empirical demonstration of the importance of attending to human user individual differences in examinations of trust and automation use. Past research has generally supported the notions that machine reliability predicts trust in automation, and trust in turn predicts automation use. However, links between user personality and perceptions of the machine with trust in automation have not been empirically established. On our X-ray screening task, 255 students rated trust and made automation use decisions while visually searching for weapons in X-ray images of luggage. We demonstrate that individual differences affect perceptions of machine characteristics when actual machine characteristics are constant, that perceptions account for 52% of trust variance above the effects of actual characteristics, and that perceptions mediate the effects of actual characteristics on trust. Importantly, we also demonstrate that when administered at different times, the same six trust items reflect two types of trust (dispositional trust and history-based trust) and that these two trust constructs are differentially related to other variables. Interactions were found among user characteristics, machine characteristics, and automation use. Our results suggest that increased specificity in the conceptualization and measurement of trust is required, future researchers should assess user perceptions of machine characteristics in addition to actual machine characteristics, and incorporation of user extraversion and propensity to trust machines can increase prediction of automation use decisions. Potential applications include the design of flexible automation training programs tailored to individuals who differ in systematic ways.
Plutonium inventories for stabilization and stabilized materials
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Williams, A.K.
1996-05-01
The objective of the breakout session was to identify characteristics of materials containing plutonium, the need to stabilize these materials for storage, and plans to accomplish the stabilization activities. All current stabilization activities are driven by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 (May 26, 1994) and by the recently completed Plutonium ES&H Vulnerability Assessment (DOE-EH-0415). The Implementation Plan for accomplishing stabilization of plutonium-bearing residues in response to the Recommendation and the Assessment was published by DOE on February 28, 1995. This Implementation Plan (IP) commits to stabilizing problem materials within 3 years, and stabilizing all other materials withinmore » 8 years. The IP identifies approximately 20 metric tons of plutonium requiring stabilization and/or repackaging. A further breakdown shows this material to consist of 8.5 metric tons of plutonium metal and alloys, 5.5 metric tons of plutonium as oxide, and 6 metric tons of plutonium as residues. Stabilization of the metal and oxide categories containing greater than 50 weight percent plutonium is covered by DOE Standard {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides{close_quotes} December, 1994 (DOE-STD-3013-94). This standard establishes criteria for safe storage of stabilized plutonium metals and oxides for up to 50 years. Each of the DOE sites and contractors with large plutonium inventories has either started or is preparing to start stabilization activities to meet these criteria.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bouzigues, H.; Reneaud, J.-M.
1963-01-01
A method and a special apparatus are described which make it possible to detach the insoluble plutonium salt deposits in the extraction chain of an irradiated fuel treatment plant. The process chosen allows the detection, in the extraction batteries or in the highly active chemical engineering equipment, of plutonium quantities of a few grams. After four years operation it has been impossible to detect measurable quantities of plutonium in any part of the extraction chain. The results have been confirmed by visual examinations carried out with a specially constructed endoscope. (auth)
SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM HYDROXIDE FROM BISMUTH HYDROXIDE
Watt, G.W.
1958-08-19
An tmproved method is described for separating plutonium hydroxide from bismuth hydroxide. The end product of the bismuth phosphate processes for the separation amd concentration of plutonium is a inixture of bismuth hydroxide amd plutonium hydroxide. It has been found that these compounds can be advantageously separated by treatment with a reducing agent having a potential sufficient to reduce bismuth hydroxide to metalltc bisinuth but not sufficient to reduce the plutonium present. The resulting mixture of metallic bismuth and plutonium hydroxide can then be separated by treatment with a material which will dissolve plutonium hydroxide but not metallic bismuth. Sodiunn stannite is mentioned as a preferred reducing agent, and dilute nitric acid may be used as the separatory solvent.
An MS-DOS-based program for analyzing plutonium gamma-ray spectra
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ruhter, W.D.; Buckley, W.M.
1989-09-07
A plutonium gamma-ray analysis system that operates on MS-DOS-based computers has been developed for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to perform in-field analysis of plutonium gamma-ray spectra for plutonium isotopics. The program titled IAEAPU consists of three separate applications: a data-transfer application for transferring spectral data from a CICERO multichannel analyzer to a binary data file, a data-analysis application to analyze plutonium gamma-ray spectra, for plutonium isotopic ratios and weight percents of total plutonium, and a data-quality assurance application to check spectral data for proper data-acquisition setup and performance. Volume 3 contains the software listings for these applications.
SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM URANIUM AND FISSION PRODUCTS
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Boyd, G.E.; Adamson, A.W.; Schubert, J.
A chromatographic adsorption process is presented for the separation of plutonium from other fission products formed by the irradiation of uranium. The plutonium and the lighter element fission products are adsorbed on a sulfonated phenol-formaldehyde resin bed from a nitric acid solution containing the dissolved uranium. Successive washes of sulfuric, phosphoric, and nitric acids remove the bulk of the fission products, then an eluate of dilute phosphoric and nitric acids removes the remaining plutonium and fission products. The plutonium is selectively removed by passing this solution through zirconium phosphate, from which the plutonium is dissolved with nitric acid. This processmore » provides a convenient and efficient means for isolating plutonium.« less
PROCESSING ALTERNATIVES FOR DESTRUCTION OF TETRAPHENYLBORATE
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lambert, D; Thomas Peters, T; Samuel Fink, S
Two processes were chosen in the 1980's at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to decontaminate the soluble High Level Waste (HLW). The In Tank Precipitation (ITP) process (1,2) was developed at SRS for the removal of radioactive cesium and actinides from the soluble HLW. Sodium tetraphenylborate was added to the waste to precipitate cesium and monosodium titanate (MST) was added to adsorb actinides, primarily uranium and plutonium. Two products of this process were a low activity waste stream and a concentrated organic stream containing cesium tetraphenylborate and actinides adsorbed on monosodium titanate (MST). A copper catalyzed acid hydrolysis process wasmore » built to process (3, 4) the Tank 48H cesium tetraphenylborate waste in the SRS's Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). Operation of the DWPF would have resulted in the production of benzene for incineration in SRS's Consolidated Incineration Facility. This process was abandoned together with the ITP process in 1998 due to high benzene in ITP caused by decomposition of excess sodium tetraphenylborate. Processing in ITP resulted in the production of approximately 1.0 million liters of HLW. SRS has chosen a solvent extraction process combined with adsorption of the actinides to decontaminate the soluble HLW stream (5). However, the waste in Tank 48H is incompatible with existing waste processing facilities. As a result, a processing facility is needed to disposition the HLW in Tank 48H. This paper will describe the process for searching for processing options by SRS task teams for the disposition of the waste in Tank 48H. In addition, attempts to develop a caustic hydrolysis process for in tank destruction of tetraphenylborate will be presented. Lastly, the development of both a caustic and acidic copper catalyzed peroxide oxidation process will be discussed.« less
PROCESS FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM IMPURITIES
Wahl, A.C.
1957-11-12
A method is described for separating plutonium from aqueous solutions containing uranium. It has been found that if the plutonium is reduced to its 3+ valence state, and the uranium present is left in its higher valence state, then the differences in solubility between certain salts (e.g., oxalates) of the trivalent plutonium and the hexavalent uranium can be used to separate the metals. This selective reduction of plutonium is accomplished by adding iodide ion to the solution, since iodide possesses an oxidation potential sufficient to reduce plutonium but not sufficient to reduce uranium.
PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM FLUORIDE FROM BISMUTH PHOSPHATE PRECIPITATE CONTAINING PLUTONIUM VALUES
Brown, H.S.; Bohlmann, E.G.
1961-05-01
A process is given for separating plutonium from fission products present on a bismuth phosphate carrier. The dried carrier is first treated with hydrogen fluoride at between 500 and 600 deg C whereby some fission product fluorides volatilize away from plutonium tetrafluoride, and nonvolatile fission product fluorides are formed then with anhydrous fluorine at between 400 and 500 deg C. Bismuth and plutonium distill in the form of volatile fluorides away from the nonvolatile fission product fluorides. The bismuth and plutonium fluorides are condensed at below 290 deg C.
PLUTONIUM COMPOUNDS AND PROCESS FOR THEIR PREPARATION
Wolter, F.J.; Diehl, H.C. Jr.
1958-01-01
This patent relates to certain new compounds of plutonium, and to the utilization of these compounds to effect purification or separation of the plutonium. The compounds are organic chelate compounds consisting of tetravalent plutonium together with a di(salicylal) alkylenediimine. These chelates are soluble in various organic solvents, but not in water. Use is made of this property in extracting the plutonium by contacting an aqueous solution thereof with an organic solution of the diimine. The plutonium is chelated, extracted and effectively separated from any impurities accompaying it in the aqueous phase.
Method of separating thorium from plutonium
Clifton, David G.; Blum, Thomas W.
1984-01-01
A method of chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.
Method of separating thorium from plutonium
Clifton, D.G.; Blum, T.W.
A method of chemically separating plutonium from thorium is claimed. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.
Method of separating thorium from plutonium
Clifton, D.G.; Blum, T.W.
1984-07-10
A method is described for chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.
Locating trace plutonium in contaminated soil using micro-XRF imaging
Worley, Christopher G.; Spencer, Khalil J.; Boukhalfa, Hakim; ...
2014-06-01
Micro-X-ray fluorescence (MXRF) was used to locate minute quantities of plutonium in contaminated soil. Because the specimen had previously been prepared for analysis by scanning electron microscopy, it was coated with gold to eliminate electron beam charging. However, this significantly hindered efforts to detect plutonium by MXRF. The gold L peak series present in all spectra increased background counts. Plutonium signal attenuation by the gold coating and severe peak overlap from potassium in the soil prevented detection of trace plutonium using the Pu Mα peak. However, the 14.3 keV Pu Lα peak sensitivity was not optimal due to poor transmissionmore » efficiency through the source polycapillary optic, and the instrument silicon drift detector sensitivity quickly declines for peaks with energies above ~10 keV. Instrumental parameters were optimized (eg. using appropriate source filters) in order to detect plutonium. An X-ray beam aperture was initially used to image a majority of the specimen with low spatial resolution. A small region that appeared to contain plutonium was then imaged at high spatial resolution using a polycapillary optic. Small areas containing plutonium were observed on a soil particle, and iron was co-located with the plutonium. Zinc and titanium also appeared to be correlated with the plutonium, and these elemental correlations provided useful plutonium chemical state information that helped to better understand its environmental transport properties.« less
What views and uses of radiation sources in the 21st century?
Blix, H
2001-04-01
Considering that in 1899 neither biotechnology nor the electronic revolution were foreseen, some humility might be advisable when one looks into the crystal ball for the future role of radiation sources. In the past 50 years, nuclear medicine, nuclear weapons, and nuclear power have had a huge impact in the world. In the next 50 years, nuclear weapons may be phased out, nuclear power revived, and nuclear medicine may continue, especially for diagnostic purposes. Conflicts between great powers and blocks will no longer be about territorial or ideological domination but about trade, finance, information, and the environment and the weapons used will not be bombs but investments, credits, and control of information. Nuclear power-still based on fission-will be relaunched and get more uses, e.g., to propel ships, to produce heat for industry and for space heating, and perhaps to desalinate water. The public will be more at ease with radiation as it is better educated, as nuclear safety continuously improves and new types of nuclear power plants emerge, as waste sites fail to cause any problems, and as no other energy source is found to deliver so much energy at reasonable cost with negligible impact on climate and environment. One kilogram of oil corresponds to 4 kWh of electricity. One kilogram of uranium fuel corresponds to 50,000 kWh, and 1 kg of plutonium 6,000,000 kWh! In nuclear medicine, radiation may give way to other treatments as the understanding of cancer advances. On the other hand, the extreme ease with which sources of radiation can be identified is unmatched and likely to make them useful tools as tracers and markers in medicine-and other fields-for a long time. For certain uses--perhaps food irradiation--radiation sources, such as cobalt, may be replaced by accelerators which may be switched on and off at will. As more sources are used, registration and control of them must be made very effective around the whole world. Very high natural emissions of radon will continue to call for cautionary measures, but many other nonradiating substances will be identified as hazardous to health and call for vigorous intervention.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Volant, Emmanuelle; Garnier, Cedric
2012-07-01
The paper aims at presenting the new information showroom called 'Escom G2' (for 'Espace Communication') inaugurated by the French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) in spring 2011. This showroom is settled directly inside the main building of the G2 nuclear reactor: a facility formerly dedicated to weapon-grade plutonium production since the late 1950's at the Marcoule nuclear centre, in south of France. After its shutdown, and reprocessing of the last spent fuels, a first dismantling step was successfully completed from 1986 to 1996. Unique in France and in Europe, Escom G2 is focused on France dismantling expertise andmore » its action for disarmament. This showroom comprises of a 300-square meters permanent exhibition, organized around four themes: France strategy for disarmament, decommissioning and dismantling technical aspects, uranium and plutonium production cycles. Each of these topics is illustrated with posters, photos, models and technical pieces from the dismantled plants. It is now used to present France's action in disarmament to highly ranked audiences such as: state representatives, diplomats, journalists... The paper explains the background story of this original project. As a matter of fact, in 1996 France was the first nuclear state to decide to shut down and dismantle its fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons. First, the paper presents the history of the G2 reactor in the early ages of Marcoule site, its operating highlights as well as its main dismantling operations, are presented. In Marcoule, where the three industrial-scale reactors G1, G2 and G3 used to be operated for plutonium production (to be then reprocessed in the nearby UP1 plant), the initial dismantling phase has now been completed (in 1980's for G1 and in 1996 for G2 and G3). The second phase, aimed at completely dismantling these three reactors, will restart in 2020, and is directly linked to the opening of a future national storage facility for irradiated graphite waste. Then, the paper recalls communication events and official visits hosted in Pierrelatte and Marcoule, following a formal invitation from the French President Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy. These visits, which were organized in order to illustrate the irreversibility of these dismantling operations, allowed visitors to discovers places that used to be former highly classified areas. Three official visits were organized in 2008 and 2009 for representatives of the Conference on Disarmament Member States, non-governmental experts and journalists. All participants visited the dismantled uranium enrichment plant in Pierrelatte, the G2 reactor and the UP1 plant in Marcoule. The visits were successful and visitors were especially impressed by the G2 reactor and its massive industrial architecture, symbolic of the early ages of nuclear history. In late 2010, this feedback convinced CEA Military Application Directorate (CEA DAM) that a permanent showroom could be installed inside the reactor, making it possible to preserve the cultural value of this historical landmark, and to continue its ongoing effort of communication and outreach. The paper explains the design of this concept: the museography project with a professional designer, the communication material conception and the features of such an original place. (authors)« less
PROCESSES FOR SEPARATING AND RECOVERING CONSTITUENTS OF NEUTRON IRRADIATED URANIUM
Connick, R.E.; Gofman, J.W.; Pimentel, G.C.
1959-11-10
Processes are described for preparing plutonium, particularly processes of separating plutonium from uranium and fission products in neutron-irradiated uraniumcontaining matter. Specifically, plutonium solutions containing uranium, fission products and other impurities are contacted with reducing agents such as sulfur dioxide, uranous ion, hydroxyl ammonium chloride, hydrogen peroxide, and ferrous ion whereby the plutoninm is reduced to its fluoride-insoluble state. The reduced plutonium is then carried out of solution by precipitating niobic oxide therein. Uranium and certain fission products remain behind in the solution. Certain other fission products precipitate along with the plutonium. Subsequently, the plutonium and fission product precipitates are redissolved, and the solution is oxidized with oxidizing agents such as chlorine, peroxydisulfate ion in the presence of silver ion, permanganate ion, dichromate ion, ceric ion, and a bromate ion, whereby plutonium is oxidized to the fluoride-soluble state. The oxidized solution is once again treated with niobic oxide, thus precipitating the contamirant fission products along with the niobic oxide while the oxidized plutonium remains in solution. Plutonium is then recovered from the decontaminated solution.
METHOD FOR RECOVERING PLUTONIUM VALUES FROM SOLUTION USING A BISMUTH HYDROXIDE CARRIER PRECIPITATE
Faris, B.F.
1961-04-25
Carrier precipitation processes for separating plutonium values from aqueous solutions are described. In accordance with the invention a bismuth hydroxide precipitate is formed in the plutonium-containing solution, thereby carrying plutonium values from the solution.
A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Parker, Frank L.
2012-07-01
Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storagemore » sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded emissions), long term care, reduced access to 'dirty' bomb materials, the social and political costs of siting new facilities and the psychological impact of no solution to the nuclear waste problem, were taken into account, the costs would be far lower than those of the present fuel cycle. (authors)« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Simmons, Mary Ann; Poston, Ted M.; Fritz, Brad G.
2011-07-29
Environmental monitoring is conducted on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site to comply with DOE Orders and federal and state regulations. Major objectives of the monitoring are to characterize contaminant levels in the environment and to determine site contributions to the contaminant inventory. This report focuses on surface soil and perennial vegetation samples collected between 1971 and 2008 as part of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Surface Environmental Surveillance Project performed under contract to DOE. Areas sampled under this program are located on the Hanford Site but outside facility boundaries and on public lands surrounding the Hanford Site.more » Additional samples were collected during the past 8 years under DOE projects that evaluated parcels of land for radiological release. These data were included because the same sampling methodology and analytical laboratory were used for the projects. The spatial and temporal trends of six radionuclides collected over a 38-year period were evaluated. The radionuclides----cobalt-60, cesium-137, strontium-90, plutonium-238, plutonium-239/240, and uranium (reported either as uranium-238 or total uranium)----were selected because they persist in the environment and are still being monitored routinely and reported in Hanford Site environmental reports. All these radionuclides were associated with plutonium production and waste management of activities occurring on the site. Other sources include fallout from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, which ended in 1980, and the Chernobyl explosion in 1986. Uranium is also a natural component of the soil. This assessment of soil and vegetation data provides important information on the distribution of radionuclides in areas adjacent to industrial areas, established perimeter locations and buffer areas, and more offsite nearby and distant locations. The concentrations reflect a tendency for detection of some radionuclides close to where they were utilized onsite, but as one moves to unindustrialized areas on the site, surrounding buffer areas and perimeter location into the more distant sites, concentrations of these radionuclides approach background and cannot be distinguished from fallout activity. More importantly, concentrations in soil and vegetation samples did not exceed environmental benchmark concentrations, and associated exposure to human and ecological receptors were well below levels that are demonstratively hazardous to human health and the environment.« less
Kolodney, M.
1959-12-01
A method is described for rapidly removing iron, nickel, and zinc coatings from plutonium objects while simultaneously rendering the plutonium object passive. The method consists of immersing the coated plutonium object in an aqueous acid solution containing a substantial concentration of nitrate ions, such as fuming nitric acid.
METHOD OF MAKING PLUTONIUM DIOXIDE
Garner, C.S.
1959-01-13
A process is presented For converting both trivalent and tetravalent plutonium oxalate to substantially pure plutonium dioxide. The plutonium oxalate is carefully dried in the temperature range of 130 to300DEC by raising the temperature gnadually throughout this range. The temperature is then raised to 600 C in the period of about 0.3 of an hour and held at this level for about the same length of time to obtain the plutonium dioxide.
METHOD OF PRODUCING PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE
Tolley, W.B.; Smith, R.C.
1959-12-15
A process is presented for preparing plutonium tetrafluoride from plutonium(IV) oxalate. The oxalate is dried and decomposed at about 300 deg C to the dioxide, mixed with ammonium bifluoride, and the mixture is heated to between 50 and 150 deg C whereby ammonium plutonium fluoride is formed. The ammonium plutonium fluoride is then heated to about 300 deg C for volatilization of ammonium fluoride. Both heating steps are preferably carried out in an inert atmosphere.
Lymph node clearance of plutonium from subcutaneous wounds in beagles
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dagle, G.E.
1973-08-01
The lymph node clearance of /sup 239/Pu O/sub 2/ administered as insoluble particles from subcutaneous implants was studied in adult beagles to simulate accidental contamination of hand wounds. External scintillation data were collected from the popliteal lymph nodes of each dog after 9.2 to 39.4 mu Ci of plutonium oxide was subcutaneously implanted into the left or right hind paws. The left hind paw was armputated 4 weeks after implantation to prevent continued deposition of plutonium oxide particles in the left popliteal lymph node. Groups of 3 dogs were sacrificed 4, 8, 16, and 32 weeks after plutonium implantation formore » histopathologic, electron microscopic, and radiochemical analysis of regional lymph nodes. An additional group of dogs received treatment with the chelating agent diethyenetriaminepentaacetic acid (DTPA). Plutonium rapidly accumulated in the popliteal lymph nodes after subcutaneous injection into the hind paw, and 1 to 10% of the implant dose was present in the popliteal lymph nodes at the time of necropsy. Histopathologic changes in the popliteal lymph nodes with plutonium particles were characterized primarily by reticular cell hyperplasia, increased numbers of macrophages, necrosis, and fibroplasia. Eventually, the plutonium particles became sequestered by scar tissue that often replaced the entire architecture of the lymph node. Light microscopic autoradiographs of the popliteal lymph nodes showed a time-related increase in number of alpha tracks per plutonium source. Electron microscopy showed that the plutonium particles were aggregated in phagolysosomes of macrophages. There was slight clearance of plutonium from the popliteal lymph nodes of dogs monitored for 32 weeks. The clearance of plutonium particles from the popliteal lymph nodes was associated with necrosis of macrophages. The external iliac lymph nodes contained fewer plutonium particles than the popliteal lymph nodes and histopathologic changes were less severe. The superficial inguinal lymph nodes of one dog contained appreciable amounts of plutonium. Treatment with diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (DTPA) did not have a measurable effect on the clearance of plutonium from the popliteal lymph nodes. (60 references) (auth)« less
Disposition of fuel elements from the Aberdeen and Sandia pulse reactor (SPR-II) assemblies
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mckerley, Bill; Bustamante, Jacqueline M; Costa, David A
2010-01-01
We describe the disposition of fuel from the Aberdeen (APR) and the Sandia Pulse Reactors (SPR-II) which were used to provide intense neutron bursts for radiation effects testing. The enriched Uranium - 10% Molybdenum fuel from these reactors was shipped to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for size reduction prior to shipment to the Savannah River Site (SRS) for final disposition in the H Canyon facility. The Shipper/Receiver Agreements (SRA), intra-DOE interfaces, criticality safety evaluations, safety and quality requirements and key materials management issues required for the successful completion of this project will be presented. This work is inmore » support of the DOE Consolidation and Disposition program. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has operated pulse nuclear reactor research facilities for the Department of Energy since 1961. The Sandia Pulse Reactor (SPR-II) was a bare metal Godiva-type reactor. The reactor facilities have been used for research and development of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems, advanced nuclear reactors, reactor safety, simulation sources and energy related programs. The SPR-II was a fast burst reactor, designed and constructed by SNL that became operational in 1967. The SPR-ll core was a solid-metal fuel enriched to 93% {sup 235}U. The uranium was alloyed with 10 weight percent molybdenum to ensure the phase stabilization of the fuel. The core consisted of six fuel plates divided into two assemblies of three plates each. Figure 1 shows a cutaway diagram of the SPR-II Reactor with its decoupling shroud. NNSA charged Sandia with removing its category 1 and 2 special nuclear material by the end of 2008. The main impetus for this activity was based on NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino's six focus areas to reenergize NNSA's nuclear material consolidation and disposition efforts. For example, the removal of SPR-II from SNL to DAF was part of this undertaking. This project was in support of NNSA's efforts to consolidate the locations of special nuclear material (SNM) to reduce the cost of securing many SNM facilities. The removal of SPR-II from SNL was a significant accomplishment in SNL's de-inventory efforts and played a key role in reducing the number of locations requiring the expensive security measures required for category 1 and 2 SNM facilities. A similar pulse reactor was fabricated at the Y-12 National Security Complex beginning in the late 1960's. This Aberdeen Pulse Reactor (APR) was operated at the Army Pulse Radiation Facility (APRF) located at the Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) in Maryland. When the APRF was shut down in 2003, a portion of the DOE-owned Special Nuclear Material (SNM) was shipped to an interim facility for storage. Subsequently, the DOE determined that the material from both the SPR-II and the APR would be processed in the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Because of the SRS receipt requirements some of the material was sent to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for size-reduction prior to shipment to the SRS for final disposition.« less
Tabulated Neutron Emission Rates for Plutonium Oxide
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Shores, Erik Frederick
This work tabulates neutron emission rates for 80 plutonium oxide samples as reported in the literature. Plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 oxides are included and such emission rates are useful for scaling tallies from Monte Carlo simulations and estimating dose rates for health physics applications.
PROCESS OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM URANIUM
Brown, H.S.; Hill, O.F.
1958-09-01
A process is presented for recovering plutonium values from aqueous solutions. It comprises forming a uranous hydroxide precipitate in such a plutonium bearing solution, at a pH of at least 5. The plutonium values are precipitated with and carried by the uranium hydroxide. The carrier precipitate is then redissolved in acid solution and the pH is adjusted to about 2.5, causing precipitation of the uranous hydroxide but leaving the still soluble plutonium values in solution.
COLUMBIC OXIDE ADSORPTION PROCESS FOR SEPARATING URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM IONS
Beaton, R.H.
1959-07-14
A process is described for separating plutonium ions from a solution of neutron irradiated uranium in which columbic oxide is used as an adsorbert. According to the invention the plutonium ion is selectively adsorbed by Passing a solution containing the plutonium in a valence state not higher than 4 through a porous bed or column of granules of hydrated columbic oxide. The adsorbed plutonium is then desorbed by elution with 3 N nitric acid.
PROCESS USING BISMUTH PHOSPHATE AS A CARRIER PRECIPITATE FOR FISSION PRODUCTS AND PLUTONIUM VALUES
Finzel, T.G.
1959-03-10
A process is described for separating plutonium from fission products carried therewith when plutonium in the reduced oxidation state is removed from a nitric acid solution of irradiated uranium by means of bismuth phosphate as a carrier precipitate. The bismuth phosphate carrier precipitate is dissolved by treatment with nitric acid and the plutonium therein is oxidized to the hexavalent oxidation state by means of potassium dichromate. Separation of the plutonium from the fission products is accomplished by again precipitating bismuth phosphate and removing the precipitate which now carries the fission products and a small percentage of the plutonium present. The amount of plutonium carried in this last step may be minimized by addition of sodium fluoride, so as to make the solution 0.03N in NaF, prior to the oxidation and prccipitation step.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Gerber, Mark A.; Schmidt, Andrew J.; Delegard, Calvin H.
2000-09-28
This document summarizes an evaluation of the magnesium hydroxide [Mg(OH)2] process to be used at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) for stabilizing plutonium/nitric acid solutions to meet the goal of stabilizing the plutonium in an oxide form suitable for storage under DOE-STD-3013-99. During the treatment process, nitric acid solutions bearing plutonium nitrate are neutralized with Mg(OH)2 in an air sparge reactor. The resulting slurry, containing plutonium hydroxide, is filtered and calcined. The process evaluation included a literature review and extensive laboratory- and bench-scale testing. The testing was conducted using cerium as a surrogate for plutonium to identify and quantifymore » the effects of key processing variables on processing time (primarily neutralization and filtration time) and calcined product properties.« less
PROCESS FOR THE SEPARATION OF HEAVY METALS
Gofman, J.W.; Connick, R.E.; Wahl, A.C.
1959-01-27
A method is presented for thc separation of plutonium from uranium and the fission products with which it is associated. The method is based on the fact that hexavalent plutonium forms an insoluble complex precipitate with sodium acetate, as does the uranyl ion, while reduced plutonium is not precipitated by sodium acetate. Several embodiments are shown, e.g., a solution containing plutonium and uranium in the hexavalent state may be contacted with sodium acetate causing the formation of a sodium uranyl acetate precipitate which carries the plutonium values while the fission products remain in solution. If the original solution is treated with a reducing agent, so that the plutonium is reduced while the uranium remains in the hexavalent state, and sodium and acetate ions are added, the uranium will precipitutc while the plutonium remains in solution effecting separation of the Pu from urarium.
DISSOLUTION OF LANTHANUM FLUORIDE PRECIPITATES
Fries, B.A.
1959-11-10
A plutonium separatory ore concentration procedure involving the use of a fluoride type of carrier is presented. An improvement is given in the derivation step in the process for plutonium recovery by carrier precipitation of plutonium values from solution with a lanthanum fluoride carrier precipitate and subsequent derivation from the resulting plutonium bearing carrier precipitate of an aqueous acidic plutonium-containing solution. The carrier precipitate is contacted with a concentrated aqueous solution of potassium carbonate to effect dissolution therein of at least a part of the precipitate, including the plutonium values. Any remaining precipitate is separated from the resulting solution and dissolves in an aqueous solution containing at least 20% by weight of potassium carbonate. The reacting solutions are combined, and an alkali metal hydroxide added to a concentration of at least 2N to precipitate lanthanum hydroxide concomitantly carrying plutonium values.
Williams, G A; O'Brien, R S; Grzechnik, M; Wise, K N
2017-04-28
A group of Aboriginal people was camped at Wallatinna in South Australia, ~170 km downwind from Emu Field, where an atomic test (the Totem 1 test) was carried out at 07.00 on 15 October 1953 local time (21.30 on 14 October 1953 GMT (Greenwich Mean Time)). They left the camp ~24 hours later. These people stated that a phenomenon that has become known as a 'black mist' rolled through their camp site ~5 hours after detonation and that some of them subsequently became sick, displaying skin reddening and nausea. They feared that the sickness was a result of exposure to high levels of radiation. The purpose of this paper is to determine if these people could have received ionising radiation doses high enough to cause the symptoms displayed. The methodology used for the dose estimates is described in the paper. The exposure modes considered were external exposure due to the passage of a contaminated plume over the camp site, inhalation of material from this plume, external exposure from material deposited on the ground as the plume passed, and consumption of contaminated food and water. The contaminants considered in the airborne cloud and the ground plume were fission products and unburnt plutonium from the nuclear detonation, and neutron activation products caused by vaporisation of the tower used to position the weapon. The source was approximated by a line source. An upper estimate of the effective doses received is ~4 mSv, which is well below the level at which acute radiation effects are observed. This estimate is consistent with earlier assessments, which did not consider inhalation of the contribution from neutron activation products. © Crown copyright 2016.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lind, O.C.; Salbu, B.; Janssens, K.
2007-07-10
Following the USAF B-52 bomber accidents at Palomares, Spain in 1966 and at Thule, Greenland in 1968, radioactive particles containing uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were dispersed into the environment. To improve long-term environmental impact assessments for the contaminated ecosystems, particles from the two sites have been isolated and characterized with respect to properties influencing particle weathering rates. Low [239]Pu/[235]U (0.62-0.78) and [240]Pu/[239]Pu (0.055-0.061) atom ratios in individual particles from both sites obtained by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) show that the particles contain highly enriched U and weapon-grade Pu. Furthermore, results from electron microscopy with Energy Dispersive X-raymore » analysis (EDX) and synchrotron radiation (SR) based micrometer-scale X-ray fluorescence ({micro}-XRF) 2D mapping demonstrated that U and Pu coexist throughout the 1-50 {micro}m sized particles, while surface heterogeneities were observed in EDX line scans. SR-based micrometer-scale X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure Spectroscopy ({micro}-XANES) showed that the particles consisted of an oxide mixture of U (predominately UO[2] with the presence ofU[3][8]) and Pu ((III)/(IV), (V)/(V) or (III), (IV) and (V)). Neither metallic U or Pu nor uranyl or Pu(VI) could be observed. Characteristics such as elemental distributions, morphology and oxidation states are remarkably similar for the Palomares and Thule particles, reflecting that they originate from similar source and release scenarios. Thus, these particle characteristics are more dependent on the original material from which the particles are derived (source) and the formation of particles (release scenario) than the environmental conditions to which the particles have been exposed since the late 1960s.« less
NON-AQUEOUS DISSOLUTION OF MASSIVE PLUTONIUM
Reavis, J.G.; Leary, J.A.; Walsh, K.A.
1959-05-12
A method is presented for obtaining non-aqueous solutions or plutonium from massive forms of the metal. In the present invention massive plutonium is added to a salt melt consisting of 10 to 40 weight per cent of sodium chloride and the balance zinc chloride. The plutonium reacts at about 800 deg C with the zinc chloride to form a salt bath of plutonium trichloride, sodium chloride, and metallic zinc. The zinc is separated from the salt melt by forcing the molten mixture through a Pyrex filter.
OXIDATIVE METHOD OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM NEPTUNIUM
Beaufait, L.J. Jr.
1958-06-10
A method is described of separating neptunium from plutonium in an aqueous solution containing neptunium and plutonium in valence states not greater than +4. This may be accomplished by contacting the solution with dichromate ions, thus oxidizing the neptunium to a valence state greater than +4 without oxidizing any substantial amount of plutonium, and then forming a carrier precipitate which carries the plutonium from solution, leaving the neptunium behind. A preferred embodiment of this invention covers the use of lanthanum fluoride as the carrier precipitate.
PROCESS OF ELIMINATING HYDROGEN PEROXIDE IN SOLUTIONS CONTAINING PLUTONIUM VALUES
Barrick, J.G.; Fries, B.A.
1960-09-27
A procedure is given for peroxide precipitation processes for separating and recovering plutonium values contained in an aqueous solution. When plutonium peroxide is precipitated from an aqueous solution, the supernatant contains appreciable quantities of plutonium and peroxide. It is desirable to process this solution further to recover plutonium contained therein, but the presence of the peroxide introduces difficulties; residual hydrogen peroxide contained in the supernatant solution is eliminated by adding a nitrite or a sulfite to this solution.
Continuous plutonium dissolution apparatus
Meyer, F.G.; Tesitor, C.N.
1974-02-26
This invention is concerned with continuous dissolution of metals such as plutonium. A high normality acid mixture is fed into a boiler vessel, vaporized, and subsequently condensed as a low normality acid mixture. The mixture is then conveyed to a dissolution vessel and contacted with the plutonium metal to dissolve the plutonium in the dissolution vessel, reacting therewith forming plutonium nitrate. The reaction products are then conveyed to the mixing vessel and maintained soluble by the high normality acid, with separation and removal of the desired constituent. (Official Gazette)
CHEMICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SLUDGE SOLIDS AT THE F AND H AREA TANK FARMS
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Reboul, S.
2012-08-29
The primary source of waste solids received into the F Area Tank Farm (FTF) was from PUREX processing performed to recover uranium and plutonium from irradiated depleted uranium targets. In contrast, two primary sources of waste solids were received into the H Area Tank Farm (HTF): a) waste from PUREX processing; and b) waste from H-modified (HM) processing performed to recover uranium and neptunium from burned enriched uranium fuel. Due to the differences between the irradiated depleted uranium targets and the burned enriched uranium fuel, the average compositions of the F and H Area wastes are markedly different from onemore » another. Both F and H Area wastes contain significant amounts of iron and aluminum compounds. However, because the iron content of PUREX waste is higher than that of HM waste, and the aluminum content of PUREX waste is lower than that of HM waste, the iron to aluminum ratios of typical FTF waste solids are appreciably higher than those of typical HTF waste solids. Other constituents present at significantly higher concentrations in the typical FTF waste solids include uranium, nickel, ruthenium, zinc, silver, cobalt and copper. In contrast, constituents present at significantly higher concentrations in the typical HTF waste solids include mercury, thorium, oxalate, and radionuclides U-233, U-234, U-235, U-236, Pu-238, Pu-242, Cm-244, and Cm-245. Because of the higher concentrations of Pu-238 in HTF, the long-term concentrations of Th-230 and Ra-226 (from Pu-238 decay) will also be higher in HTF. The uranium and plutonium distributions of the average FTF waste were found to be consistent with depleted uranium and weapons grade plutonium, respectively (U-235 comprised 0.3 wt% of the FTF uranium, and Pu-240 comprised 6 wt% of the FTF plutonium). In contrast, at HTF, U-235 comprised 5 wt% of the uranium, and Pu-240 comprised 17 wt% of the plutonium, consistent with enriched uranium and high burn-up plutonium. X-ray diffraction analyses of various FTF and HTF samples indicated that the primary crystalline compounds of iron in sludge solids are Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3}, Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4}, and FeO(OH), and the primary crystalline compounds of aluminum are Al(OH){sub 3} and AlO(OH). Also identified were carbonate compounds of calcium, magnesium, and sodium; a nitrated sodium aluminosilicate; and various uranium compounds. Consistent with expectations, oxalate compounds were identified in solids associated with oxalic acid cleaning operations. The most likely oxidation states and chemical forms of technetium are assessed in the context of solubility, since technetium-99 is a key risk driver from an environmental fate and transport perspective. The primary oxidation state of technetium in SRS sludge solids is expected to be Tc(IV). In salt waste, the primary oxidation state is expected to be Tc(VII). The primary form of technetium in sludge is expected to be a hydrated technetium dioxide, TcO{sub 2} {center_dot} xH{sub 2}O, which is relatively insoluble and likely co-precipitated with iron. In salt waste solutions, the primary form of technetium is expected to be the very soluble pertechnetate anion, TcO{sub 4}{sup -}. The relative differences between the F and H Tank Farm waste provide a basis for anticipating differences that will occur as constituents of FTF and HTF waste residue enter the environment over the long-term future. If a constituent is significantly more dominant in one of the Tank Farms, its long-term environmental contribution will likely be commensurately higher, assuming the environmental transport conditions of the two Tank Farms share some commonality. It is in this vein that the information cited in this document is provided - for use during the generation, assessment, and validation of Performance Assessment modeling results.« less
23. AERIAL VIEW LOOKING SOUTHEAST AT THE PLUTONIUM OPERATION BUILDINGS ...
23. AERIAL VIEW LOOKING SOUTHEAST AT THE PLUTONIUM OPERATION BUILDINGS 771, 776/777, AND 707. BUILDING 771, IN THE FOREGROUND, WAS BUILT IN 1952 TO HOUSE ALL PLUTONIUM OPERATIONS. BY 1956, BUILDING 771 WAS NO LONGER ADEQUATE FOR PRODUCTION DEMANDS. BUILDING 776/777, TO THE SOUTH OF BUILDING 771, WAS CONSTRUCTED TO HOUSE PLUTONIUM FABRICATION AND FOUNDRY OPERATIONS. PLUTONIUM RECOVERY REMAINED IN BUILDING 771. BY 1967, CONSTRUCTION ON BUILDING 707, TO THE SOUTH OF BUILDING 776/777, BEGAN AS PRODUCTION LEVELS CONTINUED TO EXPAND NECESSITATING THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PLUTONIUM FABRICATION SPACE (7/1/69). - Rocky Flats Plant, Bounded by Indiana Street & Routes 93, 128 & 72, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
PROCESS FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM BY REPEATED PRECIPITATION WITH AMPHOTERIC HYDROXIDE CARRIERS
Faris, B.F.
1960-04-01
A multiple carrier precipitation method is described for separating and recovering plutonium from an aqueous solution. The hydroxide of an amphoteric metal is precipitated in an aqueous plutonium-containing solution. This precipitate, which carries plutonium, is then separated from the supernatant liquid and dissolved in an aqueous hydroxide solution, forming a second plutonium- containing solution. lons of an amphoteric metal which forms an insoluble hydroxide under the conditions existing in this second solution are added to the second solution. The precipitate which forms and which carries plutonium is separated from the supernatant liquid. Amphoteric metals which may be employed are aluminum, bibmuth, copper, cobalt, iron, lanthanum, nickel, and zirconium.
PROCESS FOR SEPARATION OF HEAVY METALS
Duffield, R.B.
1958-04-29
A method is described for separating plutonium from aqueous acidic solutions of neutron-irradiated uranium and the impurities associated therewith. The separation is effected by adding, to the solution containing hexavalent uranium and plutonium, acetate ions and the ions of an alkali metal and those of a divalent metal and thus forming a complex plutonium acetate salt which is carried by the corresponding complex of uranium, such as sodium magnesium uranyl acetate. The plutonium may be separated from the precipitated salt by taking the same back into solution, reducing the plutonium to a lower valent state on reprecipitating the sodium magnesium uranyl salt, removing the latter, and then carrying the plutonium from ihe solution by means of lanthanum fluoride.
PROCESS FOR THE RECOVERY OF PLUTONIUM
Ritter, D.M.
1959-01-13
An improvement is presented in the process for recovery and decontamination of plutonium. The carrier precipitate containing plutonium is dissolved and treated with an oxidizing agent to place the plutonium in a hexavalent oxidation state. A lanthanum fluoride precipitate is then formed in and removed from the solution to carry undesired fission products. The fluoride ions in the reniaining solution are complexed by addition of a borate sueh as boric acid, sodium metaborate or the like. The plutonium is then reduced and carried from the solution by the formation of a bismuth phosphate precipitate. This process effects a better separation from unwanted flssion products along with conccntration of the plutonium by using a smaller amount of carrier.
The ORNL Chemical Technology Division, 1950-1994
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jolley, R.L.; Genung, R.K.; McNeese, L.E.
1994-10-01
This document attempts to reconstruct the role played by the Chemical Technology Division (Chem Tech) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the atomic era since the 1940`s related to the development and production of nuclear weapons and power reactors. Chem Tech`s early contributions were landmark pioneering studies. Unknown and dimly perceived problems like chemical hazards, radioactivity, and criticality had to be dealt with. New chemical concepts and processes had to be developed to test the new theories being developed by physicists. New engineering concepts had to be developed and demonstrated in order to build facilities and equipment thatmore » had never before been attempted. Chem Tech`s role was chemical separations, especially uranium and plutonium, and nuclear fuel reprocessing. With diversification of national and ORNL missions, Chem Tech undertook R&D studies in many areas including biotechnology; clinical and environmental chemistry; nuclear reactors; safety regulations; effective and safe waste management and disposal; computer modeling and informational databases; isotope production; and environmental control. The changing mission of Chem Tech are encapsulated in the evolving activities.« less
Radiochemical determination of 241Am and Pu(alpha) in environmental materials.
Warwick, P E; Croudace, I W; Oh, J S
2001-07-15
Americium-241 and plutonium determinations will become of greater importance over the coming decades as 137Cs and 241Pu decay. The impact of 137Cs on environmental chronology has been great, but its potency is waning as it decays and diffuses. Having 241Am and Pu as unequivocal markers for the 1963 weapon fallout maximum is important for short time scale environmental work, but a fast and reliable procedure is required for their separation. The developed method described here begins by digesting samples using a lithium borate fusion although an aqua regia leachate is also effective in many instances. Isolation of the Am and Pu is then achieved using a combination of extraction chromatography and conventional anion exchange chromatography. The whole procedure has been optimized, validated, and assessed for safety. The straightforwardness of this technique permits the analysis of large numbers of samples and makes 241Am-based techniques for high-resolution sediment accumulation rate studies attractive. In addition, the technique can be employed for the sequential measurement of Pu and Am in environmental surveillance programs, potentially reducing analytical costs and turnround times.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Sleaford, B W; Collins, B A; Ebbinghaus, B B
2010-04-26
This paper examines the attractiveness of material mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with reprocessing and the thorium-based LWR fuel cycle. This paper expands upon the results from earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of SNM associated with the reprocessing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel by various reprocessing schemes and the recycle of plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in LWR. This study shows that {sup 233}U that is produced in thorium-based fuel cycles is very attractive for weapons use. Consistent with other studies, these results also show that all fuel cycles examined to date needmore » to be rigorously safeguarded and provided moderate to high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and key findings will be presented.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Sleaford, Brad W.; Ebbinghaus, B. B.; Bradley, Keith S.
2010-06-11
This paper examines the attractiveness of material mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with reprocessing and the thorium-based LWR fuel cycle. This paper expands upon the results from earlier studies [ , ] that examined the attractiveness of SNM associated with the reprocessing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel by various reprocessing schemes and the recycle of plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in LWR. This study shows that 233U that is produced in thorium-based fuel cycles is very attractive for weapons use. Consistent with other studies, these results also show that all fuel cycles examined tomore » date need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided moderate to high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of "attractiveness levels" that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities [ ]. The methodology and key findings will be presented.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hull, G; Zaitseva, N; Cherepy, N
Efficient, readily-available, low-cost, high-energy neutron detectors can play a central role in detecting illicit nuclear weapons since neutrons are a strong indication for the presence of fissile material such as Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium. The main challenge in detecting fast neutrons consists in the discrimination of the signal from the gamma radiation background. At present, the only well-investigated organic crystal scintillator for fast neutron detection, in a n/{gamma} mixed field, is stilbene, which while offering good pulse shape discrimination, is not widely used because of its limited availability and high cost. In this work we report the results of ourmore » studies made with a number of new organic crystals, which exhibit pulse shape discrimination for detection of fast neutrons. In particular 1,1,4,4-tetraphenyl-1,3-butadiene features a light yield higher than anthracene and a Figure of Merit (FOM) for the pulse shape discrimination better than stilbene. New crystals are good candidates for the low-cost solution growth method, thus representing promising organic scintillators for widespread deployment for high-energy neutron detection.« less
2011-11-17
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- In the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex-41 on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, a turning fixture lowers the multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) for NASA's Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission toward the radioisotope power system integration cart (RIC). Once the MMRTG is secured on the cart, it will be installed on the Curiosity rover. The MMRTG will generate the power needed for the mission from the natural decay of plutonium-238, a non-weapons-grade form of the radioisotope. Heat given off by this natural decay will provide constant power through the day and night during all seasons. Curiosity, MSL's car-sized rover, has 10 science instruments designed to search for signs of life, including methane, and help determine if the gas is from a biological or geological source. Waste heat from the MMRTG will be circulated throughout the rover system to keep instruments, computers, mechanical devices and communications systems within their operating temperature ranges. Launch of MSL aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is scheduled for Nov. 25. For more information, visit http://www.nasa.gov/msl. Photo credit: Department of Energy/Idaho National Laboratory
Studies in support of an SNM cutoff agreement: The PUREX exercise
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Stanbro, W.D.; Libby, R.; Segal, J.
1995-07-01
On September 23, 1993, President Clinton, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, called for an international agreement banning the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. A major element of any verification regime for such an agreement would probably involve inspections of reprocessing plants in Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty weapons states. Many of these are large facilities built in the 1950s with no thought that they would be subject to international inspection. To learn about some of the problems that might be involved in the inspection of such large, old facilities, the Department ofmore » Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, sponsored a mock inspection exercise at the PUREX plant on the Hanford Site. This exercise examined a series of alternatives for inspections of the PUREX as a model for this type of facility at other locations. A series of conclusions were developed that can be used to guide the development of verification regimes for a cutoff agreement at reprocessing facilities.« less
Announced United States nuclear tests, July 1945 through December 1987
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Not Available
1988-04-01
This document lists chronologically and alphabetically by event name all nuclear tests conducted and announced by the United States from July 1945 through December 1987, with the exception of the GMX experiments. The 24 GMX experiments, conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) between December 1954 and February 1956, were /open quotes/equation-of-state/close quotes/ physics studies that used small chemical explosives and small quantities of plutonium. Several tests conducted during Operation Dominic involved missile launches from Johnston Atoll. Several of these missle launches were aborted, resulting in the destruction of the missile and nuclear device either on the pad or inmore » the air. Data on United States tests were obtained from and verified by the Department of Energy's three weapons laboratories--Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California; and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Additionally, data were obtained from public announcements issued by the Atomic Energy Commission and its successors, the Energy Research and Development Administation and the Department of Energy, respectively.« less
PRECIPITATION OF PLUTONOUS PEROXIDE
Barrick, J.G.; Manion, J.P.
1961-08-15
A precipitation process for recovering plutonium values contained in an aqueous solution is described. In the process for precipitating plutonium as plutonous peroxide, hydroxylamine or hydrazine is added to the plutoniumcontaining solution prior to the addition of peroxide to precipitate plutonium. The addition of hydroxylamine or hydrazine increases the amount of plutonium precipitated as plutonous peroxide. (AEC)
PROCESS USING POTASSIUM LANTHANUM SULFATE FOR FORMING A CARRIER PRECIPITATE FOR PLUTONIUM VALUES
Angerman, A.A.
1958-10-21
A process is presented for recovering plutonium values in an oxidation state not greater than +4 from fluoride-soluble fission products. The process consists of adding to an aqueous acidic solution of such plutonium values a crystalline potassium lanthanum sulfate precipitate which carries the plutonium values from the solution.
Schonfeld, F.W.
1959-09-15
New plutonium-base binary alloys useful as liquid reactor fuel are described. The alloys consist of 50 to 98 at.% thorium with the remainder plutonium. The stated advantages of these alloys over unalloyed plutonium for reactor fuel use are easy fabrication, phase stability, and the accompanying advantuge of providing a means for converting Th/sup 232/ into U/sup 233/.
The Fireball integrated code package
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dobranich, D.; Powers, D.A.; Harper, F.T.
1997-07-01
Many deep-space satellites contain a plutonium heat source. An explosion, during launch, of a rocket carrying such a satellite offers the potential for the release of some of the plutonium. The fireball following such an explosion exposes any released plutonium to a high-temperature chemically-reactive environment. Vaporization, condensation, and agglomeration processes can alter the distribution of plutonium-bearing particles. The Fireball code package simulates the integrated response of the physical and chemical processes occurring in a fireball and the effect these processes have on the plutonium-bearing particle distribution. This integrated treatment of multiple phenomena represents a significant improvement in the state ofmore » the art for fireball simulations. Preliminary simulations of launch-second scenarios indicate: (1) most plutonium vaporization occurs within the first second of the fireball; (2) large non-aerosol-sized particles contribute very little to plutonium vapor production; (3) vaporization and both homogeneous and heterogeneous condensation occur simultaneously; (4) homogeneous condensation transports plutonium down to the smallest-particle sizes; (5) heterogeneous condensation precludes homogeneous condensation if sufficient condensation sites are available; and (6) agglomeration produces larger-sized particles but slows rapidly as the fireball grows.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Dai, Z.; Wolfsberg, A. V.; Zhu, L.; Reimus, P. W.
2017-12-01
Colloids have the potential to enhance mobility of strongly sorbing radionuclide contaminants in fractured rocks at underground nuclear test sites. This study presents an experimental and numerical investigation of colloid-facilitated plutonium reactive transport in fractured porous media for identifying plutonium sorption/filtration processes. The transport parameters for dispersion, diffusion, sorption, and filtration are estimated with inverse modeling for minimizing the least squares objective function of multicomponent concentration data from multiple transport experiments with the Shuffled Complex Evolution Metropolis (SCEM). Capitalizing on an unplanned experimental artifact that led to colloid formation and migration, we adopt a stepwise strategy to first interpret the data from each experiment separately and then to incorporate multiple experiments simultaneously to identify a suite of plutonium-colloid transport processes. Nonequilibrium or kinetic attachment and detachment of plutonium-colloid in fractures was clearly demonstrated and captured in the inverted modeling parameters along with estimates of the source plutonium fraction that formed plutonium-colloids. The results from this study provide valuable insights for understanding the transport mechanisms and environmental impacts of plutonium in fractured formations and groundwater aquifers.
Esaka, Fumitaka; Magara, Masaaki; Suzuki, Daisuke; Miyamoto, Yutaka; Lee, Chi-Gyu; Kimura, Takaumi
2010-12-15
Information on plutonium isotope ratios in individual particles is of great importance for nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics and so on. Although secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) is successfully utilized for the analysis of individual uranium particles, the isobaric interference of americium-241 to plutonium-241 makes difficult to obtain accurate isotope ratios in individual plutonium particles. In the present work, an analytical technique by a combination of chemical separation and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) is developed and applied to isotope ratio analysis of individual sub-micrometer plutonium particles. The ICP-MS results for individual plutonium particles prepared from a standard reference material (NBL SRM-947) indicate that the use of a desolvation system for sample introduction improves the precision of isotope ratios. In addition, the accuracy of the (241)Pu/(239)Pu isotope ratio is much improved, owing to the chemical separation of plutonium and americium. In conclusion, the performance of the proposed ICP-MS technique is sufficient for the analysis of individual plutonium particles. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement
Ackerman, John P.
1992-01-01
A process for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.
O'Donnell, R G; Mitchell, P I; Priest, N D; Strange, L; Fox, A; Henshaw, D L; Long, S C
1997-08-18
Concentrations of plutonium-239, plutonium-240, strontium-90 and total alpha-emitters have been measured in children's teeth collected throughout Great Britain and Ireland. The concentrations of plutonium and strontium-90 were measured in batched samples, each containing approximately 50 teeth, using low-background radiochemical methods. The concentrations of total alpha-emitters were determined in single teeth using alpha-sensitive plastic track detectors. The results showed that the average concentrations of total alpha-emitters and strontium-90 were approximately one to three orders of magnitude greater than the equivalent concentrations of plutonium-239,240. Regression analyses indicated that the concentrations of plutonium, but not strontium-90 or total alpha-emitters, decreased with increasing distance from the Sellafield nuclear fuel reprocessing plant-suggesting that this plant is a source of plutonium contamination in the wider population of the British Isles. Nevertheless, the measured absolute concentrations of plutonium (mean = 5 +/- 4 mBq kg-1 ash wt.) were so low that they are considered to present an insignificant radiological hazard.
Froidevaux, Pascal; Haldimann, Max
2008-01-01
Background Occupational risks, the present nuclear threat, and the potential danger associated with nuclear power have raised concerns regarding the metabolism of plutonium in pregnant women. Objective We measured plutonium levels in the milk teeth of children born between 1951 and 1995 to assess the potential risk that plutonium incorporated by pregnant women might pose to the radiosensitive tissues of the fetus through placenta transfer. Methods We used milk teeth, whose enamel is formed during pregnancy, to investigate the transfer of plutonium from the mother’s blood plasma to the fetus. We measured plutonium using sensitive sector field inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry techniques. We compared our results with those of a previous study on strontium-90 (90Sr) released into the atmosphere after nuclear bomb tests. Results Results show that plutonium activity peaks in the milk teeth of children born about 10 years before the highest recorded levels of plutonium fallout. By contrast, 90Sr, which is known to cross the placenta barrier, manifests differently in milk teeth, in accordance with 90Sr fallout deposition as a function of time. Conclusions These findings demonstrate that plutonium found in milk teeth is caused by fallout that was inhaled around the time the milk teeth were shed and not from any accumulation during pregnancy through placenta transfer. Thus, plutonium may not represent a radiologic risk for the radiosensitive tissues of the fetus. PMID:19079728
REMOVAL OF LEGACY PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FROM SWEDEN
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dunn, Kerry A.; Bellamy, J. Steve; Chandler, Greg T.
2013-08-18
U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) recently removed legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in collaboration with AB SVAFO, Sweden. This paper details the activities undertaken through the U.S. receiving site (Savannah River Site (SRS)) to support the characterization, stabilization, packaging and removal of legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in 2012. This effort was undertaken as part of GTRI’s Gap Materials Program and culminated with the successful removal of plutonium from Sweden as announced at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. The removal and shipment of plutonium materials to the United States wasmore » the first of its kind under NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The Environmental Assessment for the U.S. receipt of gap plutonium material was approved in May 2010. Since then, the multi-year process yielded many first time accomplishments associated with plutonium packaging and transport activities including the application of the of DOE-STD-3013 stabilization requirements to treat plutonium materials outside the U.S., the development of an acceptance criteria for receipt of plutonium from a foreign country, the development and application of a versatile process flow sheet for the packaging of legacy plutonium materials, the identification of a plutonium container configuration, the first international certificate validation of the 9975 shipping package and the first intercontinental shipment using the 9975 shipping package. This paper will detail the technical considerations in developing the packaging process flow sheet, defining the key elements of the flow sheet and its implementation, determining the criteria used in the selection of the transport package, developing the technical basis for the package certificate amendment and the reviews with multiple licensing authorities and most importantly integrating the technical activities with the Swedish partners.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Reilly, Sean Douglas; Smith, Paul Herrick; Jarvinen, Gordon D.
Understanding the water solubility of plutonium and uranium compounds and residues at TA-55 is necessary to provide a technical basis for appropriate criticality safety, safety basis and accountability controls. Individual compound solubility was determined using published solubility data and solution thermodynamic modeling. Residue solubility was estimated using a combination of published technical reports and process knowledge of constituent compounds. The scope of materials considered includes all compounds and residues at TA-55 as of March 2016 that contain Pu-239 or U-235 where any single item in the facility has more than 500 g of nuclear material. This analysis indicates that themore » following materials are not appreciably soluble in water: plutonium dioxide (IDC=C21), plutonium phosphate (IDC=C66), plutonium tetrafluoride (IDC=C80), plutonium filter residue (IDC=R26), plutonium hydroxide precipitate (IDC=R41), plutonium DOR salt (IDC=R42), plutonium incinerator ash (IDC=R47), uranium carbide (IDC=C13), uranium dioxide (IDC=C21), U 3O 8 (IDC=C88), and uranium filter residue (IDC=R26). This analysis also indicates that the following materials are soluble in water: plutonium chloride (IDC=C19) and uranium nitrate (IDC=C52). Equilibrium calculations suggest that PuOCl is water soluble under certain conditions, but some plutonium processing reports indicate that it is insoluble when present in electrorefining residues (R65). Plutonium molten salt extraction residues (IDC=R83) contain significant quantities of PuCl 3, and are expected to be soluble in water. The solubility of the following plutonium residues is indeterminate due to conflicting reports, insufficient process knowledge or process-dependent composition: calcium salt (IDC=R09), electrorefining salt (IDC=R65), salt (IDC=R71), silica (IDC=R73) and sweepings/screenings (IDC=R78). Solution thermodynamic modeling also indicates that fire suppression water buffered with a commercially-available phosphate buffer would significantly reduce the solubility of PuCl 3 by the precipitation of PuPO 4.« less
METHOD OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM
Heal, H.G.
1960-02-16
BS>A method of separating plutonium from aqueous nitrate solutions of plutonium, uranium. and high beta activity fission products is given. The pH of the aqueous solution is adjusted between 3.0 to 6.0 with ammonium acetate, ferric nitrate is added, and the solution is heated to 80 to 100 deg C to selectively form a basic ferric plutonium-carrying precipitate.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Grison, E.
1961-01-01
A discussion is given on physical properties of plutonium, allotropic variations; kinetics of transformation; electrica; and magnetic properties; and electronic structure of the external layers of the atom. Plutonium can be used only as nuclear fuel; it is very expensive and toxic. (auth)
Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium, and Nonproliferation
controversy involving the stability of certain structures (or phases) in plutonium alloys near equilibrium Cold War is Over. What Now?, DOE Technical Report, April, 1995 6th US-Russian Pu Science Workshop * Aging of Plutonium and Its Alloys * A Tale of Two Diagrams * Plutonium and Its Alloys-From Atoms to
SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM FISSION PRODUCTS BY A COLLOID REMOVAL PROCESS
Schubert, J.
1960-05-24
A method is given for separating plutonium from uranium fission products. An acidic aqueous solution containing plutonium and uranium fission products is subjected to a process for separating ionic values from colloidal matter suspended therein while the pH of the solution is maintained between 0 and 4. Certain of the fission products, and in particular, zirconium, niobium, lanthanum, and barium are in a colloidal state within this pH range, while plutonium remains in an ionic form, Dialysis, ultracontrifugation, and ultrafiltration are suitable methods of separating plutonium ions from the colloids.
PLUTONIUM RECOVERY FROM NEUTRON-BOMBARDED URANIUM FUEL
Moore, R.H.
1962-04-10
A process of recovering plutonium from neutronbombarded uranium fuel by dissolving the fuel in equimolar aluminum chloride-potassium chloride; heating the mass to above 700 deg C for decomposition of plutonium tetrachloride to the trichloride; extracting the plutonium trichloride into a molten salt containing from 40 to 60 mole % of lithium chloride, from 15 to 40 mole % of sodium chloride, and from 0 to 40 mole % of potassium chloride or calcium chloride; and separating the layer of equimolar chlorides containing the uranium from the layer formed of the plutonium-containing salt is described. (AEC)
SEPARATION OF RUTHENIUM FROM AQUEOUS SOLUTIONS
Callis, C.F.; Moore, R.L.
1959-09-01
>The separation of ruthenium from aqueous solutions containing uranium plutonium, ruthenium, and fission products is described. The separation is accomplished by providing a nitric acid solution of plutonium, uranium, ruthenium, and fission products, oxidizing plutonium to the hexavalent state with sodium dichromate, contacting the solution with a water-immiscible organic solvent, such as hexone, to extract plutonyl, uranyl, ruthenium, and fission products, reducing with sodium ferrite the plutonyl in the solvent phase to trivalent plutonium, reextracting from the solvent phase the trivalent plutonium, ruthenium, and some fission products with an aqueous solution containing a salting out agent, introducing ozone into the aqueous acid solution to oxidize plutonium to the hexavalent state and ruthenium to ruthenium tetraoxide, and volatizing off the ruthenium tetraoxide.
Pyrochemical recovery of plutonium from calcium fluoride reduction slag
Christensen, D.C.
A pyrochemical method of recovering finely dispersed plutonium metal from calcium fluoride reduction slag is claimed. The plutonium-bearing slag is crushed and melted in the presence of at least an equimolar amount of calcium chloride and a few percent metallic calcium. The calcium chloride reduces the melting point and thereby decreases the viscosity of the molten mixture. The calcium reduces any oxidized plutonium in the mixture and also causes the dispersed plutonium metal to coalesce and settle out as a separate metallic phase at the bottom of the reaction vessel. Upon cooling the mixture to room temperature, the solid plutonium can be cleanly separated from the overlying solid slag, with an average recovery yield on the order of 96 percent.
Seaborg, G.T.; Thompson, S.G.
1960-08-23
A process is given for isolating plutonium present in the tetravalent state in an aqueous solution together with fission products. First, the plutonium and fission products are coprecipitated on a bismuth phosphate carrier. The precipitate obtained is dissolved, and the plutonium in the solution is oxidized to the hexavalent state (with ceric nitrate, potassium dichromate, Pb/ sub 3/O/sub 4/, sodium bismuthate and/or potassium dichromate). Thereafter a carrier for fission products is added (bismuth phosphate, lanthanum fluoride, ceric phosphate, bismuth oxalate, thorium iodate, or thorium oxalate), and the fission-product precipitation can be repeated with one other of these carriers. After removal of the fission-product-containing precipitate or precipitates. the plutonium in the supernatant is reduced to the tetravalent state (with sulfur dioxide, hydrogen peroxide. or sodium nitrate), and a carrier for tetravalent plutonium is added (lanthanum fluoride, lanthanum hydroxide, lanthanum phosphate, ceric phosphate, thorium iodate, thorium oxalate, bismuth oxalate, or niobium pentoxide). The plutonium-containing precipitate is then dissolved in a relatively small volume of liquid so as to obtain a concentrated solution. Prior to dissolution, the bismuth phosphate precipitates first formed can be metathesized with a mixture of sodium hydroxide and potassium carbonate and plutonium-containing lanthanum fluorides with alkali-metal hydroxide. In the solutions formed from a plutonium-containing lanthanum fluoride carrier the plutonium can be selectively precipitated with a peroxide after the pH was adjusted preferably to a value of between 1 and 2. Various combinations of second, third, and fourth carriers are discussed.
QUANTITATIVE PLUTONIUM MICRODISTRIBUTION IN BONE TISSUE OF VERTEBRA FROM A MAYAK WORKER
Lyovkina, Yekaterina V.; Miller, Scott C.; Romanov, Sergey A.; Krahenbuhl, Melinda P.; Belosokhov, Maxim V.
2010-01-01
The purpose was to obtain quantitative data on plutonium microdistribution in different structural elements of human bone tissue for local dose assessment and dosimetric models validation. A sample of the thoracic vertebra was obtained from a former Mayak worker with a rather high plutonium burden. Additional information was obtained on occupational and exposure history, medical history, and measured plutonium content in organs. Plutonium was detected in bone sections from its fission tracks in polycarbonate film using neutron-induced autoradiography. Quantitative analysis of randomly selected microscopic fields on one of the autoradiographs was performed. Data included fission fragment tracks in different bone tissue and surface areas. Quantitative information on plutonium microdistribution in human bone tissue was obtained for the first time. From these data, quantitative relationship of plutonium decays in bone volume to decays on bone surface in cortical and trabecular fractions were defined as 2.0 and 0.4, correspondingly. The measured quantitative relationship of decays in bone volume to decays on bone surface does not coincide with recommended models for the cortical bone fraction by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Biokinetic model parameters of extrapulmonary compartments might need to be adjusted after expansion of the data set on quantitative plutonium microdistribution in other bone types in human as well as other cases with different exposure patterns and types of plutonium. PMID:20838087
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Permana, Sidik; Saputra, Geby; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Saito, Masaki
2017-01-01
Reactor criticality condition and fuel conversion capability are depending on the fuel arrangement schemes, reactor core geometry and fuel burnup process as well as the effect of different fuel cycle and fuel composition. Criticality condition of reactor core and breeding ratio capability have been investigated in this present study based on fast breeder reactor (FBR) type for different loaded fuel compositions of plutonium in the fuel core regions. Loaded fuel of Plutonium compositions are based on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of light water reactor (LWR) for different fuel burnup process and cooling time conditions of the reactors. Obtained results show that different initial fuels of plutonium gives a significant chance in criticality conditions and fuel conversion capability. Loaded plutonium based on higher burnup process gives a reduction value of criticality condition or less excess reactivity. It also obtains more fuel breeding ratio capability or more breeding gain. Some loaded plutonium based on longer cooling time of LWR gives less excess reactivity and in the same time, it gives higher breeding ratio capability of the reactors. More composition of even mass plutonium isotopes gives more absorption neutron which affects to decresing criticality or less excess reactivity in the core. Similar condition that more absorption neutron by fertile material or even mass plutonium will produce more fissile material or odd mass plutonium isotopes to increase the breeding gain of the reactor.
None
2018-01-16
Another key aspect of the NNSS mission is Environmental Management program, which addresses the environmental legacy from historic nuclear weapons related activities while also ensuring the health and safety of present day workers, the public, and the environment as current and future missions are completed. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management site receives low-level and mixed low-level waste from some 28 different generators from across the DOE complex in support of the legacy clean-up DOE Environmental Management project. Without this capability, the DOE would not be able to complete the clean up and proper disposition of these wastes. The program includes environmental protection, compliance, and monitoring of the air, water, plants, animals, and cultural resources at the NNSS. Investigation and implementation of appropriate corrective actions to address the contaminated ground water facilities and soils resulting from historic nuclear testing activities, the demolition of abandoned nuclear facilities, as well as installation of ground water wells to identify and monitor the extent of ground water contamination.
Schonfeld, F.W.; Waber, J.T.
1960-08-30
A series of nuclear reactor fuel alloys consisting of from about 5 to about 50 at.% zirconium (or higher zirconium alloys such as Zircaloy), balance plutonium, and having the structural composition of a plutonium are described. Zirconium is a satisfactory diluent because it alloys readily with plutonium and has desirable nuclear properties. Additional advantages are corrosion resistance, excellent fabrication propenties, an isotropie structure, and initial softness.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ann M. Beauchesne
2000-01-01
Through the National Governors Association (NGA) project ``Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials; Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities; Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites inmore » the complex; Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the Department's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure plan and contractor integration analysis; Interstate waste and materials shipments; and Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the period from October 1, 1999 through January 31, 2000, under the NGA grant. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past three months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; convened and facilitated the October 6--8 NGA FFCA Task Force Meeting in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, external regulation of DOE; and continued to facilitate interactions between the states and DOE to develop a foundation for an ongoing substantive relationship between the Governors of key states and the Department.« less
Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement
Ackerman, J.P.
1992-03-17
A process is described for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Murarik, T.M.; Wenstrand, T.K.; Rogers, L.A.
An initial soil characterization study was conducted to help identify possible remediation methods to remove plutonium from the Nevada Test Site and Tonapah Test Range surface soils. Results from soil samples collected across various isopleths at five sites indicate that the size-fraction distribution patterns of plutonium remain similar to findings from the Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) (1970's). The plutonium remains in the upper 10--15 cm of soils, as indicated in previous studies. Distribution of fine particles downwind'' of ground zero at each site is suggested. Whether this pattern was established immediately after each explosion or this resulted from post-shotmore » wind movement of deposited material is unclear. Several possible soil treatment scenarios are presented. Removal of plutonium from certain size fractions of the soils would alleviate the sites of much of the plutonium burden. However, the nature of association of plutonium with soil components will determine which remediation methods will most likely succeed.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Murarik, T.M.; Wenstrand, T.K.; Rogers, L.A.
An initial soil characterization study was conducted to help identify possible remediation methods to remove plutonium from the Nevada Test Site and Tonapah Test Range surface soils. Results from soil samples collected across various isopleths at five sites indicate that the size-fraction distribution patterns of plutonium remain similar to findings from the Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) (1970`s). The plutonium remains in the upper 10--15 cm of soils, as indicated in previous studies. Distribution of fine particles ``downwind`` of ground zero at each site is suggested. Whether this pattern was established immediately after each explosion or this resulted from post-shotmore » wind movement of deposited material is unclear. Several possible soil treatment scenarios are presented. Removal of plutonium from certain size fractions of the soils would alleviate the sites of much of the plutonium burden. However, the nature of association of plutonium with soil components will determine which remediation methods will most likely succeed.« less
Developing a physiologically based approach for modeling plutonium decorporation therapy with DTPA.
Kastl, Manuel; Giussani, Augusto; Blanchardon, Eric; Breustedt, Bastian; Fritsch, Paul; Hoeschen, Christoph; Lopez, Maria Antonia
2014-11-01
To develop a physiologically based compartmental approach for modeling plutonium decorporation therapy with the chelating agent Diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (Ca-DTPA/Zn-DTPA). Model calculations were performed using the software package SAAM II (©The Epsilon Group, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA). The Luciani/Polig compartmental model with age-dependent description of the bone recycling processes was used for the biokinetics of plutonium. The Luciani/Polig model was slightly modified in order to account for the speciation of plutonium in blood and for the different affinities for DTPA of the present chemical species. The introduction of two separate blood compartments, describing low-molecular-weight complexes of plutonium (Pu-LW) and transferrin-bound plutonium (Pu-Tf), respectively, and one additional compartment describing plutonium in the interstitial fluids was performed successfully. The next step of the work is the modeling of the chelation process, coupling the physiologically modified structure with the biokinetic model for DTPA. RESULTS of animal studies performed under controlled conditions will enable to better understand the principles of the involved mechanisms.
Bronze age cosmology and rock art images. Solar ships, deer and charts
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Dimitriadis, G.
Bronze Age societies were technologically complex. The impressive production of metal artefacts embodies clearly their astronomical culture and cosmological viewpoint. Same ascertainment is valid also for rock art. In fact, around the European landscape were discovered several cliffs engraved with solar ships, deer and charts. How one could be interpret them? Which is the hidden mentality? From the end of 3rd millennium-early 2nd millennium B. C. deep technological transformations are made by metals. New inventions such metal extraction for weapon production, horse pulling chariot used for war and the bull pulling one used for trade may shorten the culture and material distances between Central Europe and South Mediterranean area. Indeed, taphonomic studies indicate a specific modification of the human body mortuary traditional disposition (orientated to significant astronomical targets) below a substantial transformation of mortuary apparatus with spot evidence of weapons (halberds, swords, knifes) and ornaments (double spiral, lunar shape pectorals). The famous Trundhold Solar chart, the 2nd millennium terracotta chart form Dupljaja, the solar boats petroglyph in Bohusland and the horse rider carved on Philippi's cliffs were conceived by the same mentality: communion with the divinity. Culture expressions as communicate manifestation attested in rock art were produced by the same mentality presented in Bronze Age art-crafts such as, 1. Culture epidemiologic patterns dispersion took place through out iconographic motives, and, 2. Animals can play a double face function inside an analogical-mythological system: a. animal-reflex; b. animal-agent. The question is: Could such petroglyphs help us to "read" archaeoastronomical properly in an archaeological site?
BASIC PEROXIDE PRECIPITATION METHOD OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM CONTAMINANTS
Seaborg, G.T.; Perlman, I.
1959-02-10
A process is described for the separation from each other of uranyl values, tetravalent plutonium values and fission products contained in an aqueous acidic solution. First the pH of the solution is adjusted to between 2.5 and 8 and hydrogen peroxide is then added to the solution causing precipitation of uranium peroxide which carries any plutonium values present, while the fission products remain in solution. Separation of the uranium and plutonium values is then effected by dissolving the peroxide precipitate in an acidic solution and incorporating a second carrier precipitate, selective for plutonium. The plutonium values are thus carried from the solution while the uranium remains flissolved. The second carrier precipitate may be selected from among the group consisting of rare earth fluorides, and oxalates, zirconium phosphate, and bismuth lihosphate.
Kolodney, M.
1959-07-01
Methods are presented for the electro-deposition of plutonium from fused mixtures of plutonium halides and halides of the alkali metals and alkaline earth metals. Th salts, preferably chlorides and with the plutonium prefer ably in the trivalent state, are placed in a refractory crucible such as tantalum or molybdenam and heated in a non-oxidizing atmosphere to 600 to 850 deg C, the higher temperatatures being used to obtain massive plutonium and the lower for the powder form. Electrodes of graphite or non reactive refractory metals are used, the crucible serving the cathode in one apparatus described in the patent.
30. VIEW OF A GLOVEBOX LINE USED IN PLUTONIUM OPERATIONS. ...
30. VIEW OF A GLOVEBOX LINE USED IN PLUTONIUM OPERATIONS. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONCERNS WERE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE AT THE PLANT, BECAUSE OF THE RADIOACTIVE NATURE OF THE MATERIALS USED. PLUTONIUM GIVES OFF ALPHA AND BETA PARTICLES, GAMMA PROTONS, NEUTRONS, AND IS ALSO PYROPHORIC. AS A RESULT, PLUTONIUM OPERATIONS ARE PERFORMED UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS THAT INCLUDE CONTAINMENT, FILTERING, SHIELDING, AND CREATING AN INERT ATMOSPHERE. PLUTONIUM WAS HANDLED WITHIN GLOVEBOXES THAT WERE INTERCONNECTED AND RAN SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET IN LENGTH (5/5/70). - Rocky Flats Plant, Bounded by Indiana Street & Routes 93, 128 & 72, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
Rapid Method for Sodium Hydroxide/Sodium Peroxide Fusion ...
Technical Fact Sheet Analysis Purpose: Qualitative analysis Technique: Alpha spectrometry Method Developed for: Plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 in water and air filters Method Selected for: SAM lists this method as a pre-treatment technique supporting analysis of refractory radioisotopic forms of plutonium in drinking water and air filters using the following qualitative techniques: • Rapid methods for acid or fusion digestion • Rapid Radiochemical Method for Plutonium-238 and Plutonium 239/240 in Building Materials for Environmental Remediation Following Radiological Incidents. Summary of subject analytical method which will be posted to the SAM website to allow access to the method.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1996-05-01
The purpose of the workshop was to foster communication within the technical community on issues surrounding stabilization and immobilization of the Department`s surplus plutonium and plutonium- contaminated wastes. The workshop`s objectives were to: build a common understanding of the performance, economics and maturity of stabilization and immobilization technologies; provide a system perspective on stabilization and immobilization technology options; and address the technical issues associated with technologies for stabilization and immobilization of surplus plutonium and plutonium- contaminated waste. The papers presented during this workshop have been indexed separately.
Russell, E.R.; Adamson, A.W.; Schubert, J.; Boyd, G.E.
1957-10-29
A process for separating plutonium values from aqueous solutions which contain the plutonium in minute concentrations is described. These values can be removed from an aqueous solution by taking an aqueous solution containing a salt of zirconium, titanium, hafnium or thorium, adding an aqueous solution of silicate and phosphoric acid anions to the metal salt solution, and separating, washing and drying the precipitate which forms when the two solutions are mixed. The aqueous plutonium containing solution is then acidified and passed over the above described precipi-tate causing the plutonium values to be adsorbed by the precipitate.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Richmond, C.R.
1980-01-01
The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated. (ACR)
PREPARATION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE
Burger, L.L.; Roake, W.E.
1961-07-11
A process of producing plutonium trifluoride by reacting dry plutonium(IV) oxalate with chlorofluorinated methane or ethane at 400 to 450 deg C and cooling the product in the absence of oxygen is described.
MCNP Parametric Studies of Plutonium Metal and Various Interstitial Moderating Materials
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Glazener, Natasha; Kamm, Ryan James
2017-03-31
Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) has performed calculations evaluating the effect of different interstitial materials on 5.0-kg of plutonium metal. As with all non-fissionable interstitials, the results here illustrate that it requires significant quantities of oil to be intimately mixed with plutonium, reflected by a thick layer of full-density water, to achieve the same reactivity as that of solid plutonium metal.
SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM IONS FROM SOLUTION BY ADSORPTION ON ZIRCONIUM PYROPHOSPHATE
Stoughton, R.W.
1961-01-31
A method is given for separating plutonium in its reduced, phosphate- insoluble state from other substances. It involves contacting a solution containing the plutonium with granular zirconium pyrophosphate.
Tank 241-AZ-101 criticality assessment resulting from pump jet mixing: Sludge mixing simulation
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Onishi, Y.; Recknagle, K.
Tank 241-AZ-101 (AZ-101) is one of 28 double-shell tanks located in the AZ farm in the Hanford Site`s 200 East Area. The tank contains a significant quantity of fissile materials, including an estimated 9.782 kg of plutonium. Before beginning jet pump mixing for mitigative purposes, the operations must be evaluated to demonstrate that they will be subcritical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. The main objective of this study was to address a concern about whether two 300-hp pumps with four rotating 18.3-m/s (60-ft/s) jets can concentrate plutonium in their pump housings during mixer pump operation and cause amore » criticality. The three-dimensional simulation was performed with the time-varying TEMPEST code to determine how much the pump jet mixing of Tank AZ-101 will concentrate plutonium in the pump housing. The AZ-101 model predicted that the total amount of plutonium within the pump housing peaks at 75 g at 10 simulation seconds and decreases to less than 10 g at four minutes. The plutonium concentration in the entire pump housing peaks at 0.60 g/L at 10 simulation seconds and is reduced to below 0.1 g/L after four minutes. Since the minimum critical concentration of plutonium is 2.6 g/L, and the minimum critical plutonium mass under idealized plutonium-water conditions is 520 g, these predicted maximums in the pump housing are much lower than the minimum plutonium conditions needed to reach a criticality level. The initial plutonium maximum of 1.88 g/L still results in safety factor of 4.3 in the pump housing during the pump jet mixing operation.« less
Plutonium and americium separation from salts
Hagan, Paul G.; Miner, Frend J.
1976-01-01
Salts or materials containing plutonium and americium are dissolved in hydrochloric acid, heated, and contacted with an alkali metal carbonate solution to precipitate plutonium and americium carbonates which are thereafter readily separable from the solution.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Chung, D.; Ascanio, X.
1996-05-01
The Department of Energy has issued a technical standard for long-term (>50 years) storage and will soon issue a criteria document for interim (<20 years) storage of plutonium materials. The long-term technical standard, {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides,{close_quotes} addresses the requirements for storing metals and oxides with greater than 50 wt % plutonium. It calls for a standardized package that meets both off-site transportation requirements, as well as remote handling requirements from future storage facilities. The interim criteria document, {open_quotes}Criteria for Interim Safe Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Solid Materials{close_quotes}, addresses requirements for storing materials with less thanmore » 50 wt% plutonium. The interim criteria document assumes the materials will be stored on existing sites, and existing facilities and equipment will be used for repackaging to improve the margin of safety.« less